

AWM52

Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/5/14 DIVISIONS

7 Australian Division General
Staff Branch (7 Aust Div GS
Branch)

September 1945, Report on
operations, Oboe Two



1/5/14-084A

SECRET

Subject : REPORT ON OPERATION OBOE TWO.

HQ 7 Aust Div
29 Sep 45

617/1/727

Adv LHQ

Fourteen copies (2 for 9 Aust Div) of 7 Aust Div Report on the operation OBOE TWO are submitted herewith; the report is divided into four parts :-

| | | |
|----------|---|------------------------------------|
| PART I | - | Planning |
| PART II | - | Operations |
| PART III | - | Lessons, Observations and comments |
| PART IV | - | Suitability of Equipment. |

E. J. J. J.
Maj-Gen
Comd 7 Aust Div

DISTRIBUTION.

Copies No:

| | |
|-------------------------|---------|
| 18 Aust Inf Bde | 15 |
| 21 Aust Inf Bde | 16 |
| 25 Aust Inf Bde | 17 |
| 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt | 18 |
| 1 Aust Armd Regt | 19 |
| RAA 7 Aust Div | 20 |
| RAE 7 Aust Div | 21 |
| Sigs 7 Aust Div | 22 |
| 2/1 Aust MG Bn | 23 |
| 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn | 24 |
| 2 Aust Beach Gp | 25 |
| Naval Liaison Officer | 26 |
| Comd | 27 |
| G | 28 |
| AQ | 29 |
| AASC 7 Aust Div | 30 |
| Med | 31 |
| Ord | 32 |
| AEME | 33 |
| Pro | 34 |
| File | 35 |
| War Diary | 36 - 37 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Pages</u> |
|---|--------------|
| <u>PART I - PLANNING</u> | 1-12 |
| BASIS FOR PLANNING | 1- 4 |
| CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF PLAN | 5- 7 |
| SPECIAL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN | 7-12 |
| <u>PART II - OPERATIONS</u> | 12-24 |
| OPERATIONS | 12-22 |
| COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PLAN AND THE EVENT | 22-24 |
| <u>PART III - LESSONS OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS</u> | 25-46 |
| <u>PART IV - WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT</u> | 46-50 |

APPENDICES

| | <u>Appendix</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| CHANNEL OF COMMAND FOR THE OPERATION | A |
| MAPS SHOWING DISPOSITIONS AND MOVEMENT OF MAJOR UNITS | B |
| ORDER OF BATTLE | C |
| ALLOCATION OF TROOPS TO BRIGADES | D |
| 7 AUST DIV OPERATION ORDER | E |
| MAJOR UNITS OF SHIPPING ALLOTTED | F |
| NAVAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION | G |
| AERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION | H |
| 18 AUST INF BDE OPERATIONS | I |
| 21 AUST INF BDE OPERATIONS | J |
| 25 AUST INF BDE OPERATIONS | K |
| PLANNING TIME TABLES | L |
| FLAME-THROWERS | M |
| FIRST KEY PLAN | N |
| BEACH MAINTENANCE LAYOUT AT 10 JUL | O |
| UNLOADING RATES | P |

Reference Maps:-

BALIKPAPAN : 1/25,000 (Naval Bombardment Overlay)
BALIKPAPAN : 1/25,000 }
SEPINGGANG : 1/25,000 } In addition, target designator
MANGGAR : 1/25,000 } gridded.
RIKO : B-1/50,000 and D 1/50,000
BALIKPAPAN : 1/250,000 (Sketch Map)

PART I - PLANNING

BASIS FOR PLANNING

OBJECT

- 1 By Operation OBOE TWO 7 Aust Div was charged with the capture by overwater operations of the BALIKPAPAN-MANGGAR area of Eastern BORNEO and the destruction of the enemy forces therein.

1 July 1945 was fixed as FOX Day.

CHANNEL OF COMMAND

- 2 The Channel of Command is shown as Appendix "A" attached.

TOPOGRAPHY

- 3 BALIKPAPAN is situated on the Eastern shore of BALIKPAPAN Bay, a deep water anchorage suitable for large ships and previously one of the most important refining and export centres in the EAST INDIES for petroleum products.
- 4 No other harbour facilities exist in the area but operational airfields existed at SEPINGGANG and MANGGAR, five miles and fifteen miles respectively from BALIKPAPAN. These, with BALIKPAPAN Harbour, were to become the main objectives.
- 5 The area behind BALIKPAPAN consisted of many small distinct features, none higher than 300 feet and was generally developed and cultivated with patches of light timber. Further inland rain forest was thick.
- 6 The coast to MANGGAR was marked by a number of small streams and the larger MANGGAR River, a narrow coastal plain no more than several hundred yards wide and inland similar small features to those near BALIKPAPAN but covered with rain forest. Few native tracks were known to exist in this country. The West side of BALIKPAPAN Harbour at Cape PENADJAM is low and swampy.
- 7 Reef-free and suitable beaches exist at KLANDASAN, two miles from BALIKPAPAN, and at MANGGAR. Another suitable beach, though with some reef obstructions, fronted SEPINGGANG Airstrip.

ENEMY STRENGTHS

- 8 Estimated enemy strength in the BALIKPAPAN - MANGGAR area was 3900, made up of

| | |
|-------------------------|-------|
| Combat troops | 1500 |
| AA Troops | 1500 |
| L of C and other Troops | 900 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 3900 |
| | <hr/> |

This estimate would appear to have been accurate.

POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENT

- 9 A further 1500 were believed to be at SAMARINDA which is 60 miles to the North-East and 2300 at BANDJERMASIN, 325 miles South. Of these, early reinforcement from SAMARINDA to BALIKPAPAN was possible and some 4500 Japanese civilians, Indonesian labourers and Formosans in the BALIKPAPAN area might be included with the armed forces.

ENEMY DEFENCES

- 10 As BORNEO was for so long far behind the furthestmost limits of the Japanese penetration to the South, defence of the area was based mainly on heavy AA and coast guns, of which the following were located:-

6 X 127-mm twin-barrelled dual-purpose
 3 X 120-mm dual-purpose
 22 X 75-mm dual-purpose
 38 guns ranging from 20-mm to 40-mm

- 11 The following heavy guns were captured:-

1 X 6-inch coast defence
 6 X 127-mm dual-purpose twin-barrelled
 15 X 120-mm dual purpose
 4 X 120-mm coast defence
 3 X 100-mm twin-barrelled dual-purpose
 1 X 8-cm (3-inch) coast defence
 2 X 8-cm (3-inch) short coast defence
 2 X 8-cm (3-inch) dual purpose
 1 X 75-mm regimental
 2 X 75-mm dual-purpose coast defence
 4 X 75-mm dual purpose AA
 17 X 25-mm twin-barrelled AA Tk A

- 12 Aerial photographs revealed extensive earth-works sufficient for a force greater than that known to be in the area although some were sited in depth and others were probably primarily used as air raid shelters. Many tank ditches had been constructed.

Information was available which indicated that burning oil might be employed for defence of the harbour or KLINDASAN Beach.

Although by far the greatest weight of defences was at BALIKPAPAN the whole area to MANGGAR was

carefully prepared against landings or against an advance from MANGGAR. MANGGAR was a heavily defended area.

Except for the Western end of KLANDASAN Beach, where work was proceeding, a substantial log under-water obstacle was constructed offshore from the entrance to BALIKPAPAN Bay to MANGGAR with only a few small gaps.

WEATHER

- 13 As BALIKPAPAN lies less than one degree South of the Equator, little violent weather or rough seas were expected.

ASSAULT FORCE

- 14 Force originally allotted to OBOE TWO was 7 Aust Div less one brigade group.

On examination of the task it was considered that the remaining brigade group was required. Approval was given but it was only possible to include the infantry elements of this brigade group in the assault shipping, the remainder of the group being allotted to follow-up convoys.

ORDER OF BATTLE

- 15 The Order of Battle is shown in Appendix "C" attached.

PLAN

Method

- 16 It was decided to assault KLANDASAN Beach with two brigades, 18 Aust Inf Bde on the left on a two-battalion front and 21 Aust Inf Bde on the right on a one-battalion front with no gap between brigades. 25 Aust Inf Bde was to be a floating reserve on FOX Day with the probable subsequent role of attacking along the MILFORD Highway.

The allocation of troops to these brigades is shown in Appendix "D" attached.

Objectives

- 17 Objectives were given as:-
- Securing of beachhead;
 - Capture of BALIKPAPAN;
 - Capture of SEPINGGANG airstrip;
 - Capture of MANGGAR airstrip.

Phases

- 18 The Divisional Commander laid down phases whereby the first objectives would be gained; the details of these are shown in Appendix "B" attached.
- 19 Subsequent to the assault on the beaches 18 Aust Inf Bde was to capture BALIKPAPAN while 21 Aust Inf Bde was to capture SEPINGGANG and MANGGAR airstrips by a coastwise advance.

It was stressed that 18 Aust Inf Bde would plan to secure the vital ground at PARRAMATTA at the earliest moment.

- 20 The Operation Order is attached as Appendix "E."

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

Initial Maintenance

- 21 7 Aust Div was responsible for the initial maintenance of the complete Task Force except units of US Army and US Navy Forces. Initial maintenance was planned on the following basis:-

| | |
|-------------------|---------------|
| Ammunition | 20 days (WUR) |
| MT Petrol | 15 days |
| AVGAS | 15 days |
| All other natures | 30 days |

Floating Reserve

- 22 Duplicated floating reserves for 15 days each of ammunition and petroleum were held at MOROTAI and in the BALIKPAPAN area. These reserves were loaded for selective discharge.

Subsequent Maintenance

- 23 Maintenance from F plus 15 onwards of bulk petroleum products - MT Petrol, AVGAS and ADF - was to be supplied from US sources under arrangements from 1 Aust Corps. Maintenance from this date onwards of all other natures (including petroleum products in packed form) was to be direct from AUSTRALIA under arrangements by LHQ.

Local Resources

- 24 It was not anticipated that supply maintenance would be augmented to any extent by local purchase.

Rations for PW

- 25 Rations for PW were based on 200 PW for 15 days.

NICA

- 26 A Netherlands Indies Civil Administration unit was allotted to 7 Aust Div to assist the Commander in the discharge of his responsibility for civil administration and relief.

Civilian rations and medical supplies were included in NICA relief stores.

SHIPPING ALLOTTED

- 27 The major units of shipping allotted for the operation are shown in Appendix "F" attached.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF PLAN

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LANDING AT MANGGAR

Advantages

- 28 The advantages of landing at MANGGAR were:-
- (a) That less resistance would probably be met in the initial stages;
 - (b) The depth of water offshore would permit closer approach and therefore more effective support from naval gunfire;
 - (c) Beaches would less likely be under fire after the assault resulting in a more speedy build-up of maintenance requirements.

Disadvantages

- 29 The disadvantages were:-
- (a) The distance to the main objective of BALIK-PAPIN Bay;
 - (b) An advance which entailed the crossing of numerous streams along a narrow coastal plain where only a small force could be deployed;
 - (c) The threat from the flank to such an advance;
 - (d) The known defences sited to oppose an advance from MANGGAR;
 - (e) The opportunity for the enemy at BALIKPAPAN to remain organised and adjust his defences against a threat from a known direction.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LANDING AT SEPINGGANG

- 30 The advantages and disadvantages of MANGGAR apply in varying degrees to SEPINGGANG as to MANGGAR but, in addition, a formidable anti-tank ditch lined the whole of the landing beach which was not as suitable because the gradient was less and the sea floor was generally coral as opposed to sand.

In both cases the mine sweeping problem was less than opposite KLANDASAN where fields of Allied magnetic and acoustic mines had been added to existing Dutch and Japanese fields.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF KLANDASAN

- 31 The disadvantages of landing at KLANDASAN were:-
- (a) The greatly increased mine sweeping problem;
 - (b) The greater difficulty presented to the Navy of providing maximum fire support owing to the danger of unswept mines and shallow water which required warships to stand further offshore than was desired;

- (c) Landing in the area of the enemy's strongest defences, particularly in coast defence guns, would present a greater hazard to both mine sweeping operations and the assault craft. In this circumstance paragraph (b) above becomes a greater disadvantage;
- (d) Beaches after assault were likely to be under fire for some time from enemy main defences;
- (e) Past experience in the SWPA had endorsed the policy of landing against light opposition.

32

It was decided, however, to land on KLANDASAN Beach for the following reasons:-

- (a) A successful assault against the strongest positions would considerably reduce the duration of the campaign and it was thereby hoped that casualties, which reach their highest in a long, drawn out campaign which becomes a war of attrition, would be substantially reduced;
- (b) The greatest fire support is required to overcome the position of greatest strength and this condition would be fulfilled on FOX Day;
- (c) By attacking the centre of the enemy's defences some degree of disorganisation should result which might continue for some days if the attack were pressed with vigour;

Japanese reaction is generally slow and it was hoped to capture the vital ground commanding the Harbour before he recovered from the initial bombardment;

- (d) The early capture of BALIKPAPAN Bay would ease the problem of supply over the beach and would be a safeguard against unfavourable weather;
- (e) A higher degree of concentration of both fire power and man power could be effected;
- (f) The full power of the force would be quickly deployed as opposed to the narrow front imposed by a coastwise advance;
- (g) Defences between BALIKPAPAN and MANGGAR were sited to face the East and could more readily be overcome by an advance from the West;
- (h) Fewer engineering tasks of bridging and communications would be met on the vital first day;
- (i) The location of defences suggested that the enemy considered a landing at KLANDASAN would be too hazardous an undertaking and that tactical surprise (strategic surprise was not possible with the preliminary bombardment and mine sweeping) might be achieved.

Deception Plan

33

In an attempt to foster the impression that the landing would take place at MANGGAR a Deception Plan was adopted whereby

- (a) Rumours were disseminated among the natives that a landing was to take place North of MANGGAR;
- (b) Pre-landing activity took place between MANGGAR and the MAHAKAM River to the North;
- (c) A party was landed to make a simulated beach reconnaissance North of MANGGAR and arrangements made that the enemy became aware of the reconnaissance;
- (d) The underwater obstacles were demolished at MANGGAR on FOX minus 5, at SEPINGGANG on FOX minus 3 and KLANDASAN completed on FOX minus 1;
- (e) Rumours were also spread that a landing was to be made on 4 July - American Independence Day.

EFFECT OF NAVAL AND AIR SUPPORT

34 The plan, for its success, was largely dependent on overwhelming fire support from sea and air. This aspect was fully appreciated by both services with results which were highly satisfactory to the Division.

SPECIAL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

NAVY

35 Cruisers and destroyers from US Navy, RAN and HNM Navy were to provide naval bombardment support to cover preliminary mine sweeping, pre-H Hour bombardment and subsequent support to the land forces.

It was therefore necessary to co-ordinate closely all air and naval strikes and a controller support aircraft was present from FOX minus 15.

A large number of small support craft was to supplement the heavier naval units throughout the operations.

As the enemy naval threat was light and decreased during the planning period following attacks on shipping from SINGAPORE to JAVA, further units strengthened the naval task force, which permitted the naval bombardment plan on FOX Day to be so arranged that ships could be relieved on station during a bombardment whereby a much higher scale of ammunition expenditure was possible. To cover the period of changing station, rocket craft were to make an early run, retire to re-arm and return immediately prior to H Hour.

Except during this period no low level air attacks were planned so that there would be no other interruption to the continuity of the naval bombardment.

The Navy was requested to carry out night harassing shoots with HE and star shells, the latter as a deterrent against night infiltration.

AIR

Safeguarding of Installations

36

Restrictions were imposed by GHQ on bombing

certain areas, but the essential preliminary to accurate bombing of targets designated by the Division was the destruction of the AA defences, described by the Air Force as the heaviest in the SWPA. High level pattern bombing was therefore necessary. It was, however, possible in general to avoid causing heavy damage to:-

- (a) Oil installations except those capable of being used for burning oil defence;
- (b) Harbour facilities;
- (c) Rail and highway systems;
- (d) Public utilities;

which were those targets on which GHQ placed restrictions.

Information Made Available to Air Force

37 At a very early stage of planning the Air Force was provided with:-

- (a) A comprehensive list of all known AA defences;
- (b) The location of targets of all known oil installations which could be used as a burning oil defence;
- (c) Areas which contained defences, barracks and stores against which bombing was required;
- (d) Details of targets for pre-H Hour bombing on FOX Day.

Method of Indicating Targets to Air Force

38 The method of presentation of targets to the Air Force was to mark photo mosaics and number all target areas. Air Force then rephotographed and distributed these to all air forces engaged in the task of reducing BALIKPAPAN by air. Easy and long term briefing was thereby made possible and requests for bombing required reference only to a serial number.

In addition, a number of areas was selected which could be bombed as secondary targets with a minimum of briefing should identification of own troops be difficult on FOX Day.

A further aid to the briefing of close support aircraft during land operations was provided by target designator graded maps of the objective area with scale 1 : 25,000. These maps enable a simple, quick and accurate reference to targets.

Aerial Harassing Raids by Night

39 Night heckler raids were planned for FOX minus 5, 3 and 1 Days.

Air Support Plan

40 The initial Air Support Plan was based on TARAKAN Strip being in operational use, but owing to doubts that it would be ready in time, an alternate air support plan was prepared to employ 5 and 13 US Air Forces in

addition to RAAF based on MOROTAI. Before the assault force sailed, it became necessary to adopt the alternate air support plan. Owing to difficulties met in providing effective combat air patrols over the mine sweeping force from FOX minus 5, three CVEs were made available from FOX minus 1 until FOX plus 2.

Two four-hour sorties by B24s were arranged to operate daily until FOX plus 4 as air observers.

Fluorescent panels, 3-inch mortar smoke and a limited amount of red coloured 25-pounder smoke were available as ground indicators. 3-inch mortar smoke was generally used for target indication.

Little enemy air reaction, other than the possibility of some suicide 'planes, was expected.

ARMOUR

- 41 Flame throwing tanks (FROGS) were available for the first time to 7 Aust Div and, with MATILDAS, were to be landed early. MATILDAS were to be landed from LCMs at H plus 8 minutes and from LCTs at H plus 23 minutes, while FROGS were to land from LCTs at H plus 23 minutes. Tankdozers and bridge-laying COVENANTOR were also to be available early.

RAA

Concentration of Fire Power

- 42 At all stages of planning particular attention was paid to providing the maximum concentration of fire power at all times. An allotment of eight 4.2-inch mortars was made to 18 Aust Inf Bde and four to 21 Aust Inf Bde to provide immediate support until 25-pounder guns were in action.

These mortars were landed from LVTs at H plus 3 minutes and were first in action by H plus 42 minutes.

Problem of Shooting Down to Short Ranges

- 43 In this operation, as in all where the size of the initial beachhead may be limited, the artillery problem is to be able to shoot down to short ranges. The 4.2-inch mortars would partly bridge this gap but it was decided that, although 25-pounder Mark II guns were available for all batteries, two batteries of 25-pounder short guns would be landed by H plus 50 minutes. Platforms were available and it was expected that performance would be equal to the Mark II but targets at shorter range could be engaged.

Method of Landing Guns

- 44 As the main opposition was expected in front of the left brigade, guns were to be landed on the right brigade beach so that minimum ranges could be increased.

As it was intended to land Mark II guns by H plus 90 minutes and as DUKWs require a slight modification to carry these guns, it was decided to land the shorts by DUKW and the Mark II by LVT.

Training

for the Tank Attack Regiment to man 4.2-inch mortars and also to manhandle 6-pounder guns to move with the infantry and be used as sniping guns against enemy defences. Two guns were allotted to each brigade.

AA

- 46 Heavy AA guns were not considered a requirement during the first days after landing.

RAE

Underwater Obstacles

- 47 Although the divisional engineers had received training in the demolition of underwater obstacles, the US Navy accepted responsibility to high water mark for all measures necessary to land the force. This included the destruction of the underwater obstacles for which two naval underwater demolition teams were made available. The task was carried out with complete success.

Mines, Booby Traps and Unexploded Bombs

- 48 It was anticipated that from high water mark to a considerable depth inland the area would be thickly sown with mines, booby traps and bombs. Engineer parties were therefore organised to accompany infantry in three groups:

- (a) To search for and mark mines and booby traps so that advancing infantry would not be delayed;
- (b) Follow up delousing parties;
- (c) Demolition parties for tunnels and earthworks.

- 49 Where possible RAE vehicles were pre-loaded tactically with essential operational equipment.

SIGNALS

- 50 DUKWs were made available to Signals to speed up the setting up of heavy wireless stations ashore.

INTELLIGENCE

Sources of Information

- 51 Sources available during the planning period included:-
- (a) 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Review OBOE TWO;
 - (b) Dutch maps and naval charts;
 - (c) Aerial photographs;
 - (d) Reports from natives and other personnel extracted from the area;
 - (e) Europeans familiar with BALIKPAPAN;
 - (f) Terrain studies and handbooks.

These provided almost complete information.

Aerial Photographs

- 52 In particular, the aerial photographs, both vertical and oblique, were excellent and were produced on sufficient scale for issue to section leaders.

Maps

- 53 The mapping programme was rushed but embraced 1 : 10,000, 1 : 25,000 and 1 : 50,000 series. Overprints were made of enemy defences and names were added for every feature which was considered likely to become of tactical importance. All names used in blocks of four gridded squares began with the same letter and progressed alphabetically from left to right and top to bottom. The names chosen were selected from those for which cipher groups have been allotted in the appropriate cipher book. An example of the map is attached as Appendix "B".

Organisation of Intelligence Duties

- 54 In view of the large number of intelligence units and organisations assisting the Division, a diagrammatic layout of the responsibility for co-ordination and collation of information was issued by the Division.

REHEARSAL

- 55 The landing wave diagram presented to the Navy was complicated by the need to include varying types of craft in the one wave, although all moving at the same speed, and by the variety of the ships from which the assault craft were drawn to form individual waves.

In addition, the depth of water and the mine sweeping plan required two changes of direction for many waves on their approach to the shore.

- 56 The rehearsal was designed so that the entire assault convoy would assemble, all waves of assault craft would be launched and assault infantry in LVTs would land exactly in accordance with the actual plan. Live ammunition was to be expended on a small scale but based on the final naval bombardment plan.

- 57 By agreement with the Navy, troops allotted to LCIs which were not timed to land early, were not to be embarked for the rehearsal but would embark on the day prior to sailing day to reduce the time spent on board.

AMMUNITION

- 58 The nature of the operation and the type of country permitted the employment and concentration of the full fire power of the Division, and so quantities of certain types of ammunition, particularly 25-pounder and 3-inch mortar, were requested in excess of war usage rate figures. Special arrangements were also made, by using LCTs, LVTs and DUKWs to ensure that adequate supplies and replenishment were available to forward troops early on FOX Day.

PRIORITY LOADING OF LSTs

- 59 The Navy indicated that it was unlikely that Naval Lighterage Pontoons would be released on FOX Day owing to the danger of enemy shell and mortar fire. As the beach was not suitable for beaching LSTs, plans were made to unload

ISTs by LSMs, LCTs, LCMS, LVTs and DUKWs in the stream.

In addition, nine ISTs were selected for priority unloading on FOX Day. These ISTs contained the highest priority vehicles and balanced quantities of stores and ammunition.

HQ SHIPS

60 Although space was limited, an Army-Air-Navy Headquarters operated on an AGC and a similar, though necessarily skeleton, set-up was installed as an alternate headquarters on a CGC.

HQ ASHORE

61 A joint Army-Air Force Headquarters was established on the far shore.

PART II - OPERATIONS

NAVAL SUPPORT

62 The naval support provided during the period FOX Day to FOX plus 16 Day inclusive is shown as Appendix "G" Annexures 1 and 2.

AIR SUPPORT

63 The air support given to the operation is shown as Appendix "H" Annexures 1, 2, 3 and 4.

LAND OPERATIONS

64

F DAY

After an extremely heavy aerial and naval bombardment of the known enemy strongposts commanding the landing beaches, and the landing beaches themselves, the assault landing was made by three battalions - 2/10 Aust Inf Bn on the left, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn in the centre and 2/27 Aust Inf Bn on the right.

These units quickly pressed inland against slight opposition to a depth of eight hundred yards, the initial beachhead being secured fifteen minutes after the landing.

Elements of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn quickly swung West and the high ground immediately overlooking the beaches from the left flank was captured by 1310 hours. This hill formed the southernmost part of a ridge which extended almost due North for 1500 yards. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was then relieved by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn of the responsibility for the left flank protection of the beachhead, and the whole battalion was used

to capture and occupy this dominating feature, with the co-ordinated support of the Navy; the Air Force; armour and field artillery, including 4.2-inch mortars.

In the meantime 2/12 Aust Inf Bn had pushed inland and occupied by nightfall prominent features to a depth of 1500 yards.

After 2/27 Aust Inf Bn had secured the high ground on the right flank overlooking the beachhead, 2/16 Aust Inf Bn passed through to capture G MALANG, a dominating feature 2000 yards inland.

2/14 Aust Inf Bn and 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt moved through 2/27 Aust Inf Bn and crossed the S KLANDASAN BESAR River; then the former turned East to capture the high ground on the Eastern bank of this river while the latter advanced North-East to occupy, by last light, the same ridge 1000 yards further inland.

Thus, at the end of the first day, the Division had overrun numerous heavily defended localities, denied the enemy the high ground from which serious interference could be caused to the unloading of stores and split open the crust of the defences protecting the town itself and the docks area. The first objective of securing a beachhead was achieved and little observation of the beach was left to the enemy. Some artillery and mortar fire could still be directed against the beaches.

Our casualties were 22 killed and 74 wounded.

Appendix "B" shows the locations and movement of the major units during the operation.

2 JUL

At 0800 hours 25 Aust Inf Bde landed and took over the responsibility for the central sector and inter-brigade boundaries were adjusted accordingly.

18 Aust Inf Bde was able to consolidate to the North-West on the high features overlooking the town and to mop up isolated by-passed strongposts.

Similarly, 21 Aust Inf Bde was able to strengthen its hold to the North-East on the prominent feature G MALANG and to make a successful thrust with 2/14 Aust Inf Bn along the coastal road to the East to capture by last light SEPINGGANG Airstrip.

The enemy, strongly entrenched in the foothills approximately 1000 yards to the North of the coastal road, held up the parallel advance of 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one squadron) which was designed to protect the left flank of 2/14 Aust Inf Bn.

Thus, the day's operations enabled us to capture and strengthen positions dominating the town and docks area of BALIKPAPAN, to secure the beachhead from counter-attacks from the North-East and to occupy one of the two airstrips in the area, which it was hoped to have in use for Auster aircraft by the following day.

Intermittent shelling of the landing beaches throughout caused some delay to the unloading programme.

3 JULWestern Sector

During the day 18 Aust Inf Bde reached PANDASARI overrunning the town and docks area after overcoming slight opposition.

Central Sector

25 Aust Inf Bde with 2/33 Aust Inf Bn on the right and 2/31 Aust Inf Bn on the left, overcame heavy opposition in pushing another 1000 yards inland occupying prominent features astride VALLEY Road.

Eastern Sector

21 Aust Inf Bde thrust further East with 2/14 Aust Inf Bn, which had been relieved at SEPINGGANG by 2/27 Aust Inf Bn, and by last light the former battalion had reached the BATAKAM RIVER on the Eastern bank of which an enemy force was encountered.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one squadron) patrolled vigorously inland to a depth of 2000 yards.

There was further sporadic shelling of the beaches by long range artillery, but it had little more than a nuisance value.

Progress during the day found our forces at its close in complete occupation of the town and docks area, firmly established on features in the central sector which would permit a drive along MILFORD Highway, and half way to the LANGGAR airstrip.

Our casualties at this stage were 83 killed and 275 wounded.

4 JULWestern Sector

On this day 18 Aust Inf Bde was brought into Divisional Reserve and completed mopping up in the PANDASARI Sector.

Central Sector

Both 2/33 Aust Inf Bn and 2/31 Aust Inf Bn of 25 Aust Inf Bde moved another 1000 yards North along the VALLEY Road against slight opposition, occupying many strongposts abandoned by the enemy.

Eastern Sector

2/14 Aust Inf Bn, overcoming slight opposition in its advance Eastwards, by nightfall had reached the LANGGAR RIVER and pushed two companies across the river to occupy the LANGGAR airstrip.

Throughout the day 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one squadron) continued its patrol activity North of the SEPINGGANG airstrip.

By now the enemy had been driven from all positions from which interference could be caused to the unloading of stores. He had been pushed out of the town and had lost the two airstrips. It was apparent at this stage that

he was trying to withdraw the remainder of his force to the B. TOTCHAPAR area, and with this object in view would delay as long as possible an advance along the MILFORD Highway.

Air - Enemy

One enemy aircraft of unknown type dropped two small calibre bombs in the Beach Maintenance Area causing few casualties and no damage.

5 JUL

PENADJAM Sector

At 1530 2/9 Aust Inf Bn, lifted in amphibians and LCMs and supported by aerial and naval bombardment, armour and field artillery (including 4.2-inch mortars), landed without opposition at Cape PENADJAM across BALIEPAPAN Bay. Subsequently this force came under shell fire from one heavy gun. In the area six 120-mm dual-purpose guns were captured.

Central Sector

2/25 Aust Inf Bn, having ceased to be in the Divisional Reserve began the relief of 2/31 Aust Inf Bn and the day was spent in patrolling to ascertain enemy dispositions and strengths and in concentrating for an advance on the following day.

2/6 Aust C&O Sqn cleared the B. ROT HOFLOT Peninsula.

Eastern Sector

2/14 Aust Inf Bn, under heavy shelling which caused few casualties, tightened its grip on the MANOCAR airstrip and 2/27 Aust Inf Bn carried out its rôle of protecting the L of C to this forward battalion.

A NEI company landed during the day and, less one platoon, was placed under command 25 Aust Inf Bde.

Our casualties to date numbered 96 killed and 319 wounded.

6 JUL

PENADJAM Sector

Enemy activity along the North bank of the RIKO River in the DJIMBORA area during the night 5/6 Jul substantiated evidence found by patrols which indicated that the enemy was trying to withdraw from the PENADJAM area.

Central Sector

On the 25 Aust Inf Bde sector strong opposition was met in the advance along the MILFORD Highway; however, 2/25 Aust Inf Bn succeeded on the left flank in moving forward another 500 yards to occupy features stretching from the SOMBER River to MILFORD Highway. 2/33 Aust Inf Bn continued to meet heavy opposition on its front.

Eastern Sector

Two 120-mm coast defence guns, which dominated the MANOCAR airstrip, were captured by 2/14 Aust Inf Bn.

after they had been put out of action by naval and field artillery fire.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn moved two miles North-East to occupy features astride a track from SEPINGGANG Airstrip to HILFORD Highway.

7 JUL

PENADJAM Sector

Patrolling continued throughout the day with only one minor contact with the enemy.

SOMBER Sector

During the night 6/7 Jul a NMI Force crossed the mouth of the SOMBER River and occupied SOMBER TRCAH.

HILFORD Highway Sector

Vigorous patrolling by 2/25 Aust Inf Bn and 2/33 Aust Inf Bn throughout the day found the enemy firmly established on features commanding the HILFORD Highway and limited advances only were made on the left flank. Although in brigade reserve 2/31 Aust Inf Bn suffered casualties from infiltrating parties and enemy gunfire and carried out local patrols.

Eastern Sector

Two enemy counter attacks on 2/14 Aust Inf Bn holding the KANGGAR Airstrip were repulsed with casualties. Extensive patrolling was carried out to discover the flanks of the enemy occupying the high ground North of the strip.

8 JUL

PENADJAM Sector

During the night 7/8 Jul a platoon of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn moved by LVT up the RIMO River to a point 456661 to observe any enemy movement across the river. A cavalry patrol made contact with a strong enemy position with casualties to both sides.

HILFORD Highway Sector

In spite of artillery fire and aerial bombardment, the enemy was not dislodged from his positions astride the HILFORD Highway, but 500 yards progress was made by 2/25 Aust Inf Bn on the left flank to enable us to occupy a feature East of WHITING'S ROAD overlooking the S SOMBER River. There were, however, indications that the enemy intended to withdraw. Extensive patrolling by 2/33 Aust Inf Bn resulted in casualties to both sides without any further advance being made.

Eastern Sector

On the night 7/8 Jul three enemy infiltrating patrols in 2/14 Aust Inf Bn area were repulsed with casualties.

As in the HILFORD Highway sector, the enemy showed signs of his intention to withdraw from this area.

Patrol activity continued throughout the area.

9 JULPENADJAM-DJINABORA Sector

Extensive patrolling was carried out in this sector.

TELOKTEBANG Area

At 0935 a company of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn landed without opposition on the TELOKTEBANG Peninsula but later withdrew to PENADJAM leaving one platoon in occupation of the peninsula.

MILFORD Highway Sector

2/33 Aust Inf Bn, on the right of the MILFORD Highway, moved forward another 500 yards to occupy against slight opposition features to the West of McDONALD'S Track. A patrol from 2/31 Aust Inf Bn reached a point near BATOCHEPAR without opposition and returned. 2/25 Aust Inf Bn carried out local patrols and reorganisation.

Eastern Sector

After intensive bombardment 2/14 Aust Inf Bn occupied against some opposition the high ground 2000 yards North of the KANGAR airstrip from where the enemy had shelled our positions for two days. 2/15 Aust Inf Bn made further advances North of SEPINGANG airstrip.

10 JULPENADJAM-DJINABORA-TELOKTEBANG Sector

Activity in this sector was limited to patrolling which failed to locate any enemy.

BATOCHEPAR Sector

2/31 Aust Inf Bn, supported by tanks and artillery, advanced along the MILFORD Highway approximately 2000 yards to capture the village of G BATOCHEPAR; beyond this village stiff enemy resistance was met.

On the left flank 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn, established at SOUTHER HIRI, patrolled to the East with the object of harassing the enemy L of C.

Eastern Sector

2/14 Aust Inf Bn consolidated the positions occupied on 9 Jul and patrolled forward along the VASEY Highway as far as the ADJIDEN River.

11 JULBATOCHEPAR Sector

Astride the MILFORD Highway 1000 yards North of G BATOCHEPAR enemy positions which were well sited for defence and strongly fortified were, during the day subjected to heavy artillery and mortar concentration and reconnaissance patrols continued from 2/31 Aust Inf Bn and 2/25 Aust Inf Bn.

In the other sectors activity was limited to readjustment of unit dispositions and patrolling.

12 JUL

There was little change in any sector during the day, the main activity being our patrolling to determine exact enemy dispositions.

Docking

The first Liberty ship to enter the harbour berthed alongside ML Pontoon wharf erected on the site of the old Pier No 3. LSTs also were now using harbour sites for unloading.

13 JULBATOTCHAMPAR Sector

2/25 Aust Inf Bn relieved 2/31 Aust Inf Bn and vigorous patrolling was continued in this sector.

Eastern Sector

Long range patrols operated North-East along the main road and North-West along the tracks towards BATOTCHAMPAR.

One long range patrol from 2/27 Aust Inf Bn from BANGSAL base reached AIBORHANG without sighting any enemy.

Sea

The hydrographic unit completed buoying and sounding in the channel in the harbour.

Docking

The channel and harbour were in full use at this stage.

14 JULPREADJAI DJIMBORA Sector

The force from 2/9 Aust Inf Bn stationed at DJIMBORA on 8 Jul was withdrawn to PREADJAI.

BATOTCHAMPAR Sector

2/25 Aust Inf Bn sent out numerous patrols on its left flank against strong Japanese positions astride the road.

15 JULBATOTCHAMPAR Sector

While extensive patrolling continued the dispositions of 25 Aust Inf Bde were being adjusted to commit two battalions instead of one on the brigade front.

Eastern Sector

One company of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn was moved to AIBORHANG WEST.

16 JULBATONGCHAMPAR Sector

During the night 15/16 Jul the enemy carried out many raids on our forward companies all of which were repulsed.

Following the previous day's adjustments 2/33 Aust Inf Bn took over all commitments East of the MILFORD Highway and 2/25 Aust Inf Bn became responsible for the Highway and to the West.

17 JULEastern Sector

Battalion Command Post and two companies of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn concentrated at AIRBORNE preparatory to patrolling in strength to SAI BODJA.

18 JULBATONGCHAMPAR Sector

During the night 17/18 Jul the enemy made several attacks on our forces which were repulsed with heavy casualties; however a small infiltrating party reached EC 2/33 Aust Inf Bn and caused some casualties in addition to destroying one 4.2-inch mortar.

During the day 2/31 Aust Inf Bn relieved 2/25 Aust Inf Bn from its positions astride the main road leaving 2/25 Aust Inf Bn to concentrate on their outflanking movement to the West side of MILFORD Highway. 2/25 Aust Inf Bn at this stage had three companies in contact with the enemy. 2/33 Aust Inf Bn made gains on the right flank against heavy opposition.

Eastern Sector

One company 2/27 Aust Inf Bn reached MILFORD Highway due West from SAI BODJA.

SAI BODJA was occupied by 2/27 Aust Inf Bn after only slight opposition by the enemy.

19 JULBATONGCHAMPAR Sector

Some enemy positions were reduced during the day and heavy pressure was maintained by all three battalions against those remaining astride the MILFORD Highway. Japanese infiltration parties continued to be active during the night.

20 JULPENADJAI-DJIMBORA Sector

A force consisting of two companies and tactical headquarters of 2/1 Aust Inf Bn was landed at DJIMBORA with the task of preventing any attempt by the enemy to attack BILIRAPAN Harbour area from the upper reaches of the Northern rivers where he was known to have many barges; for this purpose field artillery was landed in support. Air strikes also began against barge traffic in the upper reaches.

BATONCHAMPAR Sector

2/25 Aust Inf Bn and 2/33 Aust Inf Bn continued during the day to make small advances which were consolidated against opposition on both flanks of the enemy while 2/31 Aust Inf Bn maintained frontal pressure.

Eastern Sector

2/27 Aust Inf Bn withdrew from SAMBODJA to concentrate in the LAMARON area; a detachment of NH forces remained at SAMBODJA.

Sea

A patrol of three LCSs, supported by Spitfires, moved Northwards up BALIKPAPAN Bay to the mouth of the SINTOETHAI River destroying some barges and enemy gun positions with gunfire and rockets.

21 JULPENADJAH Sector

Elements of 2/1 Aust Pmr Bn and field artillery moved to TETPADOENG from DJINABORA.

BATONCHAMPAR Sector

Heavy fire and continued patrolling continued to reduce the enemy astride MILFORD Highway.

22 JULBATONCHAMPAR Sector

During the night 21/22 Jul the enemy broke contact in this sector and an advance of 2000 yards against slight opposition was made during 22 Jul.

22 JUL - 14 AUG

From 22 Jul to 14 Aug local patrols operated in all sectors and long range patrols covered the following areas:-

- (a) In the Eastern sector - as far North-East as the DONDANG River;
- (b) From SAMBODJA due West to MILFORD Highway;
- (c) In the central sector 16 miles from BATONCHAMPAR along MILFORD Highway;
- (d) In the TETPADOENG-PENADJAH sector - seven miles North-East of TETPADOENG Village; the upper reaches of BALIKPAPAN Bay to PAMALOPAN Village; South-West across the RIKO River.

Isolated enemy parties were seen and attacked but, for the most part, few contacts were made.

On 23 Jul a party of eight Japanese carrying demolition charges infiltrated as far as the water point of the RAAF Airfield Defence Unit at BATAHAN ITJIL before being detected and killed.

On 26 Jul a patrol from 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn clashed with a force of estimated platoon strength on the MILFORD Highway seven miles from BATOECHAMPAR.

On 29 Jul patrols from 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn inflicted casualties on 30 enemy at TEPADOENG Village and on 30 Jul captured three machine guns from another force of 15 in the same vicinity.

Infiltration parties along the MILFORD Highway during the week 31 Jul - 7 Aug were repulsed by 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt with heavy enemy casualties and the enemy L of C along this route was constantly harassed by our artillery.

Enemy counter attacks against elements of 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn in the vicinity of TEPADOENG Village on 31 Jul and on 1 Aug, and against 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn six miles along MILFORD Highway on 2 Aug from BATOECHAMPAR, were repulsed with heavy casualties.

On 7 Aug 65 Indian PW were released by a patrol from 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn from a PW compound two miles South-East of PAMALOPAN Village, and on this day another five Indian PW who had escaped reached our lines in the SAIBODJA area.

On 14 Aug 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn ambushed the enemy seven miles North-East of TEPADOENG Village, killing nine.

Casualties

Casualties for the Operation up to 14 Aug :
45 were:-

| <u>Own</u> | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------|------|-----|--|
| <u>AF</u> | Killed | 181 | | |
| | Wounded | 594 | | |
| | Missing | 2 | 777 | |
| <u>US Forces</u> | Killed | 1 | | |
| | Wounded | 18 | | |
| | Missing | 2 | 21 | |
| <u>NFI Forces</u> | Killed | 1 | | |
| | Wounded | 5 | 6 | |
| Total | | | 804 | |
| <u>Enemy</u> | | | | |
| Killed (counted) | | 1783 | | |
| Estimated additional killed | | 249 | | |
| PW | | 63 | | |

In addition the following were released:-

| | |
|--|-------|
| Natives released | 43304 |
| NFI soldiers (native) recovered | 730 |
| Indian soldiers recovered (one since died) | 69 |

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS

65 A detailed account of the operations of 18 Aust Inf Bde, 21 Aust Inf Bde and 25 Aust Inf Bde is contained

respectively in Appendices "I" "J" and "K" attached.

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PLAN AND THE EVENT

AIR

66 Air support was controlled by Controller Support Aircraft (Afloat) until FOX plus 2 owing to the presence of carriers in the area, and air control passed to Controller Support Aircraft (Ashore) on this day.

In spite of the large number of aircraft operating over the area in support of ground troops, no difficulty was met in control owing to good communications.

One strike from carrier-based aircraft caused casualties to our troops on FOX Day.

Air observers provided valuable service in spite of the loss by enemy action of three 324s up to FOX plus 5. Thereafter the absence of tactical reconnaissance aircraft was a serious deficiency, not adequately replaced by usingusters for tactical reconnaissance.

For artillery, tactical and contact reconnaissances,usters, which first took the air at 1500I hours FOX plus 2, carried out 116 sorties to FOX plus 22.

The first site selected for theuster strip proved unsuitable but little work was required to provide 500 yards of the SEPINGANG Strip on its capture.

Construction on SEPINGANG began on FOX plus 7 and Spitfires and C47s landed on FOX plus 14.

RAA

- 67
- (a) The first short guns were in action at H plus 94 minutes;
 - (b) The first Mark II guns were in action at H plus 130 minutes;
 - (c) 61,501 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition were fired to FOX plus 21 Day;
 - (d) The 6-pounder tank attack gun used in a sniper role was most successful and, employed in co-operation with attacking infantry, destroyed many strong enemy positions. A large share in the destruction of a 6-inch naval gun must go to the 6-pounder;
 - (e) 4.2-inch mortars were used extensively, especially by 18 Aust Inf Bde, from soon after landing, the first rounds being fired at H plus 142 minutes, successfully thickening up the fire when artillery support was being built up. As the campaign progressed, the 4.2-inch mortar gradually gave way to the more accurate 25-pounder, but its value was proven. It was used in neutralising areas to a flank or in advance rather than in direct close support;

- (f) Mounted on a platform the short 25-pounder was accurate, reliable and compared favourably with the Mark II when fired at short and medium ranges;
- (g) AA guns did not engage any enemy aircraft, the only activity being one light plane which dropped several small bombs.

RAE

- 68 The training in recognition by the infantry and in marking and disposal by RAE of mines and booby traps proved effective as few casualties resulted although to FOX plus 12 over 5000 mines, booby traps and unexploded bombs were deloused.

INTELLIGENCE

- 69 Enemy strengths, dispositions and locations of defences, as well as topographical information proved substantially correct.

DECEPTION MEASURES

- 70 Captured documents have proved that the enemy expected a landing at MANGGAR or to the North of MANGGAR. The enemy commander has since revealed that simultaneous landings were expected off SAE BODJA and at MANGGAR and ELANDASAN, although no new dispositions of enemy forces were made to meet these contingencies; neither were any adjustments made to add strength to his defences in the vicinity of our landing.

GEN APPRECIATION

- 71 (a) Considerable disorganisation of the enemy force continued for at least four days after the landing, during which period all major objectives were captured, in even shorter time than forecast.
- (b) The rapid advance along the coast to MANGGAR was in fact made easier by overcoming defence positions in that sector from the rear.
- (c) The enemy was unable, owing to the destruction of weapons, damage to communications, effect on personnel of the weight of bombardment and lack of trained gunners, to employ effectively indirect fire or his heavy artillery against the landing force.
- (d) The early capture on FOX Day of the PARRAHATTA feature, which was the key of the enemy defence, ensured success.
- (e) The Navy, though not without loss, was able to reduce the hazard of sea mines, which did not interfere with the landing.
- (f) The relatively few casualties suffered during the period up to which the vital objectives were gained was the most satisfactory feature of the operation.
- (g) It was not necessary during the operation to make any major changes to the plan prepared prior to the assault, commanders of all grades thereby gaining greater confidence from their initial and thorough briefing.

LANDING WAVE

- 72 Assault waves landed on a more restricted front than planned, but adjustments were made for succeeding waves; there was little other variation from the plan in timings and composition of waves.

AMMUNITION

- 73 Owing to the allotment of LVTs, DUKWs and mobile loaded trucks, ample ammunition was available at all times on FOX Day for forward units. Four LCTs were loaded solely with balanced quantities of ammunition for early unloading.

HQ ASHORE74 Change of Command

- 74 Command passed from Commander Afloat to Commander Ashore at 1900 hours FOX Day; this was later than anticipated due to difficulties in establishing satisfactory communications.

Joint Army-Air Headquarters

- 75 Air headquarters was not established ashore until FOX plus 2 on account of unavoidable delay in unloading air force communications equipment. No difficulty was, however, experienced in the control of support aircraft, Army requests being transmitted to the HQ Ship.

The joint Army-Air Headquarters operated satisfactorily from FOX plus 2 until FOX plus 13 when the Army headquarters moved to a new location and the Air Force prepared to move to SEPINGGANG airstrip.

TIME FACTOR

- 76 Although a preliminary study of the operation was made earlier by the Commander, detailed planning could not commence until 26 May and the force was embarked at MCROTAI by 22 Jun, much less time than usually considered essential; a heavy burden was thereby imposed on planning staffs. Very great work was entailed in embarkation due to somewhat limited resources; the time factor, transport and accommodation difficulties. Units of the Division arrived continuously throughout the planning stage and those to be embarked in the assault convoy were not complete with stores in the staging area until the day of embarkation.

The necessary division of the headquarters into

- (a) Planning Headquarters;
- (b) Headquarters to receive and accommodate the Division in the staging area;
- (c) Rear Headquarters, required to remain in AUSTRALIA whilst elements of the Division were there;

increased the difficulties which the target date imposed.

The target date was, however, met and the operation was successful

PART III - LESSONS, OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

77 The lessons; etc demonstrated in the Operation OBOE TWO have been grouped, for ease of reference, into those related to planning and those arising from the operation itself.

Some lessons have a general application, while others are dependent for their proper interpretation and significance on the circumstances obtaining at the time; lessons of this latter category would therefore require similar conditions and circumstances for their application.

PLANNING

78 Satisfactory planning depends on timely and adequate information and on conditions which enable a deliberate and unhurried consideration of this material. The detailed and meticulously accurate planning of an amphibious operation emphasises these requirements.

A comparison between the planning time-table used in this operation and one conforming to the requirements stated above, which are attached as Appendix "L" Annexures 1 and 2 will indicate how most of the difficulties in planning OBOE TWO arose.

Shortness of time and the unavailability of material when required combined to upset the proper sequence of planning and this reduced the effectiveness of the short time allowed. When the normal sequence of planning is upset grave difficulties are certain to result.

79 The following factors further militated against smooth and progressive planning:-

- (a) Divisional Headquarters was split into three separate sections: one for planning at MOROTAI, another for the administration of units as they reached the staging area, and the third for administering units until their departure from the Mainland. This threefold division applied to subordinate headquarters and, to a less extent, to units. The additional strain imposed on staffs by such an organisation is obvious.
- (b) The space allotted to the planning teams at MOROTAI was insufficient to prevent congestion and so located as to make quiet work impossible; it had the advantage of being close to 1 Aust Corps Headquarters and the disadvantage of being remote from the staging area for divisional units.
- (c) The Order of Battle for the Force contained many small units not under command 7 Aust Div and as an intermediate headquarters in some cases did not exist in the area direct communication was necessary; this consumed much time. Further, some units had no previous training in amphibious operations and consequently did not possess the necessary staff tables and essential data in readily accessible form.
- (d) The Order of Battle required continual revision and subsequent amendment for the following reasons:-
 - (i) Late inclusion of 25 Aust Inf Bde;

- (ii) Capacity and type of shipping allotted;
- (iii) Uncertain availability of units and sub-units for the operation, due to their commitments with other current operations and distant locations.
- (e) The undeveloped nature of the staging area at MOROTAI made additional demands on unit and force stores, and staff organisation for the most economical use of these.
- (f) The difficulties of communication produced by remoteness of the staging area from Planning Headquarters were increased by the congestion to road and signal traffic caused by the simultaneous departure of the Second Lift of 9 Aust Div Task Force for OBOE SIX and a Regimental Combat Team of 93 US Division with that of 7 Aust Div Task Force.
- (g) As 1 Aust Mil Ldg Gp contained only one Military Landing Officer, the staff of one assault brigade had additional work at the expense of consolidating operational and administrative plans.
- (h) In many cases unit and force stores did not reach the staging area in sufficient time to allow for proper sorting and documentation before being loaded into assault shipping.
- (i) Embarkation planning proceeded in part concurrently with that for the operation.
- (j) Late arrival of certain planning teams.

SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST

TIME REQUIRED FOR THE MECHANICAL PRODUCTION OF ORDERS

80 It is interesting to note the time required on the Divisional level for the mechanical production of orders:-

| | |
|----------------------------|---------------|
| Draft Administrative Order | 282 man hours |
| Firm Administrative Order | 216 man hours |
| Embarkation Order | 150 man hours |
| Total | 648 man hours |

These times are exclusive of that required for the photographic reproduction of appendices. Photographic reproduction is not possible from Divisional resources.

LANDING WAVE DIAGRAM

81 The Landing Wave Diagram presented many problems due to:-

- (a) Varying distances and types of craft involved;
- (b) Necessity for using all craft to maintain the "Build-Up" to conform to tactical requirements;

- (c) Shortage of large craft-carrying ships, e.g. LSI;
- (d) Preponderance of enemy mines allowed only a limited and irregular channel to be swept and, along with some active enemy coast defence guns and shallow water, prevented the larger ships from anchoring less than seven miles from the beaches. Thus, long distances had to be covered by the small craft.

The production of a landing diagram at an early stage in the planning in compliance with the US Navy's request, was not in accordance with the sequence of planning on which brigade planning had been based; this, therefore, produced unexpected problems for brigades.

ALTERATIONS TO LANDING PRIORITIES

- 82 Alterations to the landing priorities within the Order of Battle were frequent and, as the latter consisted of 299 units, these changes entailed considerable additional work.

"BID" SHEETS

- 83 The initiation of "bid" sheets for landing priorities proved satisfactory but it was possible to secure these only from 33 per cent of the units.

PRIORITY ARRIVAL OF STORES ON THE FAR SHORE

- 84 The regulation of shipping at the far shore in accordance with the Beach Group's capacity to discharge it and the type of shipping allotted had to be reconciled with the ability of the Navy to provide escorts. This reconciliation resulted in the arrival of certain Force stores at the far shore earlier than was required.

CAPACITY OF CRAFT FOR CARRYING VEHICLES

- 85 When brigades prepared the "Distribution of Force to Ships" for the assault convoy, it was found that more vehicles could be accommodated than had been allowed. The additional space amounted to approximately four per cent of the total vehicles and was due to the high proportion of jeeps in the assault convoy.

The basis which was used in the initial provision was as follows:-

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| LSI | 23 vehicles or 8 DUK's |
| LST (carrying pontoons) | 50 vehicles and 250 D.T stores |
| | or |
| | 11 LVT, 30 vehicles and 100 D.T stores |
| LST (without pontoons) | 70 vehicles and 200 D.T stores |

DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE OF STORES

- 86 Planning the distribution of stores to ships and the storage of these cannot be done with sufficient accuracy unless details of weight and measurement of all types of stores to be shipped are supplied.

CAPACITY OF LST AND LCI

87 The capacity of a loaded LST is normally 500 troops. In operations where it is necessary for assaulting troops to travel long distances on these craft (e.g. when landing with LVT) it is recommended that no more than 400 troops be carried and that where sufficient shipping is available the figure be 550.

Again, for long distances it is desirable that up to 40 vacant berths in LCI be left for gear and to ensure comfort.

LOADING OF CRAFT

88 The decisions of commanders of LST, LSM, LCI, LSI and LHA relative to the loading of these ships should be obtained early so that a firm basis can be used from the outset. If this is not done, the requirements of individual captains may later upset plans.

WE AND WET OF MILITARY LANDING GROUP

89 The WE of a military landing group should be increased by two draughtsmen and one clerk and the WET by two adding machines.

FORCE STORES

90 Schedules were prepared by the Divisional Staff showing the distribution of Force stores to ships by convoys and were issued in draft form to services. From these schedules the services prepared a detailed distribution of stores to ships by categories. As far as possible a standard pack was evolved for each type of ship.

ENGINEERS

91 Engineer planning for the operation included not only the allotment of units and equipment to operational tasks, but also the allotment of units and the provision of equipment and stores for base and airfield construction. CRE 7 Aust Div was responsible for co-ordinating the base and airfield with the operational requirements, but because of the shortness of time and the initial non-availability of commanders of base engineer units and airfield construction wing, he had virtually to carry out preliminary planning for them. The engineer appreciation disclosed that the first tasks would be:

- (a) Support of the assaulting brigades;
- (b) Engineer work in the Beach Maintenance Area;
- (c) Construction of an Auster airstrip.

92 It was considered that the early tasks in supporting assaulting brigades would be dealing with mines, booby traps, obstacles and enemy defences and that personnel for these tasks would have to carry sufficient stores for the first day.

A selective quantity of equipment and stores, including proposed demolition pack charges was issued to these personnel. Reserves of explosives and other stores were carried on field company vehicles, all of which were planned to land on the first day, but as some of these vehicles could not be landed until the fourth day, it would have been more satisfactory to have reserves of explosive charges and mine detection stores with the reserve

ammunition of battalions. Another factor in favour of this procedure is that battalions have facilities for bringing forward their own reserves, whereas some delay occurs in calling stores forward from a field company to engineers with the infantry.

- 93 Since the possibility of delay in bulk loaded stores coming ashore and the difficulty of locating them quickly once landed, particularly small parts of bridging equipment, was foreseen, it was decided that all stores and bridging equipment required for the first few days should be loaded tactically on engineer vehicles. The equipment so loaded included one divisional set of Bailey bridging, two small box girders, two pontoon landing bays and an assortment of bridge ironmongery and docking expedients.

- 94 A platoon was allotted for the construction of the Luster strip, and the necessary transport, mechanical equipment and stores for the task were loaded on one LSM, to be called in when required.

The wisdom of keeping stores and equipment for such a specific task together and on a beachable craft was demonstrated.

As the work required on the site selected from aerial photographs was more than anticipated and, as SEPINGGANG Airfield was captured earlier than expected, the chosen site was discarded and a short length of the latter airfield was restored for use by Lusters.

All available information indicated that no pavement material for airfield construction was likely to be found in the area; it was therefore decided to provide for completely covering runways with pierced plank matting (Parsden Mat) and surface all taxiways with a coat of mix-in-place bitumen and sand.

- 95 Arrangements were made for pooling divisional RAE transport and equipment in the early stages so that it could be allotted to either Divisional or base units depending on the tactical situation and the accessibility of the installation sites.

- 96 Aerial photographs were so excellent that they enabled an accurate allocation of bridging equipment.

SIGNALS PLANNING

- 97 Signals planning was carefully co-ordinated with that of the other services and the plan was divided into three parts:-

- (a) Communications - en route to the objective area;
- (b) Communications on FOM Day prior to H Hour;
- (c) Communications from H Hour onwards.

Wireless frequencies were not firm until 15 Jun, and this allowed insufficient time for proper calibration and netting of Army wireless sets.

ORD

- 98 As it was considered that the resources of 1 Aust Ord Beach Det would not be sufficient to perform all ordnance duties in the early stages, it was decided to augment

these by 50 stores personnel from 17 AOD and 20 ammunition personnel from 14 AAD.

OPERATIONS

99 Interesting features of the operation included the following:-

- (a) A frontal attack on a position with exceptionally strong offshore, beach and covering positions made possible mainly by substantial fire power;
- (b) The devastating effect on strongposts of heavy naval and aerial bombardment;
- (c) The small number of infantry troops required to capture even heavily defended positions when sufficient and co-ordinated support is given by supporting arms and naval and aerial bombardment;
- (d) The demonstration of the paralysing effect on the defences of a heavily fortified locality by the seizure of one of its bastions;
- (e) The value of a tactical plan being decided upon early to permit thorough briefing with a minimum of subsequent changes to the basic plan;
- (f) The use of FROG tanks for the first time by 7 Aust Div;
- (g) The extensive use of 4.2-inch mortars as close support weapons during the initial stages of the assault;
- (h) The problems involved in overcoming defences sited in tunnels;
- (i) The value of naval star shells in minimising infiltration at night;
- (j) The large number and variety of intelligence units operating under the supervision and direction of the Divisional Intelligence Staff;
- (k) The value in case of reference in both R/T and messages in allotting code names to all probable tactical features as an overprint. The system of alphabetical progression in this allotment further simplified references;
- (l) The improvisation necessary to unload stores when ISTs cannot beach.

AIR SUPPORT

100 Fluorescent panels in red and yellow were available on a basis of 36 per brigade; permitting one brigade to be completely equipped with one colour. They proved a most valuable method of indication of forward positions to supporting aircraft and were widely used. Our troops were attacked once by our own aircraft on FOX Day. Panels were not being displayed by forward troops.

A limited quantity of red and yellow coloured 25-pounder smoke was available and 140 rounds of red smoke were used effectively to indicate targets to strafing aircraft.

- 101 The heavy air support available and used permitted thorough testing of CSOB(Air) on each brigade headquarters and the Air Support Section with three air support parties and eight air liaison parties. The need for and satisfactory performance of this organisation was proven.
- 102 The formation of a joint Army-Air Force Headquarters until FOX plus 13 Day confirmed the value of this long established practice in other theatres, and was accentuated when it became necessary to split the headquarters.
- 103 An air observer, in a B24 aircraft, was aloft from CSOC to 1200 hours and from 1200 hours to 1600 hours daily for the first five days and was invaluable for contact and tactical reconnaissance. It was possible to listen to a description of the assault and subsequent operations as they were taking place. It was not necessary to employ the air observer in the secondary roles of directing the fire of naval and field guns. Three air observer aircraft were lost by enemy action, the observer of one only being recovered.
- 104 Few suitable areas existed in the early stages for the construction of an Auster strip, especially as it was desired to construct the strip adjacent to field gun positions. The site chosen proved unsuitable and only the early capture of SEPINGANG airstrip allowed them to be airborne by FOX plus 2 Day.

A total of 116 artillery, contact and tactical reconnaissance sorties were carried out to FOX plus 22 Day. No Auster was lost by enemy action although slight damage was caused by light enemy anti-aircraft fire.

Although tactical reconnaissance aircraft were requested as the first priority on the airstrip being ready to receive them, they were not made available until FOX plus 24 Day: ten days after Spitfires first landed. With the extension of the area of operations and the entry into thicker rain forest country it was a serious handicap being without proper tactical reconnaissance aircraft. Austers were used to a limited depth but this is not their proper role and it is an undesirable and often unsafe use. Reports of enemy concentrations and road and barge traffic could not be investigated and interrupted, which fact slowed down exploitation which, in turn, may have added unnecessarily to the sum of casualties amongst the land forces.

AMPHIBIOUS TRACTOR BATTALION (US ARMY)

- 105 During the operations from FOX to FOX plus 2 Day, LVT proved invaluable in landing the assault waves and in transporting heavy weapons, ammunition, consolidation stores, water, etc to forward troops. Apart from their vulnerability, jeeps and trailers in the early stages would have had a limited value due to the steep and sandy terrain behind the beaches.

ARMOUR

- 106 The loose and sandy soil restricted the use of tanks to roads except on the PAPAYATTA and TANE FARE ridges

where they provided valuable support to the infantry. The heavy preliminary naval and aerial bombardment, previous rain and enemy demolitions further limited the use of tanks.

FROGS

107 One troop of FROGS, one troop of tankdozers and one bridgelaying tank were allotted for the operation in addition to two squadrons of MATILDA tanks.

It was planned to use the tanks in co-operation and with the following formation along roads:-

(Gun Tank) - (Gun Tank) - (FROG Tank) - (FROG Tank) -

(Gun Tank) - (FROG Tank)

When opposition was encountered, it was to be engaged by gun tanks from the flanks while the FROGS advanced through to engage the position frontally by flame. The assaulting tanks were to be under the command of the troop leader of the gun tanks.

Due to bogging the tanks could not be used in this manner in the early stages of the operation but one FROG was used in co-operation with infantry with success against tunnels, pill-boxes and strongposts in the capture of PARRAMATTA Bridge and against buildings in the town area. In the later stages of the operation it was not always possible to maintain two FROGS forward due to lack of reserves and technical troubles.

Later, FROGS were used along HILFORD Highway in conjunction with gun tanks, sometimes in the order Gun Tank, FROG, Gun Tank and on other occasions with two gun tanks leading. In this manner many strongposts were reduced and some snipers silenced.

It was found that the moral effect of the flame on the enemy was considerable; in many cases the enemy vacated strongly entrenched positions in panic and fell easy victims to the small arms fire of the co-operating infantry. It had a correspondingly reverse effect on our own troops, inspiring confidence and enthusiasm.

Flame was used at a minimum distance of 15 yards and a maximum of 50. A single burst was generally sufficient for the purpose although a second shot was sometimes necessary to be certain of the desired result.

Observations

108 It is considered that FROGS are used to greater effect in pairs than singly. In the former use both sides of a track or street can be flamed simultaneously and in built-up areas the second FROG can be used, if necessary to fill any gaps left by the first.

Along tracks which are flanked by enemy positions on each side, it is often necessary for FROGS to use a nozzle giving maximum range. Owing to technical considerations, it is difficult for one FROG to be employed effectively in this manner because there is a time lag between shots which should be filled by flame from another tank.

While FROGS were used to good effect, lack of previous training with the co-operating infantry mitigated against their being used with maximum benefit. On some occasions opportunities for their use were allowed to pass unaccepted, while on others the full effect of their use was not achieved because either the tank or infantry commanders failed to appreciate fully the capabilities of the weapon.

In attacking tunnels, strongposts, etc a FROG should always approach under cover of gun tanks.

MATILDA TANKS

109

As has already been observed, the employment of tanks in the early stages was greatly restricted by the nature of the soil, damage caused by heavy preliminary naval and aerial bombardment, enemy demolitions and the use of mines.

In this operation suitable tank country was difficult to assess from aerial photographs.

For the most part operations were conducted on a troop and infantry company basis, the maximum number of tanks used on any one occasion being four. Liaison was established by the tank troop leader and the infantry company commanders and the tank squadron leader was located at battalion headquarters. In addition, there were tank liaison officers at brigade headquarters.

Workshop Facilities

110

owing to the late arrival of the planning team of 1 Aust Arm'd Regt at MOROBI it was necessary for the GCE 7 Aust Div to plan the landing of the workshops. The workshop resources were drawn from three units: 209 Aust LAD, 1 Aust Arm'd Regt Wksp and 4 Aust Arm'd Bde Wksp and the most economical and efficient combination of these elements presented difficulties. As such a combination had been tried in the early stages with only moderate success, it was abandoned for a separate control of equipment and personnel by the units concerned.

The Importance of Thorough Reconnaissance

111

The landing of three tanks by an overwater operation at MANGGAR on 5 Jul to support 2/14 Aust Inf Bn resulted in two being knocked out immediately on landing from enemy coast defence guns firing at approximately 1500 yards range. Prior reconnaissance had been carried out but an incorrect assessment of the cover available was made.

In the overwater operation of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn at PRINDJAN on the same day two of the three supporting tanks were driven off LC which had grounded approximately 70 yards from the water's edge, only to become bogged in deep mud. No Beachmaster took part in this landing.

Old Lessons Again Demonstrated

112

Tanks, wherever possible in open warfare, should lead the infantry, as this formation allows the infantrymen to be placed on the objective with speed and minimum casualties. However, where defences are thick and well camouflaged, it will be necessary for the infantry and engineers to lead and accurately locate these targets for the tanks.

In jungle and where mines are prevalent, infantry must precede the tanks at all times and tanks must

never be launched against unknown objectives or be expected to search unswept ground for targets. It is essential that, when infantry are preceding the tanks, tank officers be forward on foot with the leading infantry elements so that tanks can be quickly and methodically used whenever required.

When tanks are to be employed with infantry, the tank units concerned should be allocated to the infantry formation at least one month prior to the action. Effective co-operation can be assured only by personal contact and combined training.

ARTILLERY

- 115 This operation confirmed that adherence to the artillery training pamphlets will produce satisfactory results.

Provided that communications are good and information fast and accurate, centralised control of the divisional artillery is practicable in semi-jungle country even when the two main axes of advance are at right angles.

The heaviest concentration possible on defended areas in many instances caused the enemy to vacate these enabling the infantry to occupy them without casualties, and in other cases ensured their capture with a minimum of casualties to our own troops.

25-Pounder Mark I and Mark II

- 114 Both guns performed satisfactorily. Reference is made to their use in paragraph 67 of this report.

6-Pounder Tank Attack Gun

- 115 As it was appreciated that man-handling would be the predominant method of moving the 6-pounder tank attack gun in its role of sniping pill-boxes, log emplacements, gun positions and tunnels, the detachments for each gun were increased to an officer or senior NCO and ten other ranks and these personnel were given special training in man-handling guns.

Infantry co-operated closely with the gun crews in locating and describing targets and this weapon was used with good effect against machine gun posts, heavy gun positions and log emplacements. The infantry appreciated the necessity of accurate and clear definition of targets with the 6-pounder used in a sniping role.

Guns were generally emplaced and dug in during the hours of darkness and the target engaged at first light.

4.2-inch Mortars

- 116 12 4.2-inch mortars were landed with the second assault wave at H plus three minutes with the object of providing the earliest possible support for the assaulting infantry during a critical period until the 25-pounder field guns could be brought into action.

Two troops were placed under command of 18 Aust Inf Bde and one troop under command 21 Aust Inf Bde.

The two troops supporting 18 Aust Inf Bde were organised on similar lines to a field battery with BC at

brigade headquarters and one troop allotted to each landing battalion. OPOs and FOOs were available to the brigade with sufficient flexibility of communication to allow the use of the eight mortars as a battery, troops or sections to support either battalion separately or as a complete unit.

In previous training on the Mainland artillery methods of gun drill, fire discipline and fire control, with modifications made necessary by the different equipment, were practised.

These methods proved most satisfactory in this operation.

Reliable protective smoke screens were laid in open country by WP bombs and these bombs were used successfully in conjunction with an Auster OP in jungle country for ranging. HE concentrations proved very effective.

117 A troop of mortars was used to support the landing at PEMADJAI and subsequently to support long range patrols in this area. The country is mainly enclosed with patches of thick jungle and swamp but there are occasional clearings; the whole area is traversed by numerous waterways. The method of moving the mortars in this country varied according to the conditions and comprised the following:-

- (a) DUKW (load: one section mortars, crew and 100 bombs);
- (b) Prahui;
- (c) Jeep;
- (d) Miphhandling: greatest lift 600 yards;
- (e) Logging railway: on one occasion an advance of 2500 yards was made on trucks pushed by the crew.

118 The following conclusions could be drawn from the use of 4.2-inch mortars in this operation:-

- (a) The weapon is ideally suited for the role of early support in an amphibious operation until the field artillery can be brought into action;
- (b) During later phases, it is a valuable addition to fire power;
- (c) The HE bomb has a better comparative lethal and moral effect than the 3-inch mortar bomb but it is not as accurate and has a larger danger area; therefore support cannot be brought down close to troops with 4.2-inch mortars as with 3-inch mortars;
- (d) WP smoke proved effective and reliable;
- (e) Infantry must realise that the 4.2-inch mortar is an additional supporting weapon and not a substitute for the 3-inch mortar.

ENGINEERS

Demolition of Bridges

119 Although Japanese demolition of bridges was far from efficient, there were many partially demolished bridges and gaps in roads requiring repair or new construction.

22 days after the landing the following bridging equipment was committed:-

| | |
|---|---|
| Bailey bridges | 5 |
| Pontoon Mark V trestle and superstructure | 3 |
| PLB | 2 |
| SBC | 3 |
| FBI trestle and superstructure | 3 |

Mines and Booby Traps

120 The enemy used mines and booby traps extensively. These were very seldom laid in regular fields, the general practice being to lay them irregularly along the shoulders of roads and scattered throughout the likely bivouac areas. Generally they appeared to be laid for their nuisance value rather than as part of a defensive system; for they were neither properly covered by fire nor sited to take advantage of the topography. Such mines and booby traps caused negligible casualties.

A number of controlled mines was encountered along the MILFORD Highway and these caused casualties to our troops. They were usually well sited and controlled from well concealed positions with good observation. They were countered by stalking patrols of infantry and engineers reaching and cutting the wires from the flanks.

The mines found were mostly improvised and usually contained large quantities of explosive. Faval depth charges, aerial bombs, locally manufactured canisters of explosive and an assortment of shells fitted with firing devices of all types were used in this way. Over eight thousand of all kinds had been deloused by 22 Jul.

Tunnels and Pill-Boxes

121 A total of 110 tunnels and pill-box were demolished by engineers in co-operation with infantry.

The most satisfactory method of sealing tunnels was to explode two 25-pound pack charges on the floor of the tunnel just inside the entrance. Covering fire was provided by the infantry to enable the engineer demolition parties to approach and withdraw. Six engineers assisted by six pioneers from infantry battalions were attached to each assaulting rifle company and three engineers and three sappers to each "follow-up" rifle company. This allotment was found to be satisfactory in the circumstances. Where defences are not so many, an allotment of three engineers and three pioneers to every rifle company would probably be adequate. These engineer parties had, in addition, the tasks of detection and neutralisation of mines and booby traps, breaching and crossing obstacles and of giving assistance to the infantry in defensive positions with protective booby traps and alarm devices.

Command

122 Centralised command of all engineer units in the early stages of an operation of this nature is considered essential. The time of handing over command of engineers to their own formations should be flexible, depending on the conditions obtaining at the time, and should be decided only by the task force commander.

Equipment Required Early

123 All equipment likely to be required during the first three or four days; other than that carried on the man, should be vehicle loaded. This applies particularly to bridging equipment, where the absence of a few small parts renders the equipment useless.

It is desirable that all vehicles carrying equipment for particular tasks anticipated on the first or second day of an operation be loaded on one landing craft of a type that can beach under the worst conditions, and that arrangements be made for calling in such craft when it is required.

Sufficient stores to support the infantry for some hours and preferably for the first day should be carried on the man.

Reserves of explosives and similar stores for infantry support should be carried by battalions with unit reserve ammunition as well as in the reserves of field companies.

Pioneer tools should be issued to infantry units on a liberal scale, to be brought ashore in assault craft and discarded on the beach for subsequent collection.

Roads

124 The roads throughout the area were narrow and had been designed for light traffic only. Our own bombardment and enemy demolition destroyed much of the drainage and left many craters. Mechanical equipment could not be used on drains due to the high water table and manual labour available was inadequate for the task. With the drainage difficulties and the complete absence of road surfacing material in the area, it was impossible during the early stages to carry out much improvement to the road system. However, operations were not slowed up through lack of road communications at any time.

Trafficable roads are vital. Road preservation is so closely connected with proper drainage that it is advisable for all arms to receive some training in the principles affecting drainage; this tuition might best be given by films specially prepared for the purpose.

Training In Mines and Booby Traps

125 Training in mine detection and booby trap clearance should be devoted to principles rather than to particularities of known types. If principles are thoroughly understood, engineers will have confidence in dealing with any mine or booby trap whether it has been encountered or not. Other arms should be trained in recognition and avoidance only.

Landing Transporters 20-Ton

126 Due to bad sand performance and difficulty in negotiating causeway laps and ramps, transporters 20-ton are not suitable for landing from LCT over MLE pontoon causeways.

SIGNALS

127 Complete heavy wireless stations providing the rear link with 1st Corps were loaded into DUKWS at HOROTAI and landed in this way on the far shore. This arrangement has much to recommend it as it ensures careful transport of the equipment and enables it to operate in the

shortest possible time on the far shore.

Beach Signals

- 128 Brigades did not use the ABSOs and in spite of Divisional Signals not landing jeep-mounted wireless sets, ~~Advanced~~ Divisional Headquarters did not use the MBSO but set up its headquarters some distance off the beach.

Line Communication

- 129 It was again proved that during the initial stages of the operation, line is a most unreliable means of communication. It is considered that the energy expended by linesmen in laying fast cable which, due to traffic, lasts in some cases a matter of minutes, could be more profitably expended in building a reliable poled main artery forward of the landing beaches. Such an artery could be used by the higher formations as they land and would render unnecessary the laying of duplicate lines until such time as the Divisional Headquarters is more firmly established.

MACHINE GUN BATTALIONS

- 130 The terrain in this operation was more suitable for medium machine gun support than that previously encountered in other AMF operations in the SWPA and Divisional machine gun battalion and infantry machine gun platoons were used extensively.

Fire plans employing a machine gun company in support were used and ranges varied from 150 to 2800 yards, most firing being between 400 and 1600 yards. At one stage one brigade had the equivalent of nearly three companies deployed.

Types of supporting fire included:-

- (a) Direct fire;
- (b) Overhead fire;
- (c) Harassing fire including that on reverse slopes;
- (d) Support to patrols;
- (e) Map shoots at ranges of 1800 - 2000 yards based on 1 : 10,000 map;
- (f) Support to deliberate attacks;
- (g) Defensive fire;
- (h) Sniping 25-mm guns and neutralising mortars.

Valuable support was given by a MG officer moving forward with the attacking infantry and controlling MG support by SCR 536.

The importance of MG battalion training extensively with infantry cannot be overstressed as so many supporting weapons are now available to an infantry commander that the maximum value of the effectiveness and flexibility of the machine gun is likely to be obtained only by his consulting the supporting machine gun officer; the use of the weapon detailed and the co-ordination between the infantry machine gun platoon and machine gun battalion guns are cases in point.

INTELLIGENCE

131

Reference has already been made in paragraph 54 to the large number of intelligence units and organisations assisting the Division in this operation or controlled by the intelligence section of the general staff. These included the following:-

- Corps intelligence;
- Geological engineer intelligence;
- NEFIS (Netherlands Expeditionary Forces Intelligence Service);
- NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration);
- RAN intelligence;
- RAAF and USAAF intelligence;
- US naval intelligence;
- AIB (Allied Intelligence Bureau);
- SRD (Services Reconnaissance Department);
- FELO (Far Eastern Liaison Office);
- SI (Special Intelligence);
- CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps);
- FSS (Field Security Section);
- FSS (EE) (Field Security Section (Enemy Equipment));
- ATIS (Allied Translation and Interrogation Section);
- AAPI Gp (Aust Army Photographic Interpretation Group);
- Military History;
- Public Relations;
- MEIU (Mobile Explosive Intelligence Unit);
- Flakintel;
- US naval ordnance
- RAN enemy equipment.

The time allotted for planning required all information to be collated in three weeks. An increase in the Divisional intelligence staff is required during planning and the first strenuous weeks of operations to cope with this work.

It is recommended that two additional intelligence officers and two additional draughtsmen be attached to a division from a pool for such phases.

FSS (Enemy Equipment)

132

This operation was the first in which Field Security Section (Enemy Equipment) worked with the Division. As the section is commanded by a warrant officer, its activities were directed by GSO3(I) through OC FSS.

The section was useful to battalions in an area which was booty trapped and heavily mined. It was valuable to the Division in detailed examination of new weapons and reporting on the location and type of a great quantity of heavy enemy weapons. The presence of an NCO with each battalion was responsible for the safe collection of a mass of equipment which would otherwise have been lost to souvenir hunters. FSS is not in a position during the early stages of an operation to concentrate on enemy equipment as its time is fully occupied mainly with the collection and sorting of documents.

It is considered that the war establishment is satisfactory. The absence of an officer is overcome by direct approach to OC FSS or GSO3(I). No transport is

permanently allotted to the section but demands are made on the divisional pool.

It is recommended that the section be retained and permanently allotted to the jungle division. In non-active periods personnel should be attached to the brigades and battalions with which they are likely to operate to gain the confidence of the units they directly assist and to be available for lectures and demonstrations.

It is desirable, however, that CRE maintain close supervision of FSS(EE) activities in the field of enemy explosives.

INFANTRY

Fire Support

133 Of the old lessons, that of the use of fire support was perhaps the best demonstrated throughout the operation. The maximum available fire power was brought to bear on the enemy on every occasion before the infantry was committed to the assault. The results can be measured by the low casualty rate.

Support calls by infantry could normally be made on:-

- (a) Air support (bombing, strafing, NAE AM);
- (b) Naval gunfire (cruisers, destroyers and, in some cases LCI(G) and LCI(R));
- (c) Field artillery (25-pounder);
- (d) Tank-attack artillery (6-pounder as sniping gun);
- (e) 4.2-inch mortars;
- (f) MATILDA tanks;
- (g) FROG flame throwing tanks;
- (h) Manpack M2 flame throwers;
- (i) Sub-units of Divisional machine gun battalion;
- (j) Engineer assault and demolition parties;

in addition to the normal battalion weapons including:-

- (k) 3-inch mortars (which can be brigaded);
- (l) Machine Gun Platoon;
- (m) Tank-attack 2-pounder guns;
- (n) WP grenades;
- (o) PITA.

With such a wide range of weapons there is no target nor enemy concentration which cannot be adequately neutralised or destroyed. The successful use of these weapons depends on a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and a sound knowledge of their tactical employment. Intensive and extensive infantry co-operative training is essential if

the best use is to be gained from all the weapons available and great care is necessary in the preparation of a co-ordinated fire plan.

It is easier now than at any stage of the war to effect heavy concentrations of fire and this operation provided numerous practical examples.

Application of Principle of Speed and Maintenance of the Objective

- 134 Speed and maintenance of the objective were most strikingly demonstrated by the 21 Aust Inf Bde advance along the VASEY Highway to MANGGAR. The provision of an additional company from 2/27 Aust Inf Bn to clear tracks on the flanks of the advance enabled 2/14 Aust Inf Bn to reach its objective as a complete unit. The result was that the enemy was surprised and caught off balance. His forces were split into small components which never managed to re-concentrate into a composite fighting force.

Open Country and Jungle

- 135 Wherever possible the enemy should be fought in open country and destroyed in situ. Once the battle enters the jungle, our superior fire power loses some of its effect in that observation is poor, manoeuvrability of guns greatly diminished and often it is necessary for forward troops to be withdrawn while gunfire is brought to bear. This last requirement means breaking contact and then closing with the enemy again - a procedure which inevitably results in casualties to moving troops. The plan employed in this campaign provided that we should fight in country most advantageous to us where the full power of our weapons could be employed.

Communications

- 136 (a) In jungle country, especially where maps are not always accurate, patrols often find difficulty in pin-pointing their positions. Where a patrol has to move several thousand yards to its objective, or its final approach is to be preceded by a concentration of mortar or artillery fire on the objective, some visual system of establishing the patrol's position is essential. 2-inch mortar smoke, parachute flares or a very flare, fired by the patrol ten minutes before the support fire is to come down are three methods of indicating its position. In addition it is often advisable to fire one round of artillery smoke on to the objective ten minutes before the main concentration. If the patrol is too close, it will thus be given sufficient time to withdraw from the danger zone.
- (b) Flares were also found a good supplementary means for patrols to indicate their progress in jungle country, when observation was possible from open ground or from the air.
- (c) The more important patrols require wireless communications. The working of 108 set to 103 set was not entirely satisfactory but that of 108 set to the wireless set No 22 at Battalion headquarters was.
- (d) Pigeons were used successfully by long range patrols for which wireless could not be provided.

OP and Command Posts

- 137 OPs and command posts in view of the enemy must be concealed, with covered approaches, and only essential personnel should use them.

Reverse Slopes

- 138 Some casualties were needlessly suffered through insufficient appreciation of ground values resulting in the adoption of forward slope positions which enable posts to be destroyed separately by observed enemy fire. In open country with sparse cover, the reverse slope is often preferable. The forward slope may be a good alternative for night occupation.

3-inch Mortars

- 139 The method of using mortars by batteries of four or more proved very successful. FOOs and communications were employed in a similar manner to their use by field artillery. This grouping of 3-inch mortars provides the battalion commander with a heavy concentration of fire where it is needed.

When concentrated the requisite communications impose a heavy strain on the mortar signalmen, and special training is necessary.

M2-2 Manpack Flame-throwers

- 14 M2-2 Manpack Flame-throwers were used with success throughout the operation against such targets as tunnels, pill-boxes, log emplacements, weapon pits and snipers.

The load imposed heavy strain and fatigue on the operator when long carriage was necessary. LVTs, tanks and jeeps moving to forward areas wherever possible for the transport of the flame-thrower.

A full account of the use and functioning of this equipment is contained in Appendix "M" attached.

NIGHT INFILTRATION

Star Shell

- 141 The greater part of the fighting in the first ten days of the operation took place in fairly open country with opposing FDLs an average of about 1000 yards apart.

Only a limited quantity of 25-pounder star shell was available which it was desirable to conserve until naval support was withdrawn, was out of range, or for an emergency.

Night harassing programmes were submitted each night to the Navy and always included a proportion of naval star shell.

During this period there were virtually no enemy attempts at night infiltration. When operations later extended to jungle and naval star shell was neither in range nor considered of use owing to the thick cover, infiltration became frequent and annoying.

Although the use of star shell cannot be considered solely responsible for the absence of enemy night activity, in open country it is a useful safeguard and is recommended.

In addition, the following were used with effect:-

- (a) Extensive trip wire booby traps with sentry posts close to troop sleeping positions so that the men could be quickly and quietly aroused;
- (b) Pre-registered DF and SOS artillery. MMG and mortar tasks in which fire was brought down within 30 yards of our FDLs. Provided troops are well dug in, this method is very effective and reasonably safe;
- (c) 25-pounder artillery star shell;
- (d) In jungle, small patrols can be moved up the track to occupy positions close to the enemy FDLs at last light. As enemy patrols usually follow the tracks to within 50 yards of our positions before deploying, they can be caught as they leave their own FDLs.

It is important that in defensive positions at night only outside men must fire and there must be no movement above the ground of our own troops.

VEHICLE LOADING

- 142 Care must be exercised that vehicles are not overloaded. Vehicles with poor sand performance, such as semi-trailers, should be loaded very lightly, if at all.

Mechanical equipment should not be used for the carriage of stores.

LANDING ON THE FAR SHORE

Beach Markers

- 143 Beaches in this operation were named GREEN, YELLOW and RED. Training exercises confirmed the difficulty of clear indication of beach limits by markers. RED and YELLOW fluorescent panels designed for use in marking forward ground positions to supporting aircraft were employed vertically facing seawards to mark beach limits of their respective colours, and they were very effective.

Landing of Vehicles

- 144 Vehicles landed on the first and second days should be kept to a minimum as, until a sufficient area for the dispersal of vehicles and the reception of stores is developed; efficient handling of vehicles and stores is not possible.

UNLOADING AND DEVELOPMENT FAR SHORE

- 145 Unloading at the far shore, with few exceptions, proceeded according to plan. Although sea conditions and sporadic enemy gunfire retarded the unloading programme, at no time during the operation was the Force embarrassed by lack of supplies. Actually the delay in unloading enabled

the beaches to be kept clear of stores when the heavy cratering of roads, demolition of bridges and damage to suitable beach exits caused by LVTs would have made it a slow task to transport large quantities of stores to suitable dump areas.

Supply of Artillery Ammunition During the Early Stages

- 146 As a heavy usage rate of artillery ammunition was anticipated during the early stages of the operation it was decided to load each of four LCT with 65 tons of this ammunition. These were beached at H plus 77 minutes and DUKWs and GMC 6X6 transported the ammunition direct to the gun sites at the rate of 50 tons per hour.

FIRST KEY PLAN

- 147 The First Key Plan was satisfactory for an initial BMA with minor alterations but major readjustments were effected later to provide for better dump areas. The First Key Plan is attached as Appendix "N" and the Beach Maintenance Area layout as at 10 Jul 45 is shown as Appendix "O" attached.

LABOUR ON BEACHES

- 148 The labour available to the Beach Group was 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn, 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn and 28 Aust Wks Coy. After allowance had been made for essential administrative personnel within the units, beach staffs, unit stores personnel and PW guards, the labour available for the unloading was 1500.

The number of personnel employed up to 21 Jul when 7 Aust Base Sub Area took over all responsibilities was as follows:-

| | | | |
|-------------|--------|-------------|---------|
| FOX Day | 378(a) | FOX plus 11 | 1417 |
| FOX plus 1 | 527 | FOX plus 12 | 1478(c) |
| FOX plus 2 | 576 | FOX plus 13 | 1371 |
| FOX plus 3 | 989(b) | FOX plus 14 | 1372 |
| FOX plus 4 | 1175 | FOX plus 15 | 1332 |
| FOX plus 5 | 1191 | FOX plus 16 | 1242 |
| FOX plus 6 | 1144 | FOX plus 17 | 1223 |
| FOX plus 7 | 1324 | FOX plus 18 | 1265 |
| FOX plus 8 | 1325 | FOX plus 19 | 1130 |
| FOX plus 9 | 1320 | FOX plus 20 | 1130 |
| FOX plus 10 | 1379 | | |

- (a) Low numbers up to FOX plus 3 were due to slow build-up as personnel were landed;
- (b) 28 Aust Wks Coy commenced;
- (c) C Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn released from engineer work.

UNLOADING RATES

- 149 Appendix "P" sets out the unloading details. The average unloading times were as follows:-

| | | |
|------|-----------------|--------------------|
| LCMs | Crane operated | 7.1 tons per hour |
| | Manual operated | 9.2 tons per hour |
| LCTs | Crane operated | 8.6 tons per hour |
| | Manual operated | 11.3 tons per hour |
| LSTs | Vehicles | 40 per hour |
| | Stores | 25 tons per hour |

AASC

- 150 The AASC functioned very smoothly throughout the operation and at no time was there a shortage of essential supplies.

Captured Supplies

- 151 Considerable quantities of enemy supplies, principally rice, biscuits and canned products were located and handed over to NICA.

MEDICALWater

- 152 Water was a problem in the first week as the sources available, due to fine clay in suspension, required excessive water sterilising powder.

Native Hospitalisation

- 153 NICA personnel were landed early and, as natives did not return in large numbers until FOX plus 4 Day, proper care and treatment of the sick was possible from the start.

Incidence of Diseases

- 154 Dengue, malaria and dysentery were the only diseases experienced and their incidence was very low.

ORDNANCEAmmunition

- 155 Available quantities of the following natures of ammunition were not as great as requested:-

3-inch mortar HE
Grenades No 77 WP
4.2-inch mortar HE
4.2-inch mortar smoke
3-inch How HE

However, increased quantities of other natures, especially 25-pounder, compensated somewhat for the shortages and expenditure was less than anticipated owing to the speedy development of the campaign.

PRIORITY STORES ON THE FAR SHORE

- 156 Priority stores required on the far shore should be loaded on vehicles or beachable craft.

AUGMENTATION OF ORD BEACH DET

- 157 Reference has already been made to the necessity for augmenting the personnel of Ord Beach Det for the early

period of its operation. It is not suggested that the WE of an Ord Beach Det should be increased but that appropriate personnel from "follow-up" base installations be attached temporarily during the early busy period.

Early Provision of Mechanical Spare Parts

158 With a force of the size used in this operation a complete Bde Ord Fd Pk should be landed on the first day to cope with the numerous issues to IADs and workshop units.

A light section of an armoured regiment Ord Fd Pk carrying only essential parts for first echelon repairs to tanks is required to land on the first day.

AEME

159 The serviceability of equipment during the operation was of a high order.

Waterproofing, recovery and equipment were adequate for the operation.

PROVOST

160 Valuable work was done by the Provost Corps in the early stages of the operation in regulating and directing traffic. This was a real problem as the roads available for use were few and in need of constant repair.

PART IV - WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

161 Weapons and equipment will be referred to in this part only if their functioning in the operation was unusual or in some other way worthy of comment.

FROG Tanks

162 Except for two minor mishaps the FROG tanks were reliable. One burst a high pressure hose which was being used as a temporary measure pending the issue of metal swivel joints; while the other tank was put out of action until a leak in the air system caused by a blowhole in the metal casing could be located and repaired.

Bulldozer Tanks

163 These tanks were not efficient. Once they left the road, they became bogged due to the extra weight on the front of the vehicle. This 3½ tons added weight on the front of the vehicle greatly restricts its manoeuvrability. When the tank is closed down, it is impossible for either the crew commander or the tank driver to see ground closer than approximately six yards from the tank. This means that both tank and the dozer blade are hidden from the operator at the most important time.

Bridgelay Tank

164 Satisfactory movement of the bridgelay tank is restricted to the roads.

Short 25-Pounder

- 165 Reference has already been made in paragraph 167(f) to the successful functioning of the short 25-pounder.

4.2-Inch Mortar

- 166 One instance of breakage and two of bending occurred in the relieved portion of the threaded neck of the barrel caps. The damaged portions of one mortar were forwarded to I Aust Corps through AEME channels. Apart from these defects the equipment performed well.

It is recommended that artillery type aiming posts be issued on the scale of at least two per mortar; these would facilitate laying and increase speed in running up.

Cranes

- 167 The tracked crane HD7 has a very limited use. With its fixed boom it is necessary to lock one track while turning; this quickly causes the crane to bog in bad ground and in good ground soon spoils the surface for wheeled traffic. Cranes for use in dumps should have a 560 degrees traverse independent of tracks.

Semi-Trailers 7-Ton and Derrick Lorries

- 168 Semi-trailers and derrick lorries have a very poor performance in bad ground. It is considered that if the traction unit were converted to dual rear wheels, similar to the three-ton tipping truck, their performance would be satisfactory even in very bad ground.

Outboard Propulsion Units

- 169 The Pontoon Mark 7 22HP Propulsion Unit was used extensively for river patrol work. This unit requires considerable maintenance for efficiency.

Mine Detectors

- 170 Two types of mine detectors were used - Mine Detectors Aust No 2 Mk I and US Detectors. Conclusive comparisons were not obtained but the following opinions are of interest:-

- (a) US detectors are preferred because visual as well as aural indication is given;
- (b) Both detectors appear equal in accuracy and sensitivity;
- (c) Of 12 Aust and 10 US detectors used in the operation, eight US pattern gave continuous service while only one Aust pattern was serviceable 22 days after the beginning of the operation;
- (d) All detectors were subjected to splashing during the landing. The Aust pattern was not affected but until it dried out the US pattern lacked sensitivity;
- (e) The US pattern is too sensitive: very small pieces of metal on the ground give a reaction;

- (f) In the vicinity of the landing beaches, prodders were more useful than mine detectors because large quantities of shell and bomb splinters were picked up by the detectors.

Working Drawings With Special Equipment

- 171 The working drawings supplied with the 5000 cubic feet refrigerator were damaged beyond recognition on arrival and caused some delay in its erection.

Assembly plans accompanying special equipment should be in waterproof containers. A satisfactory method would be to enclose them in a soldered canister attached to a portion of the plant.

Switchboards TC 12

- 172 These boards have three defects:-
- (a) The shutters do not drop sufficiently to indicate clearly that a call is being made;
 - (b) The provision of marking extensions above relays is not practical;
 - (c) Cords do not readily return to sockets.

Cable Electric DIII Single

- 173 The use of DIII single cable for Divisional Signals has the following disadvantages:-

- (a) Slowness and awkwardness in the laying of metallic pairs;
- (b) Difficulty in identifying pairs on congested routes.

In congested areas, such as a beachhead, it is common to find 20 single DIII lines along any route. It is almost impossible to tell, without extensive testing, which pairs of lines constitute a circuit. As a result many instances occurred in this operation of lines being crossed during repair work, particularly that done during the hours of darkness. With twisted cable this difficulty is largely overcome. However, when more time is available for laying, spaced DIII single cable gives better speech characteristics.

Wireless Sets No 46

- 174 These were not issued in the staging area until rather late as new crystals had not arrived. The sets worked very well.

Wireless SCR 536

- 175 The main faults that developed in the SCR 536 were low crystal activity and faulty condenser type C27. Although crystals were requested, these did not arrive until the units were moving from the staging area. No replacement was possible. The C27 condensers did not arrive in time.

Slidex Code

- 176 SLIDEX was not used extensively in this operation due to insufficient time being available for a thorough knowledge of it to be obtained prior to use.

Formations and units preferred the use of maps with overprint code names in conjunction with the map reference code.

Bags Waterproof Clothing (Aust) and (US)

- 177 Bags waterproof clothing (Aust), bags waterproof clothing (US) and sheets waterproof were used and all proved very satisfactory.

Owen Sub Machine Guns

- 178 It was found that the recoil springs of OSMG quickly weakened and resulted in faulty feeds. Either frequent replacements have to be accepted or a better quality spring used. A stronger spring is also required for magazines; it was found that springs weakened after the magazines had remained loaded for a period.

5-Inch Mortars

- 179 (a) Recoil springs were too weak to withstand, for any period, the use of charge IV: some were broken, while all were stretched;
- (b) Instances occurred of the buckling and tilting sideways of the lightened base plates, especially when high charges at large switches from zero line were used;
- (c) The lugs holding the breech piece into the base socket require strengthening to prevent the opening up of the lugs which allows the breech piece to jump out during firing.

Mechanical Skid Loaders

- 180 Although only one of these was available for the operation, it proved a most efficient means of handling 44-gallon drums. The allocation of seven drum lifters per beach group is considered necessary.

Lighting

- 181 It is recommended that the seven lighting sets now authorised for beach groups be increased to ten, these to be allotted as follows:-

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| RAE Stores | 1 |
| Sup Dep | 1 |
| POL | 1 |
| Amn | 1 |
| Ord | 1 |
| Unit stores | 1 |
| PW cage | 1 |
| Beaches | 3 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 10 |

Fire Fighting Equipment

- 182 Although one JUPITER fire pump was available to the beach group, it was equipped with insufficient hose and contained no Pyrene foam attachment; it could have been operated only in close proximity to water. It is considered that a vehicle similar to the RAAF fire fighting tender should form part of a beach group equipment.

GMC Trucks 2½-ton 6X6

- 183 GMC trucks 2½-ton 6X6 gave an excellent performance throughout the operation.

Gravity Rollers

- 184 Gravity rollers were not used on the beaches but they were of great value at the AASC and Ordnance dumps.

Ammunition

- 185 Both the condition and performance of ammunition were generally good. However, instances occurred of the tail assemblies of bombs ML 4.2-inch mortar becoming detached in flight and also in the mortar barrel.


D8 Tractors

- 186 D8 tractors for tank recovery require both a winch and a dozer blade

APPENDIX A to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The Chain of Command for the Operation is shown hereunder:-



LEGEND

Chain of Command _____

In Support

Direct Communication Authorised - - - -

APPENDIX 'C' to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

ORDER OF BATTLE

PART I

7 AUST DIV UNITS

HQ UNITS

HQ 7 Aust Div
2 Aust Op Report Team
Det Directorate of Public Relations
4 Flt 1 Aust Mob Met Sqn
7 Aust Mil Hist Fd Team (LHQ Tps)

CAV

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

ARTY

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div
2/4 Aust Fd Regt
2/5 Aust Fd Regt
2/6 Aust Fd Regt
2/2 Aust Tk A Regt
2/7 Aust Svy Bty

ENGRS

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
2/4 Aust Fd Coy
2/5 Aust Fd Coy
2/6 Aust Fd Coy
2/9 Aust Fd Coy
2/25 Aust Fd Pl Coy

SIGS

Sigs 7 Aust Div
2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt Sig Tp
2/4 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec
2/5 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec
2/6 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec
2/2 Aust Tk A Regt Sig Sec
2 Aust Arty Sig Tp
2 Aust Engr Sig Sec
18 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
25 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
2/42 Aust Cipher Sec

INF

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde
HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde
HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde
2/9 Aust Inf Bn
2/10 Aust Inf Bn
2/12 Aust Inf Bn

INF (Contd)

2/14 Aust Inf Bn
2/16 Aust Inf Bn
2/27 Aust Inf Bn
2/25 Aust Inf Bn
2/31 Aust Inf Bn
2/33 Aust Inf Bn
2/1 Aust Pnr Bn
2/1 Aust MG Bn
HQ B Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt
5 Pl B Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt
6 Pl B Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt
7 Pl B Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt
8 Pl B Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt

INT

7 Aust Div Det ATIS (GHQ Tps)
'G' Aust FS Sec

ST

Hq Comd 7 Aust Div AASC
Hq 2/6 Aust Gen Tpt Coy
2/10 Aust Tpt Pl
2/11 Aust Tpt Pl
2/12 Aust Tpt Pl
2/6 Aust Wksp Pl
Hq 2/153 Aust Gen Tpt Coy
2/7 Aust Tpt Pl
2/8 Aust Tpt Pl
2/9 Aust Tpt Pl
2/43 Aust Tpt Pl
2/153 Aust Wksp Pl
Hq 2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy
2/5 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/6 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/7 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/8 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/9 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/10 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/33 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/34 Aust Sup Dep Pl

MED

2/2 Aust CCS
2/4 Aust Fd Amb
2/5 Aust Fd Amb
2/6 Aust Fd Amb
2/101 Aust Mob Bath Unit
2/2 Aust MCU (Type A)
One Laundry Increment AAMC

DENTAL

2/6 Aust Dental Unit

ORD

2/117 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk
2/124 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk
2/125 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk

AEME

2/117 Aust Bde Wksp
2/124 Aust Bde Wksp
2/125 Aust Bde Wksp
2/47 Aust LAD (Type J)
2/51 Aust LAD (Type D)
2/52 Aust LAD (Type D)
2/53 Aust LAD (Type D)
2/54 Aust LAD (Type G)
2/55 Aust LAD (Type A)
2/56 Aust LAD (Type A)
2/59 Aust LAD (Type J)
315 Aust LAD (Type J)

POSTAL

7 Aust Div Postal Unit

PRO

7 Aust Div Pro Coy

AMENITIES

113 Mob Cinema Aust Cinema Unit
114 Mob Cinema Aust Cinema Unit

MISC

7 Aust Div Reception Camp
7 Aust Div Sal Unit
3 Aust Visitors & Observers Sec

PART II

1 AUST CORPS TROOPS AND RAAF UNITS ALLOTTED TO 7 AUST DIV

Hq UNITS

Det 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec
1 Aust Mil Ldg Gp
Det 11 Aust MC Gp (Type E)

ARMED

Hq 1 Aust Armd Regt
2/1 Aust Armd Bde Recce Sqn less Det

ARTY

A Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp
2/1 Aust Comp AA Regt

SVY

Det 5 Aust Fd Svy Coy

SIGS

Det Hq A Aust Corps Sigs
3 Aust Line Sec
13 Aust Line Maint Sec
1 Aust Wireless Sec (Hy)
2 Aust Wireless Sec (Lt)
1 Aust Armd Regt Sig Tp less Det
2/1 Aust AA Regt (Comp) Sig Sec
8 Aust Pigeon Sec (Type A) less Det

INT

Det 2 AAPI Gp
35 Aust FS Sec (EE)

ST

Hq 3 Aust Sup Dep Coy
11 Aust Sup Dep Pl
12 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/25 Aust Tpt Pl
2/21 Aust Tpt Pl (DUKWS)
2/3 Aust Amphibious Increment

MED

110 Aust Adv Dep Med Stores
2/3 Aust CCS
21 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit (Type B)
10 Aust Fd Amb
2/3 Aust Mob Bact Lab
4 Aust Mob Entomological Sec

DENTAL

2/1 Aust Dental Unit
2/2 Aust Dental Unit less three Secs

ORD

1 Aust Armd Regt Ord Fd Pk (IE)
Det 4 Aust Armd Bde Ord Fk Pk
120 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk

ABCE

1 Aust Armd Regt Wksp (Type A) less Det
4 Aust Armd Bde Wksp less Det
120 Aust Bde Wksp
2/1 Aust Comp AA Regt Wksp
205 Aust IAD (Type H) less det

PRO

'A' Det SIB Det 1 Aust Corps

GRAVES

24 Aust War-Graves Unit

RAAF UNITS

No.61 Airfield Constr Wing HQ
No.1 Airfield Constr Sqn
No.2 Airfield Constr Sqn
No.3 Airfield Constr Sqn
No.6 Airfield Constr Sqn
No.4 Wireless Unit Det

PART III

2 AUST BEACH GROUP

HQ

HQ 2 Aust Beach Gp

ENGRS

2/11 Aust Fd Coy
2 Aust Mech Eqp Pl
2 Aust Beach Gp Stores Pl

SIGS

1 Aust Beach Sig Sec
4 Aust Beach Sig Sec

INF

2/2 Aust Pnr Bn

INT

'B' Det 'Q' Aust FS Sec

MED

2 AAMC Coy (Beach Gp)
23 AMCU (Type C)

ORD

1 Aust Ord Beach Det

AEME

2 Aust Beach Wksp

SAL

1 Aust Armd Bde Sal Unit

RAN UNITS ATT

B and D RAN Beach Commandos

PART IV

7 AUST BASE SUB AREA UNITS

HQ

Hq 7 Aust Base Sub Area (Type D)
Det 2 Aust Adv 2nd Echelon

ENGRS

12 CRE (Works)
57 Aust CRE (Works)
2/4 Aust Fd Sqn
21 Aust Fd Coy
9 Aust A Tps Coy
11 Aust Wksp & Pk Coy
2/3 Aust Docks Op Coy
2/10 Aust Docks Op Coy
Det 7 Pl 1 Aust Port Maint Coy
2/2 Aust Rly Constr Coy
1 Aust Port Constr Coy
3 Aust Welding Pl
5 Aust Welding Pl
5 Aust Mech Eqpt Spare Parts Sec
Det 11 Aust Small Ships Coy

SIGS

'C' Det HQ 22 L of C Sigs
13 Aust Line Sec
'A' Det 9 Aust Tech Maint Sec
'B' Det 94 Aust Tele Swbd Op Sec
9 Aust Tele Op Sec
3 Aust DR Sec (less A and B Dets)
'B' Det 4 Aust Sig Eqpt Sec
36 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K) (less Det)

INT

'B' Det 1 Aust Fd Censorship Coy
'B' Det 'C' Aust FS Sec

ST

20 Aust Fd Baking Pl
46 Aust Fd Baking Pl
66 Aust BIPOD Pl
2/4 Aust MAC Pl
'C' Det 4 Aust Bulk Petroleum Storage Coy

MED

2/12 Aust Gen Hosp (600 beds)
One Surgical Team 2/12 Aust Gen Hosp
One Surgical Team 2/2 Aust Gen Hosp
Three Laundry Increments AAMC
14 Aust MCU (Type B)
17 Aust MCU (Type B)

DENTAL

2 Sec 1 Aust Base Depot Dental Stores

ORD

Det 17 AOD
Det 4 Aust RSD
Det 10 Aust Ord Veh Pk
Det 5 Aust Ord Port Det
Det 2/7 Aust Mob Laundry & Fwd Decon Unit
Det 14 Aust LAD
2 Aust Mob Amn Repair Shop
2/3 Aust Inf Tps Ord Fd Pk (less one Veh Pk Sec)

AEME

2/3 Aust Inf Tps Wksp
5 Aust Mech Eqpt Wksp
228 Aust LAD
305 Aust LAD
336 Aust LAD
'B' Sec 10 Aust Veh Pk Wksp
6 Aust Mob Gas Gen Sec
5 Aust Mob Tyre Repair Wksp Sec

PAY

73 Aust Depot Cash Office
108 Aust Depot Cash Office

POSTAL

'A' Det 6 Aust Base Postal Unit

PRO

5, 6 Secs 2/3 Aust L of C Pro Coy

PRINTING & STATIONERY

'C' Det 11 Aust L of C Stationery Depot

AACS

Adv Det AACS

AMENITIES

17 Mob Cinema Aust Cinema Unit
20 Mob Cinema Aust Cinema Unit

MISC

'A' Det 37 Aust L of C Sal Sec
28 Aust Wks Coy
Det 10 Sec Aust Kit Store
'B' Det 1 Aust Base Sub Area Details Depot

PART V

US, NEI AND MISCELLANEOUS UNITS

US UNITS

727 Amphibious Tractor Bn less one Coy
One Boat Coy Boat Bn 593 EBSR
Det 1463 Engr Boat Maint Coy
Det Bn HQ and one Company 672 Amphib Tractor Bn
Det CIC

NEI UNITS

1 Coy 1 Bn NEI Inf
One NICA Unit (Dutch)

MISC

Det SRD
Det FELO

PART VI

RAAF UNITS IN SUPPORT FOR OPERATION

Comd Post 1 TAF RAAF
No. 83 (Army Co-Op) Wing HQ Det
No. 4 Tac R Sqn Det
No. 16 AOP Flt Det
No. 9 LASU Det
No. 79 (GR/B) Wing
No. 2 (B25) Sqn
No. 18 (B24) Sqn
No. 83 Operational Base Unit
No. 28 Air Stores Pk
No. 27 Med Clearing Sta
No. 18 Repair and Servicing Unit
No. 82 (H/B) Wing
No. 21 (B24) Sqn
No. 23 (B24) Sqn
No. 24 (B24) Sqn
No. 6 Repair and Servicing Unit
No. 30 Med Clearing Sta
No. 24 Air Stores Pk
No. 85 Operational Base Unit
No. 18 Replenishing Centre
No. 54 (Spitfire) Sqn
No. 9 Repair and Servicing Unit Det
No. 113 Air Sea Rescue Flt Det
1 Air Sp Sec and 3 Parties
8 Air Liaison Parties
No. 1 Aust Air Form Sigs Det
No. 4 Radio Installation and Maint Det
No. 2 Malaria Control Unit Det
No. 5 Replenishing Centre Det
Service Police Unit Det
No. 30 Operational Base Unit
No. 9 Tn and Mov (Office Det)
No. 2 Airfield Def Sqn Det
No. 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit Assault Ech
No. 162 Radar Sta
No. 302 Radar Sta
No. 343 Radar Sta
No. 351 Radar Sta
No. 23 Air Stores Pk
No. 26 Med Clearing Sta
No. 11 Postal Unit Det
TAF Telecom Unit Det
Aust Comd AL Sec
21 Sqn AL Sec
25 Sqn AL Sec
28 Sqn AL Sec
35 Sqn AL Sec
55 Sqn AL Sec
56 Sqn AL Sec
'B' Det 45 AL Sec (Tac R Sqn)

PART VII

US NAVAL UNITS IN SUPPORT FOR OPERATION

Mob Comn Unit No.16
PT Adv Base No.7
CB Det
C3 Radio Sta Oper Base (Small)
NABU No.12
E43 Port Director (Med) No.42
C1 Radio Sta Oper Base (Large) No.34
C8 Visual Sta No.147
C9 Radio Sta No.76
Navy Post Office (Small)
C14 Int Comn System (Med)
Det C17 Teletypewriter System No.55
D10 Storage and Supply (Small)
Small Motor Pool
Small Boat Pool
NIA 250 Men Camp Tent No.929
NIA 250 Men Camp Tent No.696
C8 Dispensary 25-Bed
CB Det
Recreation
E9 Small Craft Repair No.52
Malaria Control

APPENDIX 'D' to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

ORDER OF BATTLE - BRIGADE GROUPS

18 AUST INF BDE GP

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

with under command

18 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
Det 2/42 Aust Cipher Sec
8 Pl B/Coy 2/1 Aust Cd Regt
Lt Sec 2/47 Aust LAD (Type J) (Att HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde)
Det 'C' Aust FS Sec
Det 35 Aust FS Sec (FF)
Det ATIS
Det AAPI Gp
2/9 Aust Inf Bn
2/10 Aust Inf Bn
2/12 Aust Inf Bn
Det 2/2 Aust Tk A Regt (2x6-pr and 8x4.2 mortar)
One Coy 2/1 Aust MC Bn
2/8 Aust Tpt Pl less det
Det 2/54 Aust LAD (Type G) (att 2/2 Aust Tk A Regt)

with in support

Det 2 Aust Op Report Team
Det Directorate of Public Relations
Det 1 Aust Mil Ldg Gp
1 Sqn 1 Aust Armd Regt less two tps
Det 2/1 Aust Armd Recce Sqn
Det 'A' Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp
2 SFCP
5 SFCP
6A SFCB

(Field artillery and attached troops - see
paragraph 21 of 7 Aust Div Operation Order-
Appx 'E'.)

2/4 Aust Fd Coy
Det 1 Pl 2/9 Aust Fd Coy
Det 2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
Det 1 Aust Armd Regt Sig Tp
Det 2 Aust Engr Sig Sec
Det 'B' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div
Det 8 Aust Pigeon Sec
Det 12 Aust W/T Sec (1t) }
Det 40 Aust W/T Sec (1t) } NOT LANDING
2/33 Aust Sup Dep Pl
2/5 Aust Fd Amb (incl Surgical Team)
One sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit (att 2/5 Aust Fd Amb)
Det 2/125 Aust Bde Wksp
Det 1 Aust Armd Regt Wksp
Det 209 Aust LAD (Type H) (att 1 Aust Armd Regt)
Det 4 Aust Armd Bde Wksp
One sec 7 Aust Div Pro Coy
Det 7 Aust Fd Team Mil Hist Sec LHC
5 Air Sp Party
5 Air Liaison Party
6 Air Liaison Party
7 Air Liaison Party

US Units in support

Det 672 and 727 Amphib Tractor Bn

NEI Forces in support

Det NICA

21 AUST INF BDE GP

21 Aust Inf Bde

with under command

21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
 Det 2/42 Aust Cipher Sec
 7 Pl B Coy 2/1 Aust Cd Regt
 Lt sec 2/59 Aust LAD (Type 'J')
 Det 'C' Aust FS Sec
 Det 35 Aust FS Sec (EE)
 Det ATIS
 Det AAPI Gp
 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one sqn)
 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt Sig Tp (less det)
 2/14 Aust Inf Bn
 2/16 Aust Inf Bn
 2/27 Aust Inf Bn
 Det 2/2 Aust Tk A Regt (2x6-pr and 4x4.2 Mortar)
 One coy 2/1 Aust IT Bn
 Det 2/8 Aust Tpt Pl
 Det 2/54 Aust LAD (type G) (att 2/2 Aust Tk A Regt)

with in support

Det 2 Aust Op Report Team
 Det Directorate of Public Relations
 Det 1 Aust Mil Ldg Gp
 One sqn less three tps 1 Aust Armd Regt
 Det 2/1 Aust Armd Bde Recco Sqn
 A Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp
 1 SFCP
 3 SFCP
 4 SFCP
 1 (Field artillery and attached troops - see paragraph 21 of 7 Aust Div Operation Order-Appx 'E'.)
 2/6 Aust Fd Coy (less one pl)
 Det 1 Pl 2/9 Aust Fd Coy
 Det 2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
 Det 1 Aust Armd Regt Sig Sec
 Det B Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div
 12 Aust W/T Sec (lt))
 40 Aust W/T Sec (lt)) NOT LANDING
 Det 2 Aust Engr Sig Sec
 Det 8 Aust Pigeon Sec
 2/34 Aust Sup Den Pl
 2/6 Aust Fd Amb (incl surgical team)
 One sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit
 Det 1 Aust Armd Regt Wksp
 Det 209 Aust LAD (Type H)
 Det 4 Aust Armd Bde Wksp
 Det 2/3 Aust Inf Tps Wksp
 One Sec 7 Aust Div Pro Coy
 Det 7 Aust Fd Team Mil Hist Sec LHQ
 6 Air Sp Party
 8 Air Liaison Party
 9 Air Liaison Party
 10 Air Liaison Party

US Units in support

Det 672 and 727 Amphib Tractor Bn

NEI Forces in support

Det NICA

ORDER OF BATTLE - FOLLOW-UP TROOPS

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde

with under command

25 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
8 Pl B Coy 2/1 Aust Cd Regt
Det 315 Aust L'D (Type J) (Att HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde)
Det 'C' Aust FS Sec
Det 35 Aust FS Sec (EE)
Det ATIS
2/25 Aust Inf Bn
2/31 Aust Inf Bn
2/33 Aust Inf Bn

with in support

One Sqn 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt
Det 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt Sig Tp
One Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn
4 Air Sp Party
11 Air Liaison Party
12 Air Liaison Party

APPENDIX 'E' to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report - OBOE TWO

(Various Appendices of 7 Aust Div Operation Order OBOE)
(TWO have not been attached for this report: the)
(designation of others have been altered to conform to)
(the sequence of appendices of the Report.)

SECRET

Copy No....

7 AUST DIV OPERATION ORDER - OBOE TWO

Ref Maps: BALIKPAPAN 1/50000 Sheets A,B,C
BALIKPAPAN 1/25000

INFORMATION

- 1 Topography) See Terrain Handbook BALIKPAPAN, 1 Aust
Corps Intelligence Review No.4 and
- 2 Enemy) 7 Aust Div Intelligence Review No.2.
- 3 Own Troops
 - (a) US Forces control PALEMBAN and TAMI TAMI and fighter and bomber strips have been established on those islands.
 - (b) 26 Aust Inf Bde Gp are completing tasks of destroying enemy forces on TARAKAN and air facilities will shortly be established there. This Brigade Group upon completion of its task comes into Corps Reserve.
 - (c) 9 Aust Div less 26 Aust Inf Bde Gp is to seize and hold the area BRUNEI BAY - MIRILUTONG - SERIA of NORTH BORNEO. It is expected that by F Day for OBOE TWO air facilities will be established in the BRUNEI BAY area.

4 Naval Support

- (a) Allied Naval Forces are:-
 - (i) Transporting land forces to the BALIKPAPAN area and protecting such convoys.
 - (ii) Bombarding the beaches in support of landing
 - (iii) Intercepting any enemy attempts to reinforce or supply BALIKPAPAN by sea.
 - (iv) Escorting and protecting our shipping on the lines of communication to the BALIKPAPAN area.
 - (v) Initiating motor torpedo boat operations in the BALIKPAPAN area at the earliest practicable date.
 - (vi) Establishing naval forces in the BALIKPAPAN area as required and as arranged with 7 Aust Div.
- (b) Naval Support available is shown at Appx 'G' Annx 1 attached.

AIR SUPPORT

5 Composition

- (a) See Annexure 2 to Appendix 'D' attached.
(Not attached)
- (b) Three AUSTER aircraft will be available as soon as landing strip has been constructed on F Day and a further three AUSTRERS will be landed on F plus 1.

6 General

Allied air forces are:-

- (a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as required.
- (b) Providing air cover for the naval task forces and convoys.
- (c) Neutralizing hostile ground, naval and air forces and installations within supporting distance of the objective area and denying their movement thereto.
- (d) Prior to F Day destroying hostile ground defences in the area BALIKPAPAN - MANGGAR and destroying oil installations capable of being used as a burning oil defence against the landing and subsequent ground operations.
- (e) Providing direct support of the landing and subsequent ground operations as arranged with 7 Aust Div.
- (f) Establishing air forces in the area BALIKPAPAN - MANGGAR as soon as practicable.
- (g) Establishing and operating radar and air warning installations in Eastern BORNEO as arranged with 7 Aust Div.

INTENTION

- 7 7 Aust Div will, by overwater operations, capture and hold the BALIKPAPAN - MANGGAR area of Eastern BORNEO to enable the establishment of air and naval facilities and to conserve the petroleum producing and processing installations therein.

METHOD

8 Objectives

- (a) Secure beach-head.
- (b) Dominate BALIKPAPAN Harbour and destroy the enemy in BALIKPAPAN.
- (c) Secure SEPINGGAN airstrip.
- (d) Secure MANGGAR airstrip.

PART I - ASSAULT FORCE

ASSAULT TROOPS

- 9 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp and 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will simultaneously assault ABLE Sector (see trace attached at Appendix 'B').

ORDER OF BATTLE

- 10 See Appendix 'D' attached.

PHASES

- 11 See Appendix 'B' attached.

(a) Phase I

- (1) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp (Commander - Brig I N DOUGHERTY DSO)

Land at H Hour on ABLE GREEN Beach and capture the line from KLANDASAN BESAR river mouth at 606594 to house 603598 to road junction 595597 inclusive.

- (11) 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp (Commander - Brig F O CHILTON DSO)

Land at H Hour on ABLE YELLOW and ABLE RED Beaches and secure the line from track 595597 exclusive to road junction 580597 to coast at 577590.

(b) Phase II

- (1) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Secure the line from beach 619593 to 616604 to G MALANG 602614 thence track to road junction 587616 inclusive.

- (11) 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Secure the line from exclusive road junction 587616 to 576605 then track to Hill 87 at 574599 to coast at 577590.

TASKS

- 12 (a) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

- (1) Complete Phase I and Phase II to secure an adequate area for the maintenance of the force and to enable 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp to concentrate on gaining the vital ground from 576605 to Hill 87 at 574599.

- (11) Patrol vigorously with 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one Sqn) to the EAST and NE with a view to the early capture of SEPINGGAN air strip.

(iii) Capture pump station at 612618.

(iv) Be prepared, on release by Divisional Headquarters, to advance to the EAST to capture SEPINGGAN airstrip.

(b) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

(i) Complete Phase I and Phase II.

(ii) It is essential that the feature from 576605 to Hill 87 at 574593 be captured at the earliest possible moment after H Hour to secure the beach-head and serve as a base for subsequent operations. A plan will be prepared to take maximum advantage of the effect of the heavy early bombardment to capture Hill 87 at 574599.

(iii) Subsequently dominate BALIKPAPAN.

(iv) Destroy the enemy in the town area.

(v) Free the harbour for use at an early stage.

INTER-BRIGADE BOUNDARY

13 All inclusive 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp - road junction 596593 to road junction 595597 to 592306 to road junction 588607 thence road to road junction 583629.

RESERVE

14 (a) 25 Aust Inf Bde
(b) One Sqn 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt
(c) One Coy M/G Bn

available as floating reserve on F Day.

PART II - FOLLOW-UP TROOPS

25 AUST INF BDE GP

15 Order of Battle

See Appendix 'D' attached.

16 Role

Floating Divisional Reserve F Day.

17 Probable Locations Ashore

Hill 54 at 592602 to road junction 588607 to Reservoir 583600 to road bend 587597.

NAVAL

- 18 (a) Details of Naval Support prior to and on F Day are shown at Appendix 'C' attached.
- (b) Subsequent naval support will be through SFCPS.

AIR

- 19 Air plan for the operation is attached at Appendix 'D' Annexures 1 to 12. (not attached).

ARMOUR

- 20 Five Troops 1 Aust Armd Regt will land F plus 2 and come into Divisional reserve.

ARTILLERY

21 Field Artillery

- (a) At approximately H plus 30 one Battery of each 2/4 Aust Fd Regt and 2/5 Aust Fd Regt will land in DUKWs on ABLE GREEN Beach. Three Troops will support 18 Aust Inf Bde and one Troop 21 Aust Inf Bde.
- (b) CO 2/4 Aust Fd Regt will command both batteries and ensure:-
- (1) Survey to be completed at earliest.
- (11) Both Batteries are able to cover both Brigade fronts.
- (c) The necessary 'O' parties and preparation parties will land prior to the gun groups.
- (d) At approximately H plus 90, 2/4 Aust Fd Regt (less one Battery and Detachments) will land in LVTs on ABLE GREEN Beach and occupy a regimental gun area in the vicinity of track junction 595601. 2/4 Aust Fd Regt (less one Battery) will support 18 Aust Inf Bde. One Battery 2/5 Aust Fd Regt will support 21 Aust Inf Bde.
- (e) 2/5 Aust Fd Regt (less one Battery) will land on 21 Aust Inf Bde Beach at approximately H plus 4 hours and not later than H plus 8 hours and occupy positions in regimental area in square 5960. 2/4 Aust Fd Regt plus one Battery 2/5 Aust Fd Regt will support 18 Aust Inf Bde. 2/5 Aust Fd Regt will support 21 Aust Inf Bde.

22 AA Artillery

- (a) One Troop of six 40 mm Bofors guns will land during F Day on ABLE GREEN Beach.

Roles and Priorities

- (i) One Section will deploy on the beach and protect the landing beaches against low flying aircraft.
- (ii) One Section will protect the Beach Maintenance Area.
- (b) The Sections will be co-ordinated as early as possible for anti-aircraft role.
- (c) The Section deployed on the beach will be available for beach defence. The Section Commander will contact Beach Group Headquarters for instructions.

23 Tank Attack and 4.2 inch Mortars

Troops and Detachments are placed under command of Brigades.

24 Command

Except as previously specified all RAA 7 Aust Div units come under command CRA when HQ RAA 7 Aust Div is established ashore. Time and place will be notified.

25 Meteorological Information

Meteorological information cannot be expected before H plus 8.

ENGINEERS

- 26 (a) CRE will co-ordinate all engineer tasks.

(b) Tasks

- (i) Assist infantry
 - (ii) Construction of AUSTER strip
 - (iii) Water supply
 - (iv) Clearance of mines and booby traps
 - (v) Maintenance of road communications
 - (vi) Bridging
 - (vii) Assist RAA 7 Aust Div in movement of guns from beach to gun positions.
 - (viii) Provide engineer support for armour.
 - (ix) Coverage Scale 'A' for CCS.
 - (x) Demolition of pillboxes and tunnels
 - (xi) Construction of airstrips
 - (xii) Construction of base installations
- (c) All underwater obstacles below high water mark are a Naval responsibility. All obstacles above high water mark are a RAE responsibility.
- (d) M. Pontoon Self-propelled Barges will have RAE personnel as crews with Naval coxswain allotted by Principal Beach Master (Army). They will be under command 2 Aust Beach Gp until required for port construction at approximately F plus 5.

AA PROTECTION

- 27 (a) Offensive action will be taken against enemy aircraft at all times.
- (b) No land activity will cease merely because of the presence of enemy aircraft. Only in the locality of an area being directly attacked may shelter be taken.

DEFENCE OF BEACH AND MAINTENANCE AREA

- 28 (a) Beach Group Commander is responsible for the seaward and landward defence of Beach Maintenance Area.
- (b) G3 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn will co-ordinate seaward defences within and without Beach Maintenance Area.

SHIPPING

29 Distribution of Force to Convoys

- (a) Consolidated Divisional Distribution of Force to Convoys - see Appendix 'E' attached. (Not attached).
- (b) Divisional Distribution of Force to Convoys - See Appendix 'F' attached. (Not attached).
- (c) Divisional Distribution of Force to Ships - See Appendix 'G' attached. (Not attached).
- (d) Landing Diagram - See appendix 'K' attached. (Not attached).

LANDING SCALES

- 30 (a) F Day - Assault Scales.
- (b) F plus 2 - Build-up to Light Scale.
- (c) F plus 6 to F plus 11 - Build-up to Normal Scale.

TACTICAL LOADING

- 31 F and F plus 2 convoys will be tactically loaded complete.

REHEARSAL

- 32 Rehearsal of assault elements will be carried out on S minus 2 under instructions issued separately.

SAFEGUARDING INSTALLATIONS

- 33 All civil installations such as telephone exchanges, pumping plants, machinery, power stations and transformers, wharf and harbour installations and petroleum producing and processing installations will be kept intact as far as operation requirements permit.

Every care must be taken that there is no subsequent damage to any such installations.

SECURITY

- 34 Issued separately in 7 Aust Div Intelligence Instruction No. 3.

COMMAND

- 35 During the amphibious movements and landing the Commander Naval Attack Force will command the operation until the landing force is established ashore. Command of the forces ashore then passed to the Commander 7 Aust Div. The exact time of transfer of command will be announced by all commanders by wireless. The controlling considerations for fixing the time when the landing force is established ashore will be mutually decided between the Commander Naval Attack Force and the Commander 7 Aust Div and will be announced by them to appropriate subordinates.

36 Amphibians

One company 727 Amphibious Tractor Bn US and Det HQ and one company 672 Amphibious Tractor Bn US will revert to Divisional command at 0800 hours F plus 1.

F DAY

- 37 1 July 1945.

E HOUR

- 38 0900H

ADMINISTRATION

39 Maintenance Project

- (a) Maintenance Project is issued separately.
- (b) First Key Plan - See Appendix 'N' attached.
- (c) Administrative build-up - see Appendix 'J' attached. (Not attached.)

INTERCOMMUNICATION

- 40 SIGS 7 Aust Div Operation Order 030E TWO contains full details of Navy, Army and Air Force communications.

41 Location of Headquarters Afloat

- (a) HQ 7 Aust Div - USS WASATCH.
- (b) Alternate HQ 7 Aust Div - HMAS WESTRALIA.

42 Location of Headquarters on Landing

RISEING GROUND 596596.

Estimated time of opening ashore - H plus 4 hours.

43 Air Courier Service

RAAF will be providing an Air Courier Service to the objective area from F Day onward. 2 Aust Beach Co will be responsible for placing a buoy in the vicinity of HQ Ship by H plus 2 hours for mooring Catalina aircraft.

44. Wireless Silence

- (a) Wireless silence will be maintained by all Army wireless stations until H minus 1 hour on F day. In the event of any subsidiary landing or engineer task prior to F day, wireless silence may be broken one hour before the commencement of such operation.

Listening watch will be kept from H minus 2 hours on F Day by all Army Wireless stations afloat.

- (b) Emergency communications afloat will be passed over Navy channels prior to H minus 1 hour.

- (c) After H minus one hour, wireless silence may again be imposed and, if so, will be broken only by means of the appropriate codewords.

45. Time Zone.

Time Zone Suffix will be "I". To determine time from this Zone, nine hours will be added to GMT or one hour subtracted from Australian Eastern Standard Time.

46. Synchronization of Watches.

- (a) Afloat

Ship's time. Zone ITEM.

- (b) Ashore

After landing, Zone time will be calculated from station WTO (US Army) BRISBANE, or from ABC or BBC Time Signals.

47. Codeword for Operation.

"OBOE TWO".

48. Acknowledge.

Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

Signed at.....
Issued by LO.


APPENDIX F to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

SHIPPING ALLOTTED FOR OBOE TWO

| | | | | |
|----|--------------------------------|----|--|----|
| 1 | Group Flagship Unit | 1 | AGC | |
| | | 1 | CGC | |
| 2 | Transport Unit | 3 | LSI | |
| | | 1 | AKA | |
| | | 5 | AK | |
| | | 1 | LSD | |
| 3 | Fast Transport Unit | 5 | APD | |
| 4 | LSM Unit | 22 | LSM | |
| 5 | LST Unit | 35 | LST | |
| | | | Pontoons | 14 |
| | | | Pontoon Barges | 5 |
| | | | Surgical | 4 |
| 6 | LCI Unit | 16 | LCI(L) | |
| 7 | Control Unit | 2 | PC | |
| | | 3 | SC | |
| 8 | Close Support Unit | 10 | LCS(L) | |
| | | 8 | LCI(R) | |
| | | 6 | LCI(G) | |
| 9 | Mine Sweeping Unit | 3 | AM | |
| | | 1 | APD | |
| | | 1 | LSM | |
| | | 20 | YMS (one of which was in reserve at MOROTAI) | |
| 10 | Demolition Unit | 2 | APD | |
| | | 2 | UDT | |
| 11 | LCT Unit | 24 | LCT | |
| 12 | Salvage and Fire Fighting Unit | 1 | ARS | |
| | | 4 | LCI(S) | |
| | | 1 | ATR | |
| 13 | Service Unit | 1 | AO | |
| | | 1 | ARL | |
| | | 2 | LST | |
| | | 1 | AOG | |
| 14 | Screening Unit | 10 | DD | |
| | | 4 | DE | |
| | | 1 | PF | |
| 15 | Press Unit | 1 | PCE(R) | |
| | | 1 | LCI(L) | |
| | | 1 | FP | |
| 16 | Hydrographic Unit | 1 | AGS | |
| | | 1 | YMS | |
| | | 1 | AN | |
| 17 | Motor Torpedo Unit | 23 | PT | |
| | | 2 | AGP | |
| 18 | Support and Covering Group | 1 | CA (HMAS SHROPSHIRE) | |
| | | 6 | CL (incl HMAS HOBART) | |
| | | 9 | DD | |
| 19 | Air Combat Patrol Unit | 3 | CVE | |

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT


NAVAL BALIKPAPAN 1/250000



SECRET

ANNEX I TO APPX'G'
TO 7 AUST DIV

OPERATIONAL REPORT
OBOE TWO.



| NO | TIME | SHIP | PLAN | NO | TIME | SHIP | PLAN |
|----|-------------|------|--------------------|----|----------------|---------|----------|
| 1 | H-100 | 101 | 500 x 8" | 11 | H-100 7-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 2 | H-75 | 102 | 1000 x 5" | 12 | H-100 7-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 3 | H-60 | 103 | 900 x 8" | 13 | H-75 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 4 | H-10 | 104 | 1100 x 7" | 14 | H-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 5 | H-10 10 H | 105 | 1100 x 7" 120 x 3" | 15 | H-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 6 | H-10 10 H-5 | 106 | 1100 x 7" 150 x 3" | 16 | H-75 7-10 5-60 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 7 | H-10 7-10 | 107 | 1100 x 7" 120 x 3" | 17 | H-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 8 | H-10 7-10 | 108 | 1100 x 7" 120 x 3" | 18 | H-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 9 | H-10 7-10 | 109 | 1100 x 7" 120 x 3" | 19 | H-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |
| 10 | H-10 | 110 | 1100 x 7" 120 x 3" | 20 | H-10 | 101-100 | 500 x 8" |

ANNEXURE 2 to Appendix 'C' to
7 Aust Div Operational Report
OBOE TWO

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT FROM H HOUR FOX DAY
TO FOX PLUS 16 DAY INCLUSIVE

- 1 Six SFCPs were allotted to the assaulting battalions and naval bombardment was used most effectively in support of ground troops throughout the operation. The expenditure of ammunition as a result of call fire by SFCPs from FOX Day to FOX plus 16 Day inclusive was approximately :-

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| 8-inch | 400 rounds |
| 6-inch | 3000 rounds |
| 5-inch | 10000 rounds |
| Illuminating (5-inch) | 600 rounds |

- 2 River patrols by LCI(G) were used for deep penetration of enemy held areas.

ANNEXURE 1 to Appendix 'H' to
7 Aust Div Operational Report
OBOE TWO

AIR STRIKES FROM 28 MAY TO 30 JUN (all inclusive)

| Date | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|--------|--------------------|------|------------|
| 28 May | 6 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 24 | B24 | " |
| | 23 | B25 | " |
| | 36 | P38 | " |
| 30 May | 6 | B24 | " |
| 31 May | 6 | B24 | SEPINGGANG |
| 1 Jun | 6 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| 4 Jun | 20 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 3 | B24 | MANGGAR |
| 8 Jun | 24 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 36 | P38 | " |
| | 24 | B25 | " |
| 13 Jun | 41 | B24 | " |
| | 6 | B24 | SEPINGGANG |
| | 24 | P38 | BALIKPAPAN |
| 14 Jun | 30 | B24 | " |
| 15 Jun | 6 | B24 | " |
| | 46 | B24 | " |
| | 1 | B24 | SEPINGGANG |
| 16 Jun | 34 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 6 | B24 | " |
| 17 Jun | 15 | B24 | " |
| | 6 | B24 | " |
| | 35 | B24 | " |
| 18 Jun | 25 | B24 | " |
| | 43 | B24 | " |
| | 5 | B24 | SEPINGGANG |
| | 1 | B24 | MANGGAR |
| 19 Jun | 47 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 7 | B24 | " |
| | 45 | B24 | " |
| | 6 | B24 | " |
| | 1 | B24 | MANGGAR |
| 21 Jun | 6 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 54 | B24 | " |
| | 11 | B24 | SEPINGGANG |
| | 7 | B24 | MANGGAR |
| 22 Jun | 87 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 33 | B25 | " |
| | 29 | P38 | " |
| | 6 | B24 | " |

| Date | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|--------|--------------------|------|------------|
| 23 Jun | 6 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 24 | B24 | " |
| | 9 | B24 | MANGGAR |
| | 22 | B24 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 40 | B25 | " |
| | 28 | P38 | " |
| 24 Jun | 6 | B24 | " |
| | 47 | B24 | " |
| | 76 | B24 | " |
| | 42 | B25 | " |
| | 31 | P38 | " |
| 25 Jun | 47 | B24 | " |
| | 5 | B24 | " |
| | 43 | B24 | MANGGAR |
| | 32 | B25 | BALIKPAPAN |
| | 31 | P38 | " |
| 26 Jun | 96 | B24 | " |
| | 42 | B25 | " |
| | 36 | P38 | " |
| 27 Jun | 90 | B24 | " |
| | 36 | B25 | " |
| | 36 | P38 | " |
| 28 Jun | 102 | B24 | " |
| | 40 | B25 | " |
| | 40 | P38 | " |
| 29 Jun | 88 | B24 | " |
| | 30 | B25 | " |
| | 36 | P38 | " |
| 30 Jun | 84 | B24 | " |
| | 36 | B25 | " |
| | 36 | P38 | " |

ANNEXURE 2 to Appendix 'H' to
7 Aust Div Operational Report
OBOE TWO

PRE H HOUR BOMBARDMENT (F DAY)

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|--------------|--------------------|------|---|
| H-70 to H-60 | 21 | B24 | PARRAMATTA feature |
| H-40 to H-30 | 6 | B24 | PARRAMATTA feature |
| H-40 to H-30 | 5 | B24 | SEPOELOEH |
| H-40 to H-30 | 6 | B24 | RANDWICK feature |
| H-20 to H-10 | 6 | B24 | Area 200 yards inland and parallel to landing beaches |
| H-20 to H-10 | 6 | B24 | Area vicinity BLYTH'S JUNCTION |
| H-20 to H-10 | 6 | B24 | PARRAMATTA feature |
| H-20 to H-10 | 6 | B24 | SIGNAL HILL |

One B25 mission from H-70 to H-60 was cancelled owing to adverse weather preventing all but three aircraft from reaching the objective area.

ANNEXURE 3 to Appendix 'H' to
7 Aust Div Operational Report
OBOE TWO

AIR OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO H HOUR F DAY

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|------|-------------------------|------------|--|
| 0730 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only. |
| 0923 | 5 | P38 | SIGNAL HILL |
| 0958 | 6 | B24 | 5862 BC 5863 VW |
| 1015 | 4 | F4U | MT and targets of opportunity along VALLEY ROAD |
| 1020 | 6 | B24 | 5659 GR |
| 1110 | 6 | P38 | Tunnel and caves in 5863 FGKLPQ and strafing along road |
| 1150 | 4 | F4U | North-East along road from 5965. Targets of opportunity |
| 1158 | 6 | B24 | 5964 HMR |
| 1200 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only |
| 1248 | 8 | P38 | 5863 FGKLPQ |
| 1358 | 6 | B24 | 5965 MNRS |
| 1415 | 4 | F4U | Targets of opportunity along MILFORD HIGHWAY. |
| 1505 | 8 | P38 | 5861 H |
| 1545 | 8 | F4U | From 6166 I to 6370 Q on targets of opportunity. |
| 1645 | 8 Bombers 5 Fighters | VTM F4U | Carrier-based aircraft briefed to hit targets 5659 RSTXY 5658 DE, but due to an error of judgement failed to bomb these. |
| 1700 | 6 6 | F4U VTM | Targets of opportunity along road from 6166 T to 6370 Q |

ANNEXURE 4 to Appendix 'H' to
7 Aust Div Operational Report
OBOE TWO

AIR OPERATIONS FROM 2 JUL TO 10 AUG (INCL)

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|--------------|--------------------|----------------|--|
| <u>2 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0800 | 1 | B24 | Air Observer for observation only. |
| 0930 | 12 | B24 | ORR'S JUNCTION |
| 0945 | 6 | B24 | ORR'S JUNCTION |
| 1000 | 4 | P38 | AA positions West of large DUTCH BARRACKS BAROE WEST. |
| 1120 | 4 | Corsair | Targets of opportunity along roadway leading NE from town BALIKPAPAN. |
| 1123 | 7 | P38 | CD guns on SIGNAL HILL |
| 1136 | 2 | B25 | Sprayed DDT along coastal strip inland from landing beaches. |
| 1200 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only. |
| 1206 | 6 | B24 | AA Positions in BATOECHAMPAR area |
| 1304 | 5 | B24 | AA Positions in BATOECHAMPAR area |
| 1420 | 6 | B24 | DUTCH BARRACKS area |
| 1540 | 5 | B24 | DUTCH BARRACKS area |
| 1535 | 4 | P38 | AA Positions and defences in Square 5366. |
| <u>3 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0800 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only |
| 0940 | 6 | B24 | AA and defensive positions 5366 FGHI |
| 1000 | 4 | P38 | Dual purpose 127 mm guns in area 5664 N |
| 1100 | 5 | B24 | Dual purpose 127 mm guns in area 5664 N |
| 1200 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only |
| 1345 | 5 | B24 | AA and defensive positions 5366 FGHI |
| 1420 | 6 | B24 | Enemy troop concentrations MANGGAR dispersal areas 7466 GHLMQR |
| 1509 | 4 | P38 | 7466 GHLMQR |
| 1610 | 23 29 | Corsair VTM | Carrier-based fighters and bombers bombed and strafed targets 6366, 6367, 6368, 6369 |

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|--------------|--------------------|------|--|
| <u>4 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0800 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only |
| 1000 | 6 | B24 | AA positions in areas 5366 GHILMN |
| 1200 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only |
| 1330 | 5 | B24 | AA and defensive positions Cape PENADJAM 5062. |
| 1440 | 6 | B24 | Cape PENADJAM 4963. |
| <u>5 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0800 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only |
| 0835 | 10 | B24 | Cape PENADJAM 5062 |
| 0930 | 6 | B24 | MANGGAR 7467 D |
| 1030 | 5 | B24 | MANGGAR 7367 J |
| 1130 | 4 | B25 | Sprayed DDT along coastal strip SIGNAL HILL to SEPINGGANG |
| 1200 | 1 | B24 | Air observer for observation only |
| 1230 | 6 | B24 | Cape PENADJAM 4963 |
| 1455 | 6 | B24 | MANGGAR 7367 J |
| <u>6 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0914 | 5 | B24 | Close support targets 5965 LMS |
| 1000 | 6 | B24 | Unsuccessful close support MANGGAR area and aircraft switched to secondary target |
| 1200 | 11 | P38 | Could not establish communications with ground control officer and had to engage secondary target. |
| 1200 | 3 | B25 | Sprayed DDT Cape PENADJAM |
| 1215 | 13 | P38 | Enemy defences 7367 J - MANGGAR |
| 1350 | 6 | B24 | Enemy gun and defensive works 7468 VWX, 7467 BCD. |
| 1500 | 4 | B24 | Gun positions 6065 MN |
| <u>7 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0855 | 5 | B24 | Defensive positions in area 6065 N |
| 1035 | 6 | B24 | Gun and defensive positions in MANGGAR area 7467 CD, 7468 W. |
| 1200 | 20 | P38 | Gun and defensive positions in MANGGAR area 7467 CD, 7468 W |
| 1300 | 15 | B24 | Suspected enemy bivouac area North bank RIKO River in squares 4466, 4566, 4666 and 4746 |
| 1330 | 6 | B24 | Gun and defensive positions area MANGGAR 7467 CD and 7468 W |

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|----------------------|--------------------|------|---|
| <u>7 JUL (contd)</u> | | | |
| 1500 | 6 | B24 | Defensive positions and stores dump in area 6369 HIMN |

| | | | |
|--------------|---|-----|--|
| <u>8 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0845 | 6 | B24 | MUFFLE |
| 1000 | 6 | B24 | Unable bomb MANGGAR - secondary target bombed |
| 1020 | 4 | P38 | Defensive positions and MT 6166 BATOECHAMPAR area |
| 1200 | 6 | B24 | Were to bomb JUDGE - cloud obscured target - bombed secondary target |
| 1230 | 6 | B25 | Area 6267 Y and 6367 U BATOECHAMPAR area |
| 1245 | 6 | B25 | Areas 6369 HIMN |
| 1320 | 6 | B25 | Area 6367 O |
| 1400 | 6 | B24 | Were to bomb areas 6467 CDE and 6468 WXY MANGGAR - weathered out - secondary targets engaged |
| 1430 | 4 | P38 | Area 6166 BATOECHAMPAR |

| | | | |
|--------------|----|-----|---|
| <u>9 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0905 | 6 | B24 | Targets in areas 6166 ID |
| 1100 | 10 | P38 | Positions 7468 NOSTXY and 7467 DE |
| 1145 | 8 | P38 | Positions 7468 NOSTXY and 7467 DE |
| 1210 | 12 | P38 | Positions 7468 NOSTXY and 7467 DE |
| 1200 | 6 | B24 | Positions 7368 ABCHIMN |
| 1325 | 6 | B24 | Area 6367 MNRSWX |
| 1330 | 6 | B25 | Unable contact ground or other aircraft - jettisoned bombs and returned to base |
| 1410 | 6 | B24 | Cloud obscured target area 6371 QRYW - secondary target engaged. |

| | | | |
|---------------|---|-----|--|
| <u>10 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1930 | 2 | P61 | Targets of opportunity North of fallen trees along MILFORD Highway |

| | | | |
|---------------|----|-----|--|
| <u>11 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1205 | 18 | B25 | Targets of opportunity along road North from square 6371 |
| 1205 | 2 | B25 | Sprayed DDT along VALLEY Road |
| 1215 | 2 | P38 | Targets of opportunity along road North from square 6371 |

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|---------------------|--------------------|-----------|---|
| <u>12 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0930 | 12 | B24 | Cape PENADJAM sector - weathered out |
| <u>13 JUL - NIL</u> | | | |
| <u>14 JUL - NIL</u> | | | |
| <u>15 JUL - NIL</u> | | | |
| <u>16 JUL - NIL</u> | | | |
| <u>17 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1100 | 6 | Spitfires | Enemy positions at 6367 I |
| <u>18 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0900 | 4 | Spitfires | Weathered out over target area |
| <u>19 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0900 | 6 | P40 | Strafed targets of opportunity along SEPAKOE and SEMOI Rivers |
| 1005 | 4 | Spitfires | Enemy at 6371 VQLG |
| 1110 | 8 | P40 | Enemy huts vicinity MENTAWIR Village |
| 1430 to 1915 | 15 | Spitfires | Fifteen runs destroyed 12 enemy barges at 437843 420839 431837 471821 420839 434834 510973 512987 511983 461861 420839 412835 |
| <u>20 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1030 | 2 | Spitfires | Supported river patrol by LCSs between P BALANG and square 4887 |
| 1105 | 8 | P40 | Road junction square 6290 |
| 1205 | 4 | Spitfires | MENTAWIR Village area |
| <u>21 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0730 | 8 | P40 | Enemy positions area 6469 X |
| 1130 | 2 | P40 | Enemy positions area 6469 X |
| 1030 to 1220 | 2 | Spitfires | Targets of opportunity PAMALOEAN Village and road to South Port |
| <u>22 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1100 | 3 | P40 | Unable bomb area 6469 K owing to low cloud but were able to strafe area. |
| 1630 to 1830 | 4 | Spitfires | Targets of opportunity along roadway North of 650788 destroying : 4 staff cars 13 3-ton trucks 1 tractor |
| <u>23 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1130 | 8 | P40 | Dropped 16 x 250 lb bombs in vicinity MENTAWIR Road junction and strafed targets of opportunity along MILFORD Highway |
| <u>24 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0900 | 8 | P40 | Dropped 16 x 250 lb bombs in road junction in square 6290 |
| 1100 | 8 | P40 | Dropped 16 x 250 lb bombs on staging area and jetty in square 3575 |

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|---------------|-----------------------|------|---|
| <u>25 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1100 | 8 | P40 | Bombed and strafed area vicinity road junction in square 6290 |
| <u>26 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1500 | 4 Boomerangs | | Tac/R and Arty/R in conjunction with HMAS GASCOYNE |
| <u>27 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1100 | 6 | P40 | Bombed and strafed large enemy building 508970 |
| 1540 to 1650 | 3 Spitfires | | Strafed barge traffic SEPAKOE River - five barges ranging from 20 to 60 feet destroyed |
| 1655 to 1720 | 10 | P40 | Bombed and strafed enemy position 361731 |
| <u>28 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1635 to 1730 | 2 Spitfires | | Strafed targets of opportunity along MILFORD Highway North of MENTAWIR Village. |
| <u>29 JUL</u> | | | |
| 0945 to 1035 | 4 Spitfires | | Strafed targets of opportunity SAMARINDA Area. |
| <u>30 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1620 | 3 Spitfires | | Strafed W/T station at PAMALOEAN Village sq 3885 |
| <u>31 JUL</u> | | | |
| 1100 | 8 | P40 | Dropped 16 x 250 lb bombs and strafed large enemy buildings at 508970 - SEPAKOE River |
| 1115 | 4 Spitfires 4 P40 | | Strafed enemy position at 616756 |
| 1620 | 2 Spitfires | | Conducted an armed reconnaissance of the road from MENTAWIR Road junction in square 6290 to vicinity of SAMARINDA |
| <u>4 AUG</u> | | | |
| 1400 to 1500 | 22 P40 4 Spitfires | | Bombed and strafed enemy positions at 516909 - 528808 |
| <u>5 AUG</u> | | | |
| 1400 | 7 | P40 | Bombed and strafed enemy positions astride MILFORD Highway area 618758 |
| <u>6 AUG</u> | | | |
| 1100 | 7 P40 4 Spitfires | | Bombed and strafed enemy positions astride the pipeline at 882002 |
| 1100 | 31 | P40 | Bombed and strafed village at KOTABANGOEN. Tac/R reported 36 Indian PW in vicinity 424828. |

- 6 -

| Time | Number of Aircraft | Type | Target |
|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------|---|
| <u>7 AUG</u> | | | |
| 1430 | 7 | P40 | Bombed and strafed enemy positions at 539809 |
| <u>9 AUG</u> | | | |
| 1450 to 1810 | 6 | Spitfires | Strafed targets of opportunity along MILFORD Highway to NE of MENTAWIR Road junction. |
| 1530 to 1630 | 4 | Spitfires | Strafed enemy position on LAJANGAN IS area MAHAKAM DELTA. |
| <u>10 AUG</u> | | | |
| 1600 | 6 | Spitfires | Strafed targets of opportunity on MILFORD Highway at 653910 |

APPENDIX 'I' to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

18 AUST INF BDE

OPERATIONS FROM 1 JUL TO 14 AUG 45

PLAN

1 The operation was to be carried out in four phases:-

Phase 1-

- (a) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to land on ABLE YELLOW and ABLE RED Beaches respectively and secure line 596593 - excl track junc 595595 - pipe line to PETERSEAM JUNCTION coast at 581590;

Phase 2

- (b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to secure line track junc 595595 - road bend 595597 - all incl PARKES X-rds 587598;

Phase 3

- (c) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to
- (i) Mount an attack to capture HILL 87 (5759) and exploit North along PARRAMATTA to 576605. NOT more than one rifle company to be committed initially, but if successful additional troops could be employed at CO's discretion;
- (ii) Extend left flank of covering position to 577590.

Phase 4

- (d) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to come into Brigade Reserve on ABLE YELLOW Beach and be prepared to
- (i) Take over left flank of covering position if 2/10 Aust Inf Bn attack on HILL 87 successful.
- (ii) If this attack is not successful, capture PARRAMATT

1 JUL

2 (a) Landing

At 0855I, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, each with two companies forward, landed on ABLE RED Beach without opposition. Assault troops were thus landed five minutes ahead of schedule and some were 1000 yards West of their original landing point.

(b) Phase 1

On landing, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn advanced North-East and by 0910I the objectives for Phase 1 had been secured by D and C Coys on the right and left respectively.

2/10 Aust Inf Bn pushed inland with B Coy right and D Coy left and by 0915I reached their Phase 1 objectives against very light opposition. Patrols reported PETERSEAM JUNCTION clear and it was occupied by A Coy at 0950I under light SA fire.

(c) Phase 2

On exploiting from their Phase 1 objectives to 591597, troops of D Coy 2/12 Aust Inf Bn came under heavy enemy fire from RATION. This feature was captured by D Coy at 0945I but owing to the landing of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn on ABLE YELLOW Beach, a detached platoon of the latter was also involved in its occupation. A strong enemy bunker position on the North-East slopes of RATION held out until 1700I when it was captured with the assistance of M2-2 Flame-throwers, 25 enemy being killed. One platoon D Coy also exploited to PLUG.

A Coy less one platoon passed through D Coy, relieved D Coy troops on PLUG and captured PARKES at 1000I.

One platoon A Coy detached on landing, and confused as to its actual location, moved up VALLEY Road after encountering enemy fire and secured POTTS. At 1020I, this platoon moved on to PORTEE and patrolled to NEW-CASTLE. In patrol clashes and counter attacks by the enemy during night 1/2 Jul, 48 enemy were killed.

In attempts to contact the platoon on PORTEE, one platoon of A Coy was pinned by enemy fire in the area BLYTH'S JUNCTION. It was eventually extricated with the assistance of naval, artillery and 3-inch mortar support at 1800I.

(d) Phase 3

A Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn had exploited from PETERSHAM JUNCTION to 576597 in face of slight opposition and at 1010I, C Coy was formed up vicinity PETERSHAM JUNCTION for the attack on PARRAMATTA. Fire support position at this time was :-

- Naval - USS "CLEVELAND" originally allotted in support 2/10 Aust Inf Bn NOT available in time for the attack.
- Arty - One battery of 2/4 Aust Fd Regt established ashore but out of communication with BC and O Parties.
- Armour - All tanks bogged.

CO decided to attack before the enemy had time to reorganize, supporting C Coy with two troops 4.2-inch mortars and MG platoon. C Coy advanced on HILL 87 suffering casualties from flanking enemy fire from 577598 and from lower slopes of PARRAMATTA. At 1130I, the summit was secured but the company was held up by fire from 572598 and 574601. The former of these positions was destroyed by 1230I and with the assistance of MATILDA tanks which had now arrived, the latter position was cleared at 1240I.

C Coy continued the advance North along the ridge, and at 1412I with the support of one field battery, tanks, 4.2-inch and 3-inch mortars and MGs, PARRAMATTA was captured, naval fire being used to neutralize G SEPOELOEH and CRACKING PLANT. Patrols occupied NEWCASTLE at 1600I and reported CRACKING PLANT occupied by the enemy.

(e) Phase 4

By 1420I, two companies of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn had relieved 2/10 Aust Inf Bn in area between HILL 87 and the coast and A Coy pushed West to occupy SANTOSA HILL by 1800I.

(f) Dispositions night 1/2 Jul :

2/9 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| HQ | PETERSHAM Crossroads |
| A Coy | SANTOSA Hill |
| B Coy less one pl | 581595 |
| C Coy | East end SANTOSA Barracks to Mosque |
| D Coy plus one pl | PRUDENT |
| B Coy | |

2/10 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| HQ | 576602 |
| A Coy | 576597 |
| B Coy less one pl | Spur 578602 |
| C Coy less one pl | North End PARRAMATTA |
| D Coy | HILL 87 |
| One pl B Coy, one | NEWCASTLE |
| pl C Coy, one pl | |
| MG | |

2/12 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| HQ | 591601 |
| A Coy less one pl | PLUG |
| One pl A Coy | PARKES |
| B Coy | RUPTURE |
| C Coy | 588601 South and West to 584598. |
| D Coy | RATION |

2 JUL

3 (a) Night 1/2 Jul

All battalions carried out extensive patrolling. Attempts by the enemy to infiltrate into forward positions cost him approximately 60 casualties.

- (b) 25 Aust Inf Bde commenced landing during the morning and instructions were received from 7 Aust Div that they were to take over the central sector of the Divisional front, their boundary with 18 Aust Inf Bde being all incl PLUG - BLYTH'S JUNCTION - NEWSRIEL. As troops of 25 Aust Inf Bde took over the ground, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn troops were progressively freed to continue the advance North-West. (see below).

(c) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn

C Coy occupied POTTS unopposed at 1400I and B Coy then attacked from 585602 along the eastern slopes of POTTS and PORTEE which were secured against light opposition and without casualties by 1600I.

A Coy exploited through PORTEE, capturing NOUGHT at 1645I.

D Coy relieved troops of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn on NEWCASTLE at 1700I, being subjected to enemy MG and AA gunfire during the relief and during the night 2/3 Jul.

(d) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

Mopping up and patrolling during morning 2 Jul.

D Coy with artillery, tank, mortar and MG support, captured G SEPOELOEH and CRACKING PLANT at 1530I.

B Coy exploited through D Coy to occupy the area astride the road at 566606 at 1800I.

(e) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn

C Coy advanced to 571594 by 1315I, mopping up tunnels and barracks.

A Coy advanced to 564591 by 1700I.

(f) Final dispositions -

2/9 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------------------------|--------|
| HQ | 568593 |
| A Coy plus one pl B Coy | 564595 |
| B Coy less one pl | 569592 |
| C Coy | 566594 |
| D Coy | 583598 |

2/10 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------|-----------------------------|
| HQ | 576603 |
| A Coy | HILL 87 |
| B Coy | 566603 |
| C Coy | North end PARRAMATTA 576608 |
| D Coy | G SEPOELOEH |

2/12 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| HQ | 581609 |
| A Coy | NOUGHT |
| B Coy | 585608 |
| C Coy | 580609 |
| D Coy | NEWCASTLE |

3 JUL

4 (a) Further enemy attempts at infiltration occurred during the night 2/3 Jul.

(b) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn completed mopping up and occupation of town area.

(c) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn

RESERVOIR and feature 579617 occupied by A Coy 1100I.

B Coy moved through NOMEN and NATION to clear PANDAN-SARI area but were held up at 571619 by 25-mm, mortar and MG fire from MAIL, our casualties being three killed and one wounded. Enemy position was engaged by mortars and MGs from NEWCASTLE and the 25-mm gun was located in a concrete pillbox.

MAIL was actually in 25 Aust Inf Bde area of responsibility but as their troops had been held up at NURSE and NOBODY and as our advance could not be continued while the enemy held MAIL, arrangements were made with 25 Aust Inf Bde for 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to secure the feature.

At 1800I, B Coy launched its attack supported by artillery, tanks and 4.2-inch mortars. Though the tanks could not advance beyond the tank ditch, they continued to give support from fire positions in the vicinity. At last light the company was firmly established on the feature but the enemy still dominated the highest point and the feature was finally cleared and consolidated under cover of darkness.

(d) Dispositions night 3/4 Jul -

2/9 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------|-------------|
| HQ | 569593 |
| A Coy | G SEPOMLOEH |
| B Coy | 552598 |
| C Coy | 559591 |
| D Coy | 559599 |

2/10 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|--------------|--------|
| HQ and D Coy | 565610 |
| A Coy | 563621 |
| B Coy | 567613 |
| C Coy | 576604 |

2/12 Aust Inf Bn

| | |
|-------|-------------------|
| HQ | NE CASTLE |
| A Coy | RESERVOIR |
| B Coy | NIL |
| C Coy | NOUGHT - NECASTLE |
| D Coy | 572618 |

4 JUL

5 2/12 Aust Inf Bn completed occupation of its sector in the town.

On 4 Jul, 18 Aust Inf Bde came into Divisional Reserve.

OPERATION INDEPENDENCE

GENERAL

6 (a) A warning order was received on 3 Jul from 7 Aust Div and confirmed on 4 Jul stating that one infantry battalion was to land at PNDJAM at 051330I. Tasks :-

- (i) Ensure that no small arms or artillery fire from the West side of the harbour could disturb free entry of shipping into the harbour and working of the port area.
- (ii) Patrol to sufficient depth to ensure that no amphibious operations could be launched against the harbour.
- (iii) Assist NICA in repatriation and rehabilitation of natives.

On receipt of further orders the force was to land at C DJIMBORA and patrol West to BANDJERMSIN Road.

- (b) Brigade Commander gave the task to 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
Allotment of troops :-

Under Command

One troop 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt
One troop B Sqn 1 Aust Armd Regt
One troop 2/5 Aust Fd Regt
One troop 4.2-inch mortars
Det 2/4 Aust Fd Coy
Det 18 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
One company 2/5 Aust Fd Amb
Det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy
Det ATIS

In Support

2/4 Aust Fd Regt with under command
2/5 Aust Fd Regt
5 SECP
5 Air Liaison Party
Coy A 672 Amphib Tractor Bn
Det 593 EB and SR
Det NICA

(c) Outline Plan - 2/9 Aust Inf Bn

- (i) Forward troops D Coy right, C Coy left.
(ii) Reserve A Coy right, B Coy left.
(iii) Action on landing - Forward troops secure quick beachhead.

A Coy exploit to main enemy defences area 5062.

C Coy, on relief by Cav troop, exploit to OIL feature 4963.

5 JUL

- 7 The landing was carried out more or less according to plan and without opposition. The following points are worthy of comment :-

- (a) The assault craft was marshalled, navigated and timed onto the landing beach, not by naval personnel but by the Army. In consequence, the assault wave touched down approximately 10 minutes before schedule. The artillery fire support programme was arranged to be lifted on the firing of a light signal by the assault company commander and though he fired the signal rather prematurely, no harm resulted. A further consequence of there being no naval control was that the right assault company landed 500 yards to the right of its objective.
- (b) Owing to incomplete intelligence about the nature of the beach, the tanks on disembarkation immediately bogged down and were not available throughout the operation. In view of the lack of opposition, none of the mishaps had any serious consequences. The operation subsequent to the landing went off entirely as planned. The only enemy reaction was the engagement of C Coy by a Japanese rear party manning 120-mm dual purpose guns in the vicinity 507626. Six guns were eventually captured in this area, one intact, the enemy rear party having withdrawn from this last.

Operations Subsequent to the Landing

- 8 (a) The remainder of the period 6/22 Jul was taken up in extensive patrolling based on PENADJAM to locate the enemy, determine his strength and exert the maximum pressure on him short of major engagements.
- (b) On 6 and 7 Jul, C Tp 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn, moving across country from PENADJAM, made contact with a strong enemy position in the area of the tram line 4464 4564. Five enemy were killed; own casualties were three killed.

On 7 Jul, one platoon of B Coy was moved to reinforce the Commando Squadron and for the next week patrolling continued to locate the exact positions occupied by the enemy. He was found to be in depth along the tram line with diggings and bunkers and many automatic weapons. On 12 Jul, D Coy took over in the railway area and Tac HQ was established at village 4565. At this stage, movement and maintenance were by water using largely DUKWs. Further probing, combined with heavy artillery concentrations and air strikes, caused the enemy to withdraw from the railway position and by 17 Jul, D Coy had occupied village 4163.
- (c) Meanwhile, on 8 and 9 Jul, further landings in company strength had been made without opposition at DJINABORA and TELOKTEBANG. One platoon D Coy and one platoon A Coy remained at DJINABORA and TELOKTEBANG respectively, the remainder of the companies returning to PENADJAM.
- (d) Patrol by prahu and armed LCM were also made up the RIKO River and its tributaries. On 15 Jul, a 400-ton Japanese freighter was captured at 398688 and on the night 15/16 Jul a standing patrol located on the captured ship intercepted a 65-foot Japanese launch towing another launch and four prahus and sank them with SA fire and PITA, killing eight enemy. River patrols were also made up the PAREH PAREH River.
- (e) On 18 Jul, C Coy relieved D Coy and pushed West and North. It appeared that the enemy had relied on the waterway for his maintenance and when the PAREH PAREH and RIKO Rivers were closed to his traffic, he immediately withdrew his out-post positions to the RIKO area where he was ^{next} encountered in strength on 26 Jul.
- (f) On 17 Jul, A Coy 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn with one section 2/4 Aust Fd Regt and a number of beachlights came under command the brigade and were moved to DJINABORA, their task being to prevent enemy raiding parties moving South into BILIRAPAN BAY and interfering with the shipping.
- (g) This force was subsequently augmented by the addition of B Coy 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn, a Tac HQ and a further section of 25-pounders. On 21 Jul, they were landed at TEMPADOENG, their role having been extended to include patrolling forward, both by land and water, to locate the enemy in the head and on the Eastern shores of BILIRAPAN BAY. The landing at TEMPADOENG was unopposed but at 1515I a Japanese patrol of four men approached the perimeter at 473788, one being killed.

9 On 23 Jul, a patrol of 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn killed two enemy at 482803.

A patrol from 2/9 Aust Inf Bn encountered enemy in vicinity 348723. After a short encounter, the enemy withdrew and our patrol advanced to 361730 without further contact.

On 25 Jul, a patrol strength one officer 25 ORs from A Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn moving to RIKO reached high ground at 360730 at 261300I. One section moved East to 366730. The remainder of the patrol, on attempting to move North, were fired on by two three-inch mortars and three LMGs.

The section at 366730 was attacked by enemy of unknown strength and returned to join the main body. The enemy, whose strength was later estimated at two platoons, continued to engage our troops who returned to 345700 after suffering eight casualties.

On 26 Jul, a water patrol from 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn landed at 490880 and moved forward to MENTAWIR village without contact. The patrol returned to TEMPADOENG.

On 26 Jul, a patrol from 2/9 Aust Inf Bn established an OP at 357733 and reported an enemy position estimated one company strength astride the track at 363730. 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn established a standing patrol by one platoon plus artillery O party and detachment 3-inch mortars at 490772.

On 29 Jul, patrols from 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn located approximately 30 enemy at 518797. This position was later engaged by artillery fire.

On 30 Jul, B Coy 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn was established at 516797. A patrol from the village in square 5179 with artillery in support took a position located at 518795: seven enemy were killed and three MGs captured.

On 31 Jul, approximately 20 enemy attacked B Coy's position and were repulsed.

At 0530 on 1 Aug, our positions at 516796 were attacked by approximately 50 enemy. The attack was repulsed with casualties to both enemy and own troops.

On 3 Aug, a patrol from 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn encountered enemy of one platoon strength at 521808. These positions were bombed and strafed by Kittyhawks on 4 Aug and a subsequent patrol on 5 Aug found the positions unoccupied. This patrol continued to 533007 where it was fired on by enemy at 537805. On 6 Aug, a patrol encountered 20 enemy at 528808 which withdrew when our artillery engaged them. Another patrol encountered enemy at 533792.

A patrol from 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to PAMALOEAN village on 6 Aug reported the area clear but native reports stated that there were 300 to 400 enemy one kilo North of the village. A patrol on 7 Aug engaged enemy at 380385 with unknown results.

On 8 Aug, after artillery concentration on enemy position at 383854 a patrol occupied PAMALOEAN Village. The patrol reported signs of a hasty withdrawal by the enemy.

On 9 Aug, a patrol from 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn from 551823 to 562836 reached 563873 where they engaged 30 enemy, three of whom were killed. Artillery and mortar concentrations were fired on the enemy positions. On 13 Aug, 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn standing patrol at 516808 engaged three enemy.

APPENDIX "J" to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

21 AUST INF BDE

OPERATIONS FROM 1 JUL TO 14 AUG 45

PLAN

The operation was planned to take place in five phases:-

Phase 1

2/27 Aust Inf Bn was to land on ABLE GREEN Beach at H Hour and secure a covering position to a depth of approximately 800 yards.

Phase 2

2/16 Aust Inf Bn was to land on ABLE GREEN Beach and advance through 2/27 Aust Inf Bn to secure an area bounded by G MALANG, CHILTON'S Road and VALLEY Road.

Phase 3

Phase 3 was to be carried out in two stages:-

Stage 1

One troop 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn was to land on ABLE GREEN Beach and report strength and dispositions of enemy in area East of G MALANG, RAVENSHOE and bounded by PUMP Road and EATHER'S Track.

Stage 2

2/14 Aust Inf Bn was to land on ABLE GREEN Beach and concentrate in an area 500 yards directly inland from this Beach.

Phase 4

Phase 4 was to take place in two stages:-

Stage 1

2/14 Aust Inf Bn was to cross the KLANDASAN BESAR River and capture area bounded by line of Phase 2 of Divisional Plan (see Appendix "B" attached) and KLANDASAN BESAR River.

Stage 2

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one squadron) and one troop was to land on ABLE GREEN Beach and concentrate in area 500 yards directly inland from junction ABLE YELLOW and ABLE GREEN Beaches.

Phase 5

Phase 5 was to be conducted in two stages:-

Stage 1

2/14 Aust Inf Bn was to extend area of responsibility to North-West to include PUMP Road.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn was to assume responsibility for area bounded on the East by PUMP Road, North by CHILTON'S Road, West by inter-brigade boundary and South by line approximately East and West through ROTTNEST.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn was to be responsible for area South of this.

Stage 2

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one squadron), on orders from Bde HQ was to advance through 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and secure SEPINGGANG Airstrip.

1 JUL

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

2/27 Aust Inf Bn landed on ABLE GREEN Beach at H Hour.

A Coy captured ROTTNEST against light opposition and consolidated.

B Coy captured ROMILLY and consolidated. At 1930I a counter attack on this feature by 20 Japanese was repulsed; six enemy being killed.

D Coy swung East clearing bunker positions on beach at 603593 and patrolled area between VASEY Highway and S KLANDASAN BESAR.

C Coy passed through A Coy and cleared spur from ROTTNEST to 607600. There was some opposition from an enemy post at 608613.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

2/16 Aust Inf Bn commenced landing on ABLE GREEN Beach at H plus 28 minutes and concentrated in area ROMILLY where they met light mortar fire.

B Coy captured spur 596601 and then RECORD. Patrols were pushed out to RESORT.

C Coy moved via ROTTNEST to RAVENSHOE where there was no opposition, thence to feature 603608 and at 1700I captured G MALANG.

D Coy was in reserve until G MALANG was captured. They then attacked through G MALANG to capture feature 589609 at 1830I. Artillery, 4.2-inch mortar and MGs supported the attack.

A Coy was not committed and remained in reserve with Bn HQ at RAVENSHOE.

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

2/14 Aust Inf Bn commenced landing on ABLE GREEN Beach at H plus 58 minutes and assembled at 600596.

C Coy moved via ROTTNEST and occupied RANDWICK feature at 1540I reporting bridge 610599 intact but suitable only for jeeps. VASEY Highway from rd junc 607600 to East reported mined

Remainder of battalion moved on to RANDWICK and REWARD features and consolidated by 1730I.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

One troop landed at H plus 45 minutes and moved through ROTTNESST reporting enemy on spurs 608603 and 607605. This troop occupied spur 608603 after the enemy had retired.

Remainder of 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one squadron) commenced crossing the S KLANDASAN BESAR River and moving through REWARD. Forward troops were held up by heavy L fire from positions astride tracks at 624607 and 624605. Forward troops dug in area 622606 for night; remainder at 608603.

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde was located at 599595.

2 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

One platoon moved East along VASEY Highway as patrol at 0930I. This platoon reached SEPINGGANG Airstrip without opposition by 1115I. The remainder of the battalion (less C Coy) moved up at 1130I and consolidated as follows:-

| | |
|-------|----------------------------|
| A Coy | Area 651605 |
| B Coy | Area dispersal bays 645601 |
| D Coy | Area dispersal bays 658607 |
| Bn HQ | 647599 |

C Coy remained RANDWICK feature until relieved by B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn then moved up and occupied reserved position 645599 at approximately 1600I.

Patrols moved across the SEPINGGANG BESAR River (a 40 foot gap having been blown in the bridge) to stores area 623615, bivouac area 663619, and to LANCE and LAGER features.

The only enemy seen were two Japanese moving North along SCHOFIELD'S Track.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

2/16 Aust Inf Bn occupied ONEPONG, OWEN and RESORT features by patrols without enemy opposition. A patrol to OPERATOR was fired on by an enemy gun in the vicinity of 55955225, which was engaged by artillery with unknown results except that the firing ceased.

The areas occupied by the battalion after relief by 2/33 Aust Inf Bn at 1600I hours were as follows:-

One company MALANG patrolling to 610609;
Bn HQ and one company KROLL 604607;
One company spur 610609 and patrolling to rd junc 607600;
One company ROTTNESST and patrolling to RAVENSHOE and to spur 606601;
B Ech with C Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn (until 3 Jul) on spur 606601;
Standing patrol to be established first light on 610609.

Occupation of areas previously held by 2/27 Aust Inf Bn was completed by 1900I.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

D Coy cleared in succession spurs 610609, 610612, 610614, 610617 and patrolled to PUMP STATION and OPTIMIST. Action commenced at 1200I and the company withdrew to RANDWICK feature at approximately 1900I.

B Coy relieved C Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn on RANDWICK at 1500I.

Bn HQ and A Coy occupied REWARD feature at approximately 1830I.

C Coy remained at 606601 until proposed relief by 2/16 Aust Inf Bn on 3 Jul.

Mortar and tank attack platoons occupied area rd and track junc 628595 at approximately 1900I.

The Battalion Commander carried out a reconnaissance of knoll 629604 and Cavalry position in preparation for an attack on this feature by 2/27 Aust Inf Bn on 3 Jul.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt (less one squadron)

As 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt had no support weapons available and artillery FOO was out of communications, their unsupported attempt to capture feature 629604 was repulsed. They dug in in the area 625605 and kept contact with the enemy to gain all possible information of his strength and dispositions.

When artillery support was available the position was harassed but the enemy showed no signs of withdrawing.

3 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

C Coy moved at first light across the SEPINGGANG BESAR River and advanced along VASEY Highway. The area was found to be mined and booby trapped and these were deloused as the company moved through. By 1400I it had crossed the BATUKAN KEPUL River and encountered approximately 20 enemy in trenches and two pill-boxes in area 684618. Two Japanese, disguised as trees, moved towards the forward platoon and were shot. C Coy attacked with naval support and captured the feature. One enemy dead was found, the remainder having withdrawn. The area between the road and the coast to the river at 689619 was mined and contained bomb, oil and ammunition dumps. Two burnt out armoured cars and one heavy truck were found on the far bank of the river.

The remainder of the battalion moved from SEPINGGANG at 1300I and occupied the following localities:-

| | |
|-------|--------|
| Bn HQ | 684614 |
| A Coy | 683616 |
| B Coy | 685615 |
| D Coy | 684617 |

Patrols moved forward along VASEY Highway and North along track at 679614.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

2/16 Aust Inf Bn remained in reserve in the following areas:-

| | |
|-------|--------|
| Bn HQ | 604607 |
| A Coy | 603607 |
| B Coy | 602601 |
| C Coy | 602612 |
| D Coy | 610608 |

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

5 Pl 2/27 Aust Inf Bn patrolled to Knoll 629604 at first light, found the enemy had withdrawn and occupied the position.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn's proposed attack on this feature was cancelled and the battalion took over the defence of the SEPINGGANG Airstrip from 2/14 Aust Inf Bn at 1000I as follows:-

| | |
|-------|--------|
| Bn HQ | 656603 |
| A Coy | 648604 |
| B Coy | 664607 |
| C Coy | 655603 |
| D Coy | 652604 |

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

B Tp 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn occupied Knoll 629604 and patrolled forward to LAGER feature to contact 2/14 Aust Inf Bn. No enemy were seen.

The remainder of the regiment (less one Squadron and B Tp) moved at 1000I via JUDY feature to JELLY. The intention was to establish a firm base at JELLY, open the track from JELLY to PUMP Road and 614610 as an L of C and patrol forward to McDONALD'S Track and POLGLAZE Track.

The regiment found heavy going including the cutting of tracks through thick timber over JUDY feature.

A well prepared enemy position on JUDY from 627611 to 628615 was apparently abandoned immediately prior to the arrival of our own troops. The following were found in the position:-

2 X 81-mm mortars and ammunition;
89 grenades;
Large quantities of written matter and personal equipment.

The country between JUDY and JELLY consisted of heavy rain forest and marsh.

The regiment occupied an area around 635619 for the night and patrolled along a track towards PUMP Road. Signs of recent occupation but no enemy were seen.

4 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

The battalion at 0800I advanced along VASEY Highway with the object of capturing the MANGGAR Airstrip.

A Coy had crossed the MANGGAR BESAR River and were moving through the airstrip when enemy coast defence guns at 740677 and 747678 opened up. Mortar and 25-mm fire were also encountered. A Coy took up a position and dug in in vicinity of 741669 to 744667.

Artillery and naval gunfire was directed on to the coast defence guns and the Japanese were observed to come out and close the doors in front of the gun at 740677 when this fire commenced.

B Coy moved across the river and by 1900I occupied a position in the vicinity of 733665. Mortar fire on a located MG position at 738670 started a large fire and explosions of ammunition.

D Coy occupied a position at rd junc 729652.

C Coy occupied a position at rd junc 727650.

Command Post was established across the river at 736660 until after dark when it returned to Bn HQ at rd junc 728649.

The intention was to hold a bridgehead and positions as above until full fire support was concentrated to cover the capture of the remainder of the airstrip on 5 Jul.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

2/16 Aust Inf Bn locations remained unchanged.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

C Coy moved to BATAKAN BESAR and patrolled tracks North of rd juncs 688618, 697624 and 713637.

The battalion (less C Coy) remained on SEPINGGANG Airstrip.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

B Tp remained on Knoll 629604.

The Regiment (less one squadron and two troops) remained on JELLY.

One troop reverted to command 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Patrols were carried out to the East, North-East and North, and reported the following areas clear of the enemy:-

Features JAZZ, JINGO, JOKE, JESTER and JUICY;

Track from JELLY to rd bend 624623 to PUMP Road 614610;

Track from junc 629622 to JACK;

Bivouac area 633627.

A patrol to JACK, GAME and GATE features encountered approximately 40 enemy with one HMG and three LMGs in bunkers on GATE. The patrol withdrew to GAME and the

enemy followed down the track attempting to outflank GAME on the East, but when the patrol withdrew to JACK no further attempt was made to pursue it. It is thought that the enemy on GAME were portion of a force covering the withdrawal to and concentration of the enemy at BATOECHAMPAR.

5 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

During the night 4/5 Jul enemy artillery shelled our position between PACER Road and the sea South-East of D Coy.

Supporting arms were disposed to give maximum fire support and endeavoured to destroy located gun positions at 747678, 739677 and 742680 and MG positions at 744677. Naval and aerial support and armour were arranged.

Patrols from 051330I to 051600I reported dummy gun muzzle at 743682, a gun firing in position at 744680 and Japanese in the vicinity of 730674.

Enemy guns fired intermittently from 051440I onwards scoring direct hits on S MANGCAR BESAR Bridge but causing no serious damage.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

Routine patrols reported the battalion area clear of the enemy.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

At 051100I 12 enemy were sighted on HERO by C Coy patrols.

B Coy was moved to 691625 with the task of patrolling features bounded by HERO, HAVEN, HAIL, HARDY and KITTY.

Patrols for the day reported 10 to 12 Japanese at HEAVY but otherwise no movement.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Four patrols covered the area GIANT, GRAND, MERIT, MODERN, OPTIMIST, JAZZ, LANCE and JUMPY.

Reports received indicated that the enemy was in position on GATE; fresh tracks were seen on OPTIMIST but otherwise no movement was seen.

Support

(a) Naval

One cruiser and two destroyers fired accurately on MANGCAR airfield throughout the day. No definite destruction of enemy def positions was reported.

(b) Armour

One troop of tanks was landed in LCMs at MANGCAR BESAR Beach North of the River at 737660; two of the tanks were knocked out after landing and the remaining one took cover.

(c) Tank Attack

6-pounder guns were brought forward and scored several direct hits on bunkers and gun positions.

6 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrolled during the morning of 6 Jul and engaged located gun positions with artillery (both indirect and over open sights), a 6-pounder tank attack gun, naval and aerial bombardment.

D Coy attacked coast defence gun positions at 739677 at 1600I hours, captured the position and consolidated in this area. A counter attack at approximately 1620I hours was broken up by artillery and mortar fire.

C Coy moved over the MANGGAR BESAR River at 1634I hours and occupied a position at 741669.

Sporadic fire from enemy guns at 747678 continued until after dark on the bridge area and along VASEY Highway.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

Bn HQ, A Coy and D Coy moved at 0830I via track from PUMP Road to track junc 629621 to JACK and GAME features where they took over from E Tp 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt. A Coy occupied GAME with Bn HQ and D Coy occupying JACK feature

Patrols to GATE were by the enemy with rifle and LMG fire from pill-boxes sited on the high ground at GATE.

The battalion remained in these positions during the night 6/7 Jul, patrolling forward.

B Coy remained at RAVENSHOE.

C Coy remained at MALANG.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

B Coy moved to KING feature and patrolled as follows:-

Patrol No 1

HERO, HEAVY, HAVEN, HAREM, HAIL and return to KING by the same route - a well used track with signal cable laid and dumps of food and clothing at intervals along it.

Patrol No 2

KIND, HARRY, HARDY, HASTY, KIDDY, KISS and return to KING - no movement was seen.

Patrol No 3

KING to HABIT, HAIL and by previous route - four Japanese were contacted on HABIT but withdrew.

Patrol No 4

Along track following the MANGGAR BESAR River to FERN and return - no movement was seen.

C Coy remained in its previous location and patrolled from track and road junction 721644 via JOE and JOLLY, returning via JUNK. No enemy movement was seen.

No change was reported for the remainder of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

E Tp moved at 0730I from JELLY via JACK and GAME to the lower slopes of GATE where the enemy was found to be still in position. E Tp handed the position over to 2/16 Aust Inf Bn.

One troop was placed under command 2/16 Aust Inf Bn.

F Tp on MERIT patrolled North to houses at 613642 and found the track to be an unused footpad. One section of this troop which remained with 2/33 Aust Inf Bn during the night 4/5 Jul on MODERN, met enemy fire from MUFFLE during its return. It was accompanied by a platoon of 2/33 Aust Inf Bn which took over and engaged MUFFLE. The section returned to MERIT.

B Tp remained at 628605.

7 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

During the night 6/7 Jul the enemy attacked the D Coy position at 739677 and a patrol encountered the C Coy position at 742669. Both attempts were met with heavy small arms fire and repulsed.

During the day 2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrolled to the North, North-East and East along the coast. Located gun and mortar positions were engaged with artillery (both indirect and over open sights), mortars and naval and aerial bombardment. 39 out of 42 rounds from 25-pounders scored direct hits over open sights on a gun at 745687.

No enemy gunfire was directed on to our positions during the day.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

B and C Coys moved at 0900I via track from PUMP Road to track junction 629622 to JACK feature.

A and D Coys occupied GAME with Bn HQ, B Coy less one platoon and C Coy occupying JACK.

One platoon of B Coy relieved F Tp 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt on MERIT feature.

The battalion patrolled to the East and reported the area clear of enemy as far as GIANT feature.

The enemy on GATE were harassed by mortar, MG and small arms fire throughout the day. The fire was returned on a 200 yard front causing slight casualties.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

2/27 Aust Inf Bn was relieved of the responsibility of the SEPINGGANG Airstrip and, less one company, moved to an area West of the MANGGAR BESAR River. Its dispositions were as follows:-

| | |
|-------|--------|
| Bn HQ | 722640 |
| A Coy | 732646 |
| C Coy | 712633 |
| D Coy | 734648 |

B Coy patrolled from track and road junc 663607 to track junc 658620, thence North-East via features KEEL, HALO, HAIR and HACK. No enemy movement was seen and the patrol returned via the same route.

A C Coy patrol from the MANGGAR KETJIL River to 714639, JOE, JOLLY, EVER to river 717672 reported having sighted and engaged the enemy on JOE; 711663 and JOLLY. In each case the enemy parties withdrew.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

The Regiment, less one squadron and one troop, with under command B Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn less one platoon, was given the responsibility of the defence of the SEPINGGANG Airstrip. The Regiment moved at 0900I via bivouac area 635629, LADY SCHOFIELD, track junc 628595 to SEPINGGANG. Dispositions were as follows:-

| | |
|---------|--------|
| RHQ | 656602 |
| 2/3 Sqn | 653605 |
| 2/5 Sqn | 649603 |

F Tp on MERIT was relieved by 2/16 Aust Inf Bn and A Tp reverted from under command 2/16 Aust Inf Bn. Both troops rejoined the Regiment at SEPINGGANG.

8 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

A Coy relieved D Coy at 1200I. Local patrols were carried out. Two air strikes by Liberators were unable to be carried out owing to low cloud.

Artillery, mortar and naval gunfire were used to rake the areas behind the old coast defence gun position at approximately 740380 and re-entrants on either side of FROST.

Otherwise no change reported.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

2/16 Aust Inf Bn contained the enemy on GATE and harassed the position with mortar and artillery fire. Following a heavy concentration of mortar and IG fire, the battalion reported at 1830I that the enemy had withdrawn from GATE and the position had been occupied by 16 Pl 2/16 Aust Inf Bn. No other change in dispositions was reported.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

B Coy moved out at 0800I and proceeded via

KNIFE, KEEN, KELP, KIDDY, HARRY, HARDY, HANK to HAIL. Five enemy were seen at KELP who withdrew in the direction of KIDDY. The company encountered enemy of estimated one platoon strength with three LMGs, one FMG and one light mortar on HAIL. One platoon of B Coy occupied feature 668663; the remainder of the company was located on HANK. No change was reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

One section accompanied B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn on its movement to HAIL.

A patrol of one section moved from SEPINGGANG to JUMPY, JUMBO, bivouac and stores area 657621, KERN, KIDDY, KIND, HERO: no enemy movement was seen.

F Tp rejoined the Regiment from MERIT.

No other changes reported.

9 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

Following air strikes by P38s and Liberators and naval and aerial bombardment, A and C Coys moved forward and at 1700I occupied FROST feature at 741682 and spur at 745678 respectively. One troop of tanks accompanied C Coy. No enemy opposition was encountered.

B Coy moved up and occupied A Coy's position at 739677.

D Coy moved up and occupied C Coy's position at 741669.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

2/16 Aust Inf Bn moved forward from GATE through GLAD to GRAND where an enemy position was encountered. This was engaged by artillery fire and the enemy withdrew at 1900I.

A Coy occupied GRAND at 1930I and consolidated.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

B Coy maintained contact with the enemy position on HAIL. A patrol from HANK to HAVEN to HAREM to HAIL found no enemy until they encountered the HAIL position when they returned to E Coy who were relieved by 2/3 Aust Cdo-Sqn at 1200I. B Coy returned and occupied a position at 722640.

A patrol of one platoon from C Coy moved from KING via HERO to HEAVY, observing no enemy movement.

A platoon of A Coy moved at 1600I and took over a position at 733666 from B Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn with the task of protecting and patrolling the left flank of that battalion.

No change was reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn moved at 0800I via KERP, KIDBY, HASTY, HARRY, HARDY, HANK and took over positions at 668645 and 668642 from B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn at 1200I. The squadron maintained contact and harassed the enemy with fire during the afternoon.

HQ 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt moved at 1700I and established itself at 697626.

2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn (less one troop) reported no change.

10 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

The battalion consolidated during the day in the positions occupied on the evening of 9 Jul. Bn HQ moved forward to 733672, and a patrol was sent along VASEY Highway to the bridge across the ADJIRADEN River; it reported the bridge completely blown with a gap of 60 feet.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

The battalion moved forward from GRAND through GENT on to the South-West slopes of ENVOY where the enemy were encountered in bunker positions. After the exact location of 25 Aust Inf Bde and 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn had been determined artillery and small arms fire was brought to bear on the position. The enemy held it against light patrols.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol by A Coy through ENVOY to BAND encountered an outpost position of five enemy at 1420I of which three were killed after being engaged. The patrol moved on and at 1510I found approximately 30 enemy holding BAND. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn patrolled to HAIL and found that the enemy had withdrawn. The squadron advanced through HABIT and EVENT to ESSAY. A patrol forward to ENVOY was halted under Brigade orders at approximately 1430I, so that 2/16 Aust Inf Bn could engage the ENVOY feature with artillery. The squadron concentrated and consolidated on ESSAY.

11 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

The battalion remained in the same position and carried out a complete search of the area for enemy dead and equipment. 54 Japanese bodies were buried and it was estimated that an additional 150 bodies were in tunnels and bunkers. These were blown in.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

The enemy withdrew from ENVOY during the night 10/11 Jul and D Coy occupied the feature at 0830I. Patrols to ELOPE did not encounter any enemy.

After 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn took over the ENVOY feature at 1105I, the battalion (less D Coy) moved back to

its camp site at 702627 while D Coy remained on JACK feature.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

D Coy moved at 0800I along VASEY Highway through 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and took over a position on the ADJIRADEN River at 763692. Patrols to 758757, 757710 and 763699 found no enemy.

A patrol from A Coy to BAND found the enemy still in occupation of the position and sounds of wood cutting in the area were heard. A patrol to AGOG reached a point 728690 and heard three or four enemy.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

2/3 Aust Cdo Sqd took over the ENVOY feature from 2/16 Aust Inf Bn at 1105I. No change reported for the remainder of the regiment.

12 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol moved through FROST and FOOL to AGOG but no enemy were seen, there being foxholes along the track every 40 yards between FOOL and AGOG. Freshly dug positions, including one HMG position, several shelter tunnels, grenades, SAA and JUKI HMG ammunition were found on AGOG. Foot tracks were found leading from AGOG in several directions and each one was followed for approximately 400 yds from the feature.

A patrol to BAND feature did not contact any enemy.

A third patrol from 759677 to 735680 to ENVOY found no enemy but located tunnels with abandoned personal equipment and one 81-mm mortar. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

D Coy moved from the JACK feature and took over the defence of the SEPINGGANG Airstrip from 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt at 1200I and was located in area 650603.

A patrol of one officer and 11 other ranks moved via MANGGAR KETJIL, FLAG and LOVE to rd junc 669701. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

A Coy, with under command one platoon of MG, one section 4.2-inch mortars, one 6-pounder gun and artillery 0 party moved at 0900I via VASEY Highway to BANGSAI which was reached at 1500I and positions were occupied at 764735.

D Coy reported no change.

The remainder of the battalion moved via VASEY Highway and by 1700I had taken up defensive positions in the LAMAROE area. Dispositions were as follows:-

| | |
|------------------------|-----------------|
| Bn HQ, B Coy and C Coy | vicinity 759685 |
| Bn HQ plus 5 Pl | 759685 |
| A Coy | 765734 |
| B Coy | 751680 |
| C Coy | 756684 |
| D Coy | 763691 |

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

D Tp moved from SEPINGGANG to JACK and took over the feature from D Coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn at 1200I. E Tp moved from SEPINGGANG and rejoined 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn in the KING area. A Tp was located on the ENVOY feature and 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn (less A Tp) in the HABIT area.

Local patrolling from JACK, HABIT and ENVOY was carried out during the day. No change reported for the remainder of the regiment.

13 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

Patrols to AGOG and BALE found no enemy. The track through VASEY Highway through BAND and BANAL to BALE was discovered to be five feet wide, well used and could be made jeepable with two or three days' work. The track through FROST, FOOL and AGOG swings North-East and joined the other track at BALE. Beyond BALE the track runs North-West and the patrol followed it for 800 yards. The patrol remained on BALE and was built up to one company strength as a patrol base. No change was reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol from PANGGAR INTJIL through FLAG to DOVE returned to the battalion area at 151400I. At DOVE the patrol met a party of three Japanese marines carrying explosives. Two were killed and the other was probably wounded but escaped. No change was reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol from A Coy based at BINGSAL moved North along VASEY Highway to AMBORATANG (N) and returned without seeing any enemy.

A patrol from D Coy to BALD found no track and no sign of the enemy. Five huts with mines in the area were discovered at 755694.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

A 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn patrol to EDIT discovered three huts, one containing a safe which was blown and found to contain some documents and badges of rank. No enemy was seen nor was any equipment found.

A 2/33 Aust Inf Bn patrol via JACK, GRAND and GENT reached ENVOY and contacted A Tp at 1145I. No change reported for remainder of the regiment.

14 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

B Coy relieved A Coy on BALE and AGOG.

A patrol from A Coy moving along a track were engaged by the enemy from 727698 and withdrew when the enemy encircled their position. Approximately 20 enemy then took up a position on track junc 727694.

A C Coy patrol through ENVOY to AGOG.

reported no contact. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol through FERN, FARE and DOLL to DAME found a well defined track from 680666 to 688666 and made no contact with the enemy. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol from BANGSAL moved through feature 55, 708748 to 686742 without making contact.

A patrol to AMBORANG W and AMBORANG E reported the latter village unoccupied and made no contact.

A reconnaissance patrol moving per jeep reached SAMBODJA at approximately 1500I, reporting that the town was occupied by the enemy and was being fired. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Extensive patrolling to ENVOY, ELBO and HAVEN resulted in the destruction of three enemy. Otherwise there was no change.

15 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

A platoon of B Coy on AGOG was relieved by 14 Pl C Coy and rejoined B Coy on BALE. The enemy was contacted holding positions astride the track at 727698. Remainder of the battalion unchanged.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

A Coy, with under command one section of IFFS and 3 Pl (acting as a rifle platoon) moved at 0900I via HANGAR DEWIL, FLAG and DOVE to BADEN where Coy HQ, 3 Pl and 7 Pl established. By 1700I 8 Pl and 9 Pl were established on spur 672655 overlooking track junction 669702. A Coy encountered small arms fire at 660692 but the enemy could not be located. A track running East and West of track junction 669702 was reported approximately eight feet wide and very muddy and did not appear to have been used, except by one or two small parties, for some days.

C Coy relieved D Coy on SEPINGGANG airstrip at 653605. Patrols from C Coy searched the area of the Water Point 678616 which was attacked by a party of ten enemy on the night 14/15 Jul. No enemy were found.

D Coy moved into a new bivouac area at 748664 as a working party. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

C Coy moved via VASTY Highway to AMBORANG W where it took up a position at 756802 by 1400I. Local patrols found no sign of the enemy. Otherwise no change reported.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Patrols saw one enemy on spur South-East of HARRY and found a Japanese rifle on HACE. Three Japanese attempted to attack a booby trap clearing party at 647656 at 0745I but were dispersed by SME fire. Otherwise no change and no contact reported.

16 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

D Coy moved through B Coy and by 1200I occupied a position astride track at 722698. A patrol to the river at 716703 and on to ADULT feature contacted four enemy at approximately 715709, one of which was killed.

Tracks were reconnoitred from 727698 to the MANGGAR BESAR River at 713699. Both of these points are suitable stores offloading points. Otherwise no change in the battalion reported. Tracks were also reced from AGOG to the MANGGAR BESAR River at 722688.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

A Coy moved to area 672698. A patrol North across the track to BABY found no sign of the enemy. At 1800I A Company headquarters was mortared by 81-mm mortars from the direction of ACTOR. Artillery fire was brought down in the general area ACTOR and the mortar ceased without casualties resulting. A patrol contacted four Japanese at 659699, one of whom was killed. A further patrol contacted two Japanese at 670700 and killed one of them.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

C Coy moved to ALBORNING W and bivouaced in D Coy area. Otherwise no change reported.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Patrols killed isolated enemy at 662662 and track junc FLOPE, EMVOY, ESSAY.

17 JUL2/14 Aust Inf Bn

A B Coy patrol from BALE moved through BALD, AFTER and ADZE and returned without sighting any enemy.

D Coy moved to ADZE but found the feature unsuitable as a defensive position. No enemy were found on the feature but a patrol contacted a party of enemy of estimated one platoon strength occupying a position astride the track at 713703; the company returned to a position at 719701. A section maintained contact with the enemy at 713703 and directed artillery on to their position. Two enemy were killed by this section. No change reported in the remainder of the battalion.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

A Coy patrolled from the company area 673698 to BABYL, ACTOR and AGRE and along track to the river at 681707. No enemy were contacted but movement was seen on the East bank of S TAPPO at approximately 682707. Two enemy were contacted by a standing patrol on BIDEH feature; one was killed and the other escaped.

Bn HQ and B Coy moved from the BATAKAN area to a new bivouac and occupied areas at 750865 and 748664 respectively. No change reported in the remainder of the battalion.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

The Comd Post, A Coy and B Coy (less one platoon) concentrated at AMBORANG preparatory to patrolling in strength to SAMBODJA on 18 Jul.

One platoon of B Coy relieved A Coy at B'NGSAL.

C Coy moved across country from AMBORANG by an unmade route and by 1755I reached a position at 682791. The company was preparing to establish an OP on MILFORD Highway at approximately 660794 and carry out an ambush on 18 Jul. No other changes were reported.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Patrols reported no contact with the enemy.

18 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

D Coy moved to 719701 and occupied the position. A patrol from this company advanced to TIBER HILL 703706, then moved 500 yards North along the tramline without making contact with the enemy.

Bn HQ moved to a new bivouac area at 744562. No other changes reported.

2/16 Bn Patrols contacted the enemy at 663700 and 681706, killing two in the ambush position prepared at 663700.

B Coy relieved A Coy at 373678, when the latter returned to a new bivouac area at 748664. No other changes were reported.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

Comd Post, A Coy and B Coy reached SAMBODJA at approximately 1230I and occupied positions at 801876, 801876 and 808753 respectively. Two enemy were killed in SAMBODJA.

A patrol to FUMING STATION 784890 reported no contact, while a patrol to 793902 killed one Japanese and wounded one. No sign of a track from SAMBODJA to IT PAGAT was found. Local patrols around A Coy reported no contact.

C Coy less 15 Pl continued its advance towards MILFORD Highway but at 1500I had not reached it. 15 Pl remained at 684792.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Patrols reported no contact.

19 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

Patrols from D Coy cleared TIBER HILL area 703707 and track junc 692717. A patrol, then contacted 2/16 Aust Inf Bn patrol at track junc and KANGAR BESAR 682707,

moved through to B Coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn and returned to D Coy without contacting any enemy. A platoon patrol moved 1500 yards along the tramline North from track junc 692717 and found two camouflaged pill-boxes at the junction but no sign of the enemy. Natives stated that approximately 200 enemy were located at the end of the tramline in the area approximately 685743. They stated further that the enemy retired to a re-entrant to the North-East during the day and returned to the area at night to continue digging. This confirmed previous native reports of a force in the area. A patrol to ADULT contacted no enemy.

Bn HQ, A Coy and B Coy moved to bivouac areas 745661, 743661 and 745661 respectively.

C Coy occupied a position at 727692 and D Coy occupied a position at 718703 as a patrol base.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

A B Coy patrol to BABY stayed the night 18/19 Jul in that area and reported no contact. A patrol North-West along the West bank of the MANGGAR BESAR River to 682706 and thence along track to the North-East reported no contact. A patrol to the MANGGAR River at 682707 contacted 2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrol. This platoon later moved to junc track and tramline 692717 and set an ambush. Otherwise no change was reported.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

A Coy patrols from BABODJA reported a well worn track running from BABODJA WEST along the SAKANAN River. A native stated that 14 Japanese moved along a track to the East on 18 Jul and that two moved North along the pipeline track. A further patrol from A Coy moved down to BAROE via the main road but found no signs of recent enemy occupation. Many sick natives were in and around BAROE.

C Coy returned from a patrol to HILFORD Highway. On 18 Jul the company remained in the area approximately 675800 while the OC and a small party moved to reconnoitre the Highway. They reached it at approximately 666800 at 1700I and located by sound four parties of enemy along a stretch of 300 yards of road. The patrol was then seen and pursued. They evaded the enemy and returned to the company area for the night 18/19 Jul. A platoon patrol on 19 Jul could not reach the Highway again within the time limit imposed and returned to the company area and C Coy moved back to AMBORAWANG. A patrol to the South during the return trip found a three foot wide track at 690785 - presumed to be the reported track from KILO 25 to TARATIP. The jungle was very thick for the last 2000 yards to the HILFORD Highway and a track had to be cut making movement very slow.

A D Coy patrol to Trig Area 784895 reported no contact.

2/7 Aust Cav (C&O) Regt

A patrol saw two Japanese between GATA and GIPSY at approximately 1300I.

NEI Platoon

The NEI Pl attached to 2/27 Aust Inf Bn moved to BABODJA with a patrol of A Coy. The platoon then followed a well worn five foot track along the South bank of the SAKANAN River, cleared a village in square 7790 and proceeded

to 750907. A native stated that 14 Japanese moved along a track to the East on 18 Jul and that two moved North along the pipeline track. Signs and native reports indicated Japanese occupation within the preceding 24 hours.

20 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol from D Coy moved through TIENTER MILL North along track and tramline to 685750 where they both ended. A track to the North-East towards S TIAPO branches from the tramline at approximately 692720. This was followed for 1000 yards but no enemy were contacted on either track. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol from B Coy moved from 672698 South-East along the West bank of the MANGGAR BESAR River without making contact.

A patrol moved via track to MANGGAR BESAR at 696714 then continued North along the East bank to 654723 where chopping and felling of heavy timber was heard. The patrol probed forward and found itself within an enemy position which extended over a front of 150 yards. The patrol engaged the enemy who returned heavy fire and our casualties were one killed and one wounded, while four enemy were killed. It was estimated that at least 100 enemy were in the position and women were in the area with them. The patrol withdrew to a position on the river at 696714 and dug in. No change reported for the remainder of the battalion.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

Comd Post, A Coy and D Coy returned from SIBODJA and occupied positions as under:-

| | |
|-------|-----------------|
| Bn HQ | 759685 |
| A Coy | 765744 - 764734 |
| D Coy | 759689 |

B and C Coys concentrated in areas 753682 and 756684 respectively.

2/7 Aust Cav (C&O) Regt

Patrols throughout area 4 reported no contact, but large quantities of food were found in the area 676626, stores in tunnel at 687629 and a destroyed 40-mm gun at 673614.

1st Platoon

The platoon remained at SIBODJA in area 601881 and carried out local patrols.

21 JUL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

A patrol followed a track North from track junction 713707 through ADULT and then along track which conformed to the "reported" track on the map. The patrol reached a point approximately 690771 and returned. The track was approximately six feet wide but overgrown except for a narrow footpad

in the centre which appeared to be well used. No enemy were contacted.

A patrol along a footpad from the end of the tramline at 688749 proceeded North for 2000 yards and then South-West for 600 yards and returned without making contact.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

B Coy moved from a position at 670700 via track junction and MANGGAR BESAR River 681707 thence to HUT area 675710. From there one platoon moved forward to a feature at 663725 where the enemy were contacted on 20 Jul, but found the position empty and occupied it at 1355L. B Coy moved through and occupied a position at approximately 653732 and patrolled 1200 yards to the North and to the East finding no tracks and making no contact. A patrol to 644736 contacted a small party of enemy with casualties to both sides.

D Coy moved at 0830L from the battalion bivouac area through D Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and TIEBER HILL to area 667711 where they occupied a defensive position.

C Coy was relieved by B Coy 2/1 Aust Inf Bn on SEPINGGANG at 1400L and returned to the battalion bivouac area 750665.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

No change.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Patrols throughout area 4 reported no contact.

E Tp moved from JACK feature and took over the protection of AVGAS Depot 653597 at 1200L.

B Coy 2/1 Aust Inf Bn

This company reverted from under command 2/27 Aust Inf Bn and moved to SEPINGGANG where they relieved C Coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn in defence of the airfield.

NEI Pl

The platoon located at SIBODJA reported two native women arrived at SIBODJA at 0600L. They stated that they had left G PAGAT on 201600L and that 100 Japanese were there. The Japanese told the women they were allowed to leave because they (the Japanese) were moving South.

A patrol to BAROE thence four miles North along the coast to SAGAGO found two natives there who stated that 17 Japanese armed with rifles were living off the land ten miles North of SAGAGO. The Japanese were last seen on 19 Jul.

22 JUL

2/27 Aust Inf Bn assumed responsibility for patrolling the Brigade sector and B Coy moved up to the TIMBER MILL area 721700 where they took over from D Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and established a patrol base.

D Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn on being relieved returned to the Battalion bivouac area at MANGGAR BEACH 743661.

Patrols from B Coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn cleared the area BABY, BABEL, ACTOR, BADEM and BAGON and found no sign of enemy. 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt patrols throughout ENVOY area also failed to make contact.

23 JUL

The Brigade Commander decided that one Battalion only should be committed in an operational role from now on.

C Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and B and D Coys 2/16 Aust Inf Bn returned from the upper MANGGAR area and both Battalions concentrated in their respective bivouac areas on the coast immediately North of the mouth of the MANGGAR River. Battalion areas were:-

2/14 Aust Inf Bn -- area 745660
2/16 Aust Inf Bn -- area 743666

2/27 Aust Inf Bn sent out one platoon from B Coy to patrol through ADULT and along the "Reported" track which ran North to MILFORD HIGHWAY at 660794. This patrol saw 8 Japs moving ahead of them. The Japs disappeared and no shots were fired. Otherwise no contact was made and they bivouaced night 23/24 Jul at 675791 with the intention of moving on to MILFORD HIGHWAY the following day. Another platoon patrol from A Coy moved West from AMBORANINE along the track cut by C Coy on 18/19 Jul.

The NEI Coy at SAMBODJA and 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn at ENVOY patrolled their areas but made no contact.

24 JUL

Platoon from B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn moved along the "Reported" track to MILFORD HIGHWAY and came upon a party of 4 enemy at 671794. One member of the patrol was wounded but the enemy's casualties, if any, were unknown. The patrol moved on the contacted enemy approximately one platoon in strength on the knoll 670794. In the brief engagement which followed one Jap was killed and one wounded, our patrol suffered one killed.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn patrolled from the TIMBER MILL across the MANGGAR BESAR, into the BABY area and to track junction 668701 but made no other contact.

A patrol from 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt saw 3 Japs, who escaped, at 576622 but made no other contact.

2/14 Aust Inf Bn and 2/16 Aust Inf Bn were settling into their bivouac area.

25 JUL

2/27 Aust Inf Bn continued, with small patrols, to comb the area from ADULT feature, around TIMBER MILL area and BABY feature.

2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn patrols from ENVOY and HAIL made no contact but a standing patrol at 650622 killed one Jap who was subsequently identified as a member of the raiding party which attacked the BATAKAN KETJIL Water Point early on 24 Jul.

B Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn fired on 3 Japs at 658619 but the enemy escaped.

26 JUL

2/27 Aust Inf Bn continued patrolling. A section patrol from A Coy at BANGSAL moved West along blazed tracks to 739745 - 713732 and returned without seeing any sign of enemy. B Coy reconnoitred by DUKW along MANGGAR BESAR as far as the LAY River where enginers were to clear the river of floating debris. Other routine patrols in the TIMBER MILL - ADULT area did not make contact.

2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn were relieved of all patrolling responsibilities in the HAIL and ENVOY area and concentrated at the BATAKAN BESAR.

NEI at SAMBODJA patrolled up the Pipeline through SAMBODJA without contact.

27 JUL

B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn patrolled again in the area ADULT - TIMBER MILL - tramline North to 688748 and then to feature 683741 - BABY - track junction 668702 with moving and standing patrols. No movement was seen.

Patrols from A Coy to 716744 and from D Coy to BALD to East to track 757708 also made no contact.

A NEI patrol followed the track from SAMBODJA to G.PAGAT, reached approximately square 6737 and were told by natives the main Jap positions were further on.

28 JUL

2/27 Aust Inf Bn again patrolled ADULT - "Reported" track to trig 55 - TIMBER MILL and tramline - BABY - track junction 668701 - BAND and BALE without contact. In most instances standing patrols were established. They discovered an overgrown track running East from the "Reported" track at 717720, which was believed to have been the original continuation track to TARATIP.

29 JUL

A Patrol from B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn along the tramline and thence to 695748 made contact with a party of 12 Japs at this point. One man was killed and the patrol returned. Other routine patrols did not make contact.

NEI Coy again patrolled the track from SAMBODJA to G.PAGAT and reached a point they believed to be feature in square 6392, and which the natives claimed to be G.PAGAT itself. The position consisted of bunkers and foxholes but they were empty and no Japanese were seen in the area.

30 JUL - 31 JUL

Standing and mobile patrols from B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn in the same areas made no contact.

On 31 Jul an NEI patrol returned from the MAHAKAM Delta area where they had killed one of two Japanese in the river guardhouse at 043049. There were several native reports of Japanese moving towards SAMBODJA along the coast and down the pipeline.

1 AUG

On 1 Aug, as a result of consistent native reports of Japanese activity to the North of SAMBODJA C Coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn was moved to SAMBODJA where the NEI Coy was placed under command and Maj WILSON 2/16 Aust Inf Bn took command of the force. A Coy with one Tp 2/5 Aust Fd Regt to provide fire support moved to AMBORAWANG.

Tac R reported a large number of natives moving down the coast to BAROE and other natives stated 100 Japanese were almost at BAROE. Local patrols around SAMBODJA however did NOT contact any enemy.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn continued mobile and standing patrols in the TIMBER MILL area without contact.

2 AUG

2/16 Aust Inf Bn had been warned for the Divisional task of reconnoitring the roads, tracks, rivers and coastline North of SAMBODJA to BOENGATIREM, and to the MILFORD HIGHWAY, with a view to a possible future move of a force to SAMARINDA. As a result of the reported Japanese activity in this area it was decided that 2/16 Aust Inf Bn would concentrate forthwith at SAMBODJA and carry out this task immediately. Their presence at SAMBODJA would also be a safeguard for NICA and the natives in the area.

A Coy and the Troop of 25-pounders moved up from AMBORAWANG and the Battalion Commander moved up and established a forward Command Post at 801680. Preliminary patrols of approximately one platoon strength each moved out along the coast North of BAROE - along the oil pipeline to the DONDANG River and along the track to G.PAGAT.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn patrols in the TIMBER MILL area and West from AMBORAWANG made no contact.

3 AUG

B and D Coys 2/16 Aust Inf Bn together with main Battalion Headquarters moved to SAMBODJA and the Battalion took up positions as under:-

| | | |
|------------------------|---|--------|
| Battalion Headquarters | - | 801880 |
| A Company | - | 793882 |
| B Company | - | 795871 |
| C Company | - | 801877 |
| D Company | - | 803883 |

The coast patrol reached SENIPAH River area and found it clear of Japanese. The patrol along the Pipeline contacted one platoon of enemy at 882997, three enemy were killed and two wounded in the encounter. The patrol to MT PAGAT, although they did not make contact received native reports of 150 Japanese 3 miles West of point 716904, which was the furthest extent of their patrol.

B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn killed one Japanese and wounded one in an ambush set at 694750 and later in the same position engaged a party of 6 Japanese inflicting estimated casualties of 3 killed and 1 wounded. A further patrol contacted 3 Japanese at 703706 without casualties to either side.

4 AUG

21 Aust Inf Bde HQ patrol reconnoitred the entrance to the SAMBODJA River in an LCM and found that it was NOT navigable.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn patrol towards G. PAGAT reached 6890 without contact and a further patrol left to follow up the pipeline and estimate enemy strength in the area 9203. An NEI patrol through SENIPAH to 974985 returned without making contact.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn ration truck was fired on by an enemy ambush party on the SAMBODJA road at 762814. No casualties were caused and subsequent patrols found that the enemy had left the area. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn patrols in the ADULT-MANGGAR-TIMBERMILL area did not make contact.

5 AUG

In view of the Japanese activity on 2/16 Aust Inf Bn L of C, B Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn moved to AMBORAWANG from where they patrolled all the tracks leading West towards the MILFORD HIGHWAY.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn's platoon patrol along the pipeline contacted one platoon of enemy at 889007 and returned to a position at 845974. The following patrols, each approximately one platoon in strength, set out from SAMBODJA:

- (a) To move along the coast from BAROE to MOEARA DJAWA, with an LCM co-operating offshore.

(b) To traverse the pipeline to SOENGATIREM, reconnoitre the navigability of the BAMBANGAN River to 908085, reconnoitre for a track to end of track 908085 and then reconnoitre the track to MILFORD HIGHWAY.

(c) To find a route from the pipeline to MILFORD HIGHWAY, set an ambush and withdraw.

(d) To move along track through G. PAGAT to MILFORD HIGHWAY at 662923, and then at 760018, observe for 4 hours at each point, set ambushes and withdraw.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn patrols in the TIMBER MILL area were prevented from moving far by heavy rains and consequent flooding of rivers and streams.

6 AUG

2/14 Aust Inf Bn took over responsibility for patrolling the Brigade Sector, excluding SAMBODJA, and A Coy relieved B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn at the patrol base 722700. Ambushes were established along the main tracks in the area.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn: "(a)" patrol killed one Japanese at MOERA DJAYA.

"(b)" patrol to SOENGATIREM contacted enemy at 880004 and withdrew while a pre-arranged air strike of P40s and Spitfires was made on the position. Patrol then moved forward, killed one Japanese and the remainder fled. They continued along the track and again contacted Japanese at 900016.

"(c)" patrol trying to find a route to MILFORD HIGHWAY reported they could not locate their position owing to very difficult nature of the country, thick forests and NIPA swamps.

7 AUG

2/14 Aust Inf Bn standing and mobile patrols in the TIMBER MILL area made no contact.

A second coastal patrol from 2/16 Aust Inf Bn from BAROE to SOENGATIREM moved through HANDIL DELAPIN along the canal to feature 53 and then to point 000058 without contact.

The patrol from the pipeline to MILFORD HIGHWAY found the thick virgin forest, and swamps, impassable and returned without reaching HIGHWAY. The patrol to G PAGAT contacted a small enemy party at 690890 and killed two Japanese.

8 AUG

2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrols in the TIMBER MILL area made no contact with the enemy.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn patrols to MOERADJAWA, from pipeline to MILFORD HIGHWAY and through G PAGAT to MILFORD HIGHWAY all reported in. The G PAGAT patrol cut the HIGHWAY at 666925 observed for some time and reported continuous vehicle movement at night. They killed one additional Japanese.

The two patrols to SOENGATIREM, one via the pipeline and one via the coast were observed by Tac R to be at 914032 and 015074 respectively - otherwise these patrols remained out of communication.

9 AUG

A platoon patrol from B Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn moved West from AMBORAWANG to the track leading onto MILFORD HIGHWAY contacted a party of Japanese at 689785, killed 7 of them and suffered 2 wounded themselves. Other 2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrols in the TIMBER MILL area made no contact.

The two 2/16 Aust Inf Bn patrols to SOENGATIREM were still out but no contact was made.

10 AUG

2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrols still made no contact.

Both 2/16 Aust Inf Bn patrols to SOENGATIREM reported in.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn maintained their daily contact from the ADJIRADEN to the 2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrol base in the TIMBER MILL area.

11 AUG - 12 AUG

2/14 and 2/16 Aust Inf Bns patrols continued to search the TIMBER MILL and SAMBODJA areas respectively, but no sign of enemy was found.

13 AUG

2/14 Aust Inf Bn patrols still made no contact.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn less A Coy returned from SAMBODJA and concentrated in the battalion bivouac area at MANGGAR BEACH.

The NEI Coy remained at SAMBODJA under command A Coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn.

14 AUG

B Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn returned from AMBORAWANG to battalion bivouac area 744763.

The Brigade policy from this time onwards was that 2/14 Aust Inf Bn should maintain one company patrol base in the TIMBER MILL area and from there patrol the Brigade Sector excluding SAMBODJA and that 2/16 Aust Inf Bn maintain one rifle company and the NEI Coy at SAMBODJA to patrol to the area West, North and East to the coast.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn remained in Brigade reserve in LAMAROE area and maintained one Coy at BANGSAL.

Appendix 'K' to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBCE TWO

25 AUST INF BDE

Operations from 1 JUL - 14 AUG

PLAN

On 1 Jul 25 Aust Inf Bde was floating reserve with the probable subsequent role of attacking along MILFORD Highway.

1 JUL

Bde HQ landed - C Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn killed 7 enemy.
(596595) - Alternate HQ (Lt-Col MARSON) landed 011530L.

2 JUL

- 1 All Bns less two Coys 2/25 Aust Inf Bn landed.
Bde HQ 589599.
2/25 Aust Inf Bn moved PARKES and PLUG.
2/31 Aust Inf Bn moved RATION.
2/33 Aust Inf Bn moved RECORD - Cas.
- 2 One Coy 2/31 Aust Inf Bn moved to RESORT 1700 hrs.
Patrol to RAVENSHOE contacted 2/16 Aust Inf Bn.
- 3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn relieved 2/16 Aust Inf Bn. Coys
on ORANGE - ONTONG - OWEN - 89. Patrolled to BLYTHS
contacted 18 Aust Inf Bde.
- 4 Standing patrol 2/25 Aust Inf Bn BLYTHS JUNG
captured 1 Formosan, 1 Javanese.
- 5 1045L, 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn and C Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn
reverted to Div comd. One Bn (2/25) remain conc area in
Div res.
- 6 Engr and Arty sp by arrangement 18 Aust Inf Bde.
Det 2/4 Aust Fd Coy arrived Bde HQ 1600 hrs. One det placed
in sp each 2/31 and 2/33 Aust Inf Bns.
- 7 FOO party 8 Bty 2/4 Aust Fd Regt to each 31 and
2/33 Aust Inf Bns.

3 JUL

- 1 Brig issued orders night 2/3 JUL.
- 2 Infm - Suggested 100 Japs on OPERATOR.

Additional Tps - Under Comd

2 and 4 Tps 1 Aust Armd Regt
Two dets 2/4 Aust Fd Coy
One pl 2/1 Aust MG Bn

In sp

One Bty 2/4 Aust Fd Regt

3 JUL (Contd)3 Task

Secure line ORANGE - MURPHEYS JUNG - CHILTON RD - NEWSREEL and patrol fwd to OCTOBER - OXYGEN - NURSE - NAIL - hr 573627 - OPERATOR - OPUS - NOBODY. If not occupied, to secure with strong standing patrols. 2/31 and 2/33 Aust Inf Bns fwd - inter bn bdy LAVERTON - LETTER - track junc 588626 - OPERATOR - OPUS incl to 2/33 Aust Inf Bn - inter Bde bdy incl to 25 Aust Inf Bde (2/31 Aust Inf Bn) 574628 - NAIL - NURSE - NEWSREEL.

4 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) At 0730 hrs C Coy (one sec) patrolled to track junc 598613 and up re-entrant to NE. Then returned to 89. NMS.
- (b) A Coy moved via OCTOBER and was consolidating on OXYGEN by 1200 hrs.
- (c) B Coy (one pl) patrolled to OPUS, encountered strong enemy posns. Coy occupied lower end of OPUS - OPERATOR ridge with one pl on reverse slopes of OPUS. OPUS and OPERATOR were heavily shelled and mortared.
- (d) D Coy moved to occupy OCTOBER - contour 60.
- (e) C Coy remained as ordered by Bde on 89.

- 5 (a) 2/31 Aust Inf Bn moved and occupied line CHILTONS RD - NEWSREEL by 1000 hrs with slight opposition. 3 x 81 mm Mortars captured. Killed 5 Japs. Comd Post NEWSREEL.
- (b) A Coy advancing towards NOBODY was held up at 588621 by fire from OPERATOR.
- (c) D Coy moved towards NURSE and came under fire of 4 HKGs on NURSE. The cas caused by this fire were 6 killed 20 wounded. Mov fwd was prevented and the Coy took up posn on NW slopes of NEWSREEL.

- 6 By 1600 hrs, after by mortar and Arty conc, A and B Coys 2/33 Aust Inf Bn had by a combined pincer mov secured and consolidated OPUS and OPERATOR, and ridge running 3T from OPERATOR towards OXYGEN.

- 7 A Coy 2/31 Aust Inf Bn was enabled to continue mov towards NOBODY, and overcoming some opposition occupied 587622.

8 Locations

2/31 Aust Inf Bn - Bn HQ 594601, A Coy 593602

B Coy 593601, C Coy 593603, D Coy 593601

2/33 Aust Inf Bn - Bn HQ 592617, A Coy OXYGEN, B Coy OPUS - OPERATOR, C Coy 89(598609), D Coy ORANGE - Contour 60 (599622) - feature 73 (596623).

4 JUL

- 1 The general policy outlined was to use all possible supporting arms, and when enemy was forced to retire, move up and occupy posns by patrols, followed by force to consolidate.
- 2 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn and C Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn again came under comd also 2 tps MATILDAS and one Td FROGS available. Two 6 pr guns and one SFCP came under comd 1600 hrs.
- 3 In accord with policy Arty, MGs and 3" Mortars poured fire on to known posns during night F plus 2 - F plus 3.

4 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) At 0730 hrs B Coy 2/33 Aust Inf Bn moved fwd via 592620 and by 1430 hrs reached LEWIS and LETTER without opposition. D Coy moved fwd and occupied LEWIS - B Coy consolidated on LETTER.
- (b) C Coy patrols adv via 73(597623) - 594630, to within a few hundred yds of MACKAY at 598641 by 1730 hrs. No contact but native reported gun on MACKAY abandoned, gun on METAL knocked out - no Japs within 5 kilometres of MACKAY. All villages in area occupied by natives.

5 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Enemy posns to Bn front were similarly pounded during night. At 0700 hrs A and D Coys patrolled fwd, found the posns clear and occupied NURSE and NOBODY. 66 enemy dead were counted, mostly as result of Arty, MG and Mortar fire. 2 OERLIKONS, 2 JUKI, 2 MGs, 1 x 81 mm Mortar and 3 PW captured.
- (b) By 1200 hrs C Coy had relieved Coy 2/12 Aust Inf Bn on NAIL, and by 1700 hrs a patrol base of one pl was est on LODGE. Patrol to LUNCH reported mov on LAVERTON.

6 2/25 Aust Inf Bn completed conc and ceased to be Div res.7 Locations

2/25 Aust Inf Bn - PARKES - PLUG

2/31 Aust Inf Bn - One Pl C Coy standing patrol LODGE, A Coy NOBODY. Bn HQ and C Coy less one pl KITE, D Coy NURSE, BCoy, NEWSREEL

2/33 Aust Inf Bn - D Coy LEWIS, B Coy LETTER, C Coy ORANGE - OCTOBER - contour 60(599622), A Coy OPERATOR, Bn HQ OPUS.

5 JUL1 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Reported enemy appeared to be moving WEST 0745 hrs.
- (b) C Coy during morning took MACKAY and MODERN without opposition. OP on MACKAY reported LIB crashed approx 3 miles NE LUNCH. Fire from JUSTICE.

- (c) D Coy adv to METAL meeting some opposition. Occupied southern slopes of feature. Own cas 1 OR killed 1 OR wounded. Timbered area from METAL and EAST along rd was heavily engaged by bn mortar and MMGs during afternoon. 600 rounds 3" mortar were fired.
- (d) C and B Coys occupied MARGIN, MARSHALL, MUTUAL without opposition, but were under fire from METAL and JOINT
- (e) B Coy patrol to MUFFLE at 1035 encountered enemy fire. Feature was heavily mortared.
- (f) Locations
B Coy MARSHALL with pl on MUTUAL, C Coy MARGIN with one pl MUTUAL, D Coy METAL 595644, A Coy MACKAY, Bn HQ 596634.

2

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) During night enemy throw grenades and shot at D Coy on NURSE. No other activity. Further enemy dead on NURSE - total at least 79.
- (b) C Coy secured LODGE.
- (c) A Coy moved to LODGE and later to 584643.
- (d) B Coy moved to LETTER.
- (e) D Coy moved to LEWIS and later to LODGE.
- (f) C Coy secured LIVERPOOL after a short engagement. Enemy cas 10 KIA - own 5 WIA. Patrolled from LIVERPOOL NW to HUON and pipeline. MMS.
- (g) Comd Post - At 1340 hrs enemy EMG fired on comd post from METAL wounding Adjut, IO and 2 ORs. From 1615 to 1645 hrs comd post was shelled by enemy who later fired 30 rounds over bn posns. Guns pinpointed at 592655 and 596653 - probably 75 mm. Own cas 3 OR WIA. Arty fire was directed on posns. Results not known.

(h) Locations

Bn HQ and A Coy 584643, B Coy 589646, C Coy LIVERPOOL, D Coy LODGE.

3

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Moved fwd 0730 hrs.
- (b) A Coy relieved 2/31 Aust Inf Bn on NAIL and NURSE by 0900 hrs.
- (c) C Coy consolidated on LUNCH by 1115 hrs.
- (d) B Coy moved to feature 574640 and patrolled to BAROE barracks without contact.
- (e) D Coy moving to area 577640 found two 127 mm guns at 579633. Patrolled to barracks area 571637 and found 6 dead Japs. Also patrolled to 574624 - 578631 finding 12 dead Japs.

- (f) A Coy moved to LOWOOD and LINERTY by late afternoon.
No opposition.

(g) Locations

BHQ 577637, A Coy LOWOOD, LINERTY, B Coy 574640,
C Coy LUNCH, D Coy 577640

4

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) Moved through 2/25 Aust Inf Bn, through beach barracks area to LOCK and LAEL without contact. Patrolled fwd to KNOT and KING - no opposition - and reported BAROE PENINSULAR clear of enemy.

- (b) Patrols report condition of coastal def installations good. Two twin barrelled dual purpose guns, only slightly damaged and one 5 ft diameter SL, with power installations intact. Killed 1 Jap.
Many natives in area in bad condition.

- (c) Location - LOCK, one to KNOT.

5

New Bde bdy between 21 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes incl to 25 Aust Inf Bde MUFFLE - feature 39 - ETON - ECHO - EDIT - COCOA.

6 JUL

1

Bde com policy for 6 Jul was to probe fwd NE on two Bn front 2/33 Aust Inf Bn right, 2/25 Aust Inf Bn left. Inter bn bdy - MILFORD HIGHWAY incl to 2/33 Aust Inf Bn. NEI Coy to relieve 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn on BAROE PENINSULAR. 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn to occupy LOWOOD and LINERTY. After 2/25 Aust Inf Bn had adv move through to FREIGHT and FILTER - one pl MGs allotted to 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn and two pls to each fwd Bn.

2

2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) C Coy patrolled from MARSHALL towards JUDGE reaching 611647 where fired on from JUDGE. Enemy in occupation.
- (b) A Coy patrolling from MODERN reported MUFFLE occupied. Killed 3 Japs.
- (c) D Coy and Comd Post occupied METAL all day. At approx 1545 hrs Comd Post was shelled from vicinity JOINT. Gas incl 30. Maj LYON BM assumed Comd.

(d) Locations

BHQ 589643, A Coy MODERN, B Coy MARGIN - MUTUAL,
C Coy MARSHALL, D Coy METAL.

3

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) During night small enemy parties tried to infiltrate all Coy areas. Gas 1 Jap K. Own 1 K, 5 W.
- (b) A Coy moved from LOWOOD to HUON.
- (c) B Coy patrolled from HUON to 588664. No contact. Report stores area 589666 occupied.
- (d) C Coy patrolled fwd - one pl reaching 589652, occupied 589649 - 589652 - patrolled to cultivation 5965.

(e) D Coy relieved G Coy 2/31 Aust Inf Bn on LIVERPOOL.

(f) Locations

BHQ and D Coy LIVERPOOL 582648, A and B Coys HUON,
C Coy 589649

4

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) During night enemy party attempted to infiltrate on LIVERPOOL causing 2 casualties, enemy 1 killed. Now Bde Reserve.

(b) C Coy relieved from LIVERPOOL by D Coy 2/25 Aust Inf Bn.

(c) Locations

Bn HQ and A Coy 585645, B Coy 589646, C Coy 593637,
D Coy LIVERPOOL

5

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

Relieved by NEI Coy during morning - moved LOWCOD, LINERTY, LUNCH by 0930 hrs. 1700 moved to LETTER and LEWIS giving depth to Bde position.

6

NEI Coy

Relieved Coy - patrolled DARTOE PENINSULAR during day. Fired on across SCHIBER RIVER + HQ KNOT.

7

Arty

During night Arty fired 1040 rounds on JUSTICE, JAM, HPAK, 599659, 612663.

2/4 Aust Fd Regt and one Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt in support from 1650 hrs.

7 JUL

1

2/25 Aust Inf Bn - sec patrol left at 0811 hrs 594652.

(a) C Coy - patrol contacted 2/33 Aust Inf Bn on left flank METAL - both reported no contact with enemy.

(b) B Coy - from HUON patrolled to 588658. Reported feature unoccupied.

(c) A Coy - took up posn 588657 and patrolled to JAM reporting still occupied.

(d) Locations

Bn HQ 582645, A Coy 589657, B Coy HUON, C Coy 589648,
D Coy LIVERPOOL

2

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) D Coy - during night killed one infiltrating Jap who carried explosives. Air burst during day caused 5 casualties.

No operations during day.

(b) Locations - No change

3

2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Patrols from A and C Coys to western slopes of MUFFLE report movement on 39 and estimated 50 enemy on MUFFLE.

(b) Location

No change

4

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

No operations

5

NET Coy

- (a) Patrol crossed SOEMBER RIVER before first light, landing 560663. Patrolled forward to EDITION coming under LMG fire.
- (b) Patrol moved towards SOEMBER - TENGAH and reported it clear.
- (c) Moved to ELASTIC and EPIDEMIC. No opposition.

(d) Location

HQ KNOT, Patrol EPIDEMIC

6

Arty

2/4 Aust Fd Regt engaged hostile guns, bunkers and defences forward of Bde. 2480 rounds FE fired.

8 JUL

1

2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Bn HQ - During night enemy party 12 - 16 infiltrated via MILFORD HIGHWAY carrying rifles, one LMG, spears, 75 mm shells, grenades. Own casualties, Killed in Action - 1 offr, Wounded in Action - 3 OR, enemy killed 3 offr 9 OR. Enemy cut lines to RETAL.
- (b) D Coy - 0830 hrs patrolled towards JUSTICE reported enemy in occupation.
- (c) A Coy - Patrol to forward slopes MUFFLE and were grenaded and fired on by LMG, one LMG pit cleared - 4 enemy killed.

Patrol to ORDERLY and 617632 made no contact with 2/16 Aust Inf Bn. Reported fresh tracks leading towards MUFFLE.

Patrol to 609640 to investigate movement located small party who fired on A Coy positions. On return of patrol enemy were engaged by MG and Mortars.

- (d) C Coy - Patrol towards JUDGE sighted 7 Japs with rifles and satchels moving NORTH from JUDGE. Arty fire brought to bear. Patrol towards MUFFLE to investigate result of air strike.

(e) Locations

BnHQ 589640 otherwise no change. Maj BENNETT assumed command.

2

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) B Coy - fired on small Jap party during night causing some casualties.
- (b) A Coy - Coy occupied 589658. Patrolled towards JAM, at 1000 hrs reached timber edge 592658. Fired on from JUSTICE.
- (c) D Coy - Moved 0800 hrs to join A Coy in area 589658. In by 1000 hrs and patrolling to STORES area 590664. Occupied CULTIVATION area 587662 at 1200. One pl reached JOB and remained until relieved by Tp Cav at 1500 hrs.

(d) Supporting Fire

Mortar and Arty on JAM 1630 hrs.

(e) Location

Bn HQ 582645, A Coy 589658, B Coy FUON, C Coy Two pls LIVERPOOL, two secs 588649, one sec LUNCH, D Coy 588662.

3

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) During night small parties of Japs attempted infiltration of B and C Coy areas. 6 Japs killed. No operations during day.

(b) Location

No change.

4

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) 0830 hrs moved round left flank 2/25 Aust Inf Bn towards JOB and reached western slopes of LIVERPOOL by 0900 hrs. At 1200 hrs in position 587667 and reported enemy mines. Casualties caused 2 killed, 2 wounded. By 1500 hrs Tp on JOB relieved pl D Coy 2/25 Aust Inf Bn. Remainder STORES area 590664 patrolling NORTH and NE. Fired on by snipers from FILTER and 588669. Enemy map found on JOB. Located and marked mines at 587663 and 588664. Sqn concentrated on JOB for night.

(b) Location

JOB

5

NEI

No contact. Location - HQ KNOT, two secs EMPIRE 580682.

6

Arty

2/4 Aust Fd Regt supported Bns by heavy concentrations on JUDGE, JOINT, and JUSTICE. 3 enemy guns visible to FOOs and were engaged by heavy fire. Direct hits scored.

FOO with Cav on JOB directed fire on to opportunity targets. Rounds fired - 4600 HE.

9 JUL

1

2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Quiet night but loud explosions heard behind JUSTICE and MT movement heard between 2/33 and JUSTICE.

- (b) D Coy

0700 hrs patrol moved to JUSTICE. No opposition Met 2/25 Aust Inf Bn patrol.

At 1000 hrs occupied JUSTICE.

Patrol by 1100 hrs had reached 603658 and at 1200 hrs Coy was building up patrol.

1530 hrs by fire and movement secured MACDONALDS RIDGE from 612658 to incl MILFORD HIGHWAY. Enemy withdrew leaving 1 off 4 ORs killed.

- (c) C Coy

0700 hrs patrolled to JUDGE and reported enemy still in occupation.

Pushing towards JUDGE again at 1145 hrs met no opposition but reported loud explosion behind MACDONALDS feature.

Advancing under light fire captured 613653.

- (d) A Coy

Patrol towards MUFFLE came under heavy fire from MUFFLE.

Reported extensive movement on feature.

MUFFLE had mortar and Arty fire on it and by 1130 hrs was occupied and Coy was patrolling towards 39.

- (e) B Coy

At 0700 hrs moved to JOINT, reached to w in 150 yds of top of feature. Enemy movement seen and patrol reported diggings on forward slopes seemed to be booby trapped.

B Coy moved to JOINT 1500 hrs.

Patrol located crashed B24 and bodies of crew at 60350555.

- (f) Location - Bn HQ and B Coy JOINT, A Coy 618652, C Coy 615653, D Coy 608661.

2

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) Arty fire brought on to FREIGHT and FILTER. Patrols drove enemy from them 1000 hrs.

- (b) By 1110 hrs Sqn reached 597667 and patrolled towards CULT 600659. Large fire reported STORES area Square 6166 - thought to be result of air strike.

(c) One tp moved towards STORES (603679) arriving at 1600 hrs. Sighted one enemy.

(d) Remaining Tps moved to FLY and FORGE. At 1700 hrs Tp on FLY fired on by IMG and rifles from STORES area in square 6069. Engaged by Arty and patrols directly reached road junction 602692 and reported clear of enemy.

(e) Location

Sqn HQ, H and J Tps FLY, G Tp FORGE

NEI

(a) At 0800 hrs patrols to EVICT and ENROL. At 1600 hrs patrols reached BUNDABERG and BIAS. No movement seen.

(b) Location

HQ ENOT, patrols BUNDABERG and BIAS.

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) No enemy activity during night.

(b) A Coy

0700 hrs patrol reached JAM and continued to JUSTICE - which they occupied without opposition by 0730 hrs. Contacted 2/33 Aust Inf Bn patrol at 0745 hrs. Remainder of Coys concentrated on JAM.

(c) D Coy

Relieved Cav on JOB.

(d) B Coy

Moved to area 589658 - 588662 by 1200 hrs. During afternoon Bn followed enemy and by 1600 hrs had secured SOEMBER KAMAN from excl MILFORD HIGHWAY to 602675 with one Coy.

(e) G Coy moved from LIVERPOOL 1600 hrs to 609668. Large quantity enemy eqpt captured :-

| | |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 4 Type 97 IMGs | 2 Woodpeckers |
| 1 IMG | 2 Grenade dischargers |
| Large quantity spears | 60 Rifles |
| 1 Gun unknown calibre | 1 x 75 mm Gun |
| 1 Dual purpose Naval gun | 1 JUKI |
| 50 - 60 x 250 lb bombs | 3 Ann dumps |
| 1 Jap manpack flame thrower intact | |

(f) Location

Bn HQ 601659, A Coy 603661, B Coy 605660, C Coy 609668, D Coy 602674

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) At approx 082200 small enemy party attempted to infiltrate B and C Coy lines. Was fired on and withdrawn.

(b) At 1500 hrs Bn moved forward astride MILFORD HIGHWAY passing through forward tps.

- (c) A Coy - secured JUNIOR against slight opposition.
- (d) D Coy - secured stores area 617673. NMS. 18 Pl patrolled to FALLEN TIMBER 6367. Reported Japs in position NORTH on HIGHWAY. Patrol returned to Coy at 617666 at 2300 hrs. No contact.
- (e) C Coy occupied 614664 at 1630 hrs. No contact. Captured 1 x 75 mm, 2 x 75 mm twin barrel and 1 SL.
- (f) B Coy at 1630 hrs ordered move forward astride HIGHWAY. 10 Pl reached road and track junction 621667 after passing through 700 yds long mined with 1000 lb bombs connected by electrical wires. Wires were cut as pl advanced and just prior to reaching end of area, remaining bombs exploded. Killed in action 2, wounded in action 4, blast cases 15. Pl regained contact with main body.
- (g) A Coy moved from JUNIOR to astride MILFORD HIGHWAY 623667. In position 1800. NMS.

(h) Location

Bn HQ, B, C and D Coys area - junction MILFORD HIGHWAY - PHILLIPSONS RD, A Coy astride road at 622668.

6

Arty

2/4 Aust Fd Regt. Heavy concentrations on enemy positions with devastating effect.

Inspection of JAM and JUSTICE reveals many direct hits on bunkers and constructed OPs. Inspection of JOINT confirmed that 2 x dual purpose 75 mm guns were knocked out by Arty fire. Direct hits were scored in both gun pits, all sighting gear and controls were destroyed.

Two ammunition dumps destroyed and pits assumed to have been occupied by enemy gunners were blown out and some enemy dead found in pits.

One tunnel was also demolished on JOINT.

On JAM, JUSTICE, JOINT and MUFFLE devastation was caused by Regt. Shell holes on features are approx 5 yds apart. Total ammunition expended in support 25 Inf Bde since 7 Jul approx 15,000 rounds HE.

10 JUL

1

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Slight enemy movement between A and D Coys during night. Some casualties inflicted on enemy.
- (b) C Coy - 0730 hrs moved forward - axis advanced MILFORD HIGHWAY. At ERODE enemy LMG and rifle fire encountered. Arty fire brought down, enemy driven from feature - enemy casualties - 4.

B- 1000 hrs forward elements reached 627670 and were pushing towards CELLO. At 628671 between forward and following platoons - 3 mines exploded - own casualties 2 wounded.

(c) D Coy

(i) CELLO occupied by D Coy 1130 hours.

(ii) Supported by tanks, including FROGS, Artillery and 4.2 mortars, MMG and 3-inch Mortar advanced under heavy fire from HMGs and LMGs and at 1600 hours were astride road at 637673. Preliminary count enemy dead - 25.

(iii) Captured 9 x AA, 3 x OERLIKONS, 3 x JUKI.

(d) A Coy

Moved through D Coy on left of road and supported by tanks and flame throwers, artillery, 3-inch mortar and 6-pounder, reached approximately 636675 and contacted strong enemy positions at 638675 and 636677.

25 enemy killed, own casualties 12 KIA, 11 WIA.

(e) Location

Astride MILFORD HIGHWAY from 637673 to 635674.

2 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) B Coy

Standing patrols of section strength established at 609663, 613664 and 617666.

(b) C Coy

Patrol to FUNERAL reported no contact. During afternoon water party at 611668 attacked by one Japanese throwing grenades. Caused some casualties before being killed.

(c) Location

No change.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

(a) A Coy

Patrolled along McDONALDS TRACK to report suitability for jeeps.

(b) Location

No change.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) Patrol to SOEMBER KIRI to clear area - then WEST to pipeline to contact NEI Troops - then NORTH along pipeline to PUMPING STATION 5873. Engaged enemy SOEMBER KIRI area killing 4 and capturing equipment. Met friendly native who reported area clear. Moved WEST to pipeline and contacted NEI Troops at 1400 hours. Continued NORTH to within 1000 yards of PUMPING STATION. Saw 8 Japanese and fired on them. Results unknown. Japanese set fire to store containing coconut oil and withdrew up river by boat. When approximately 800 yards from PUMPING STATION patrol observed enemy movement in area. Returned to SOEMBER KIRI base because of lateness of hour.
- (b) To move EAST along POPES TRACK to contact 2/31 Aust Inf Bn on MILFORD HIGHWAY - contacted 20 Japanese at 608697 and killed 8. Returned to base with additional information of timber railway running along general line POPES TRACK.

(c) Location

SOEMBER KIRI area.

5 NEI Coy

Moved forward and occupied FORGE and FLY.

6 Artillery

2/4 Aust Fd Regt supported attack 2/31 Aust Inf Bn on CELLO with concentrations directed by FOO from tank, one 20mm gun, which had previously caused many casualties from McDONALDS was found knocked out by direct hits on gun and gun emplacement.

Bunkers, dumps and living quarters in vicinity gun also destroyed. Artillery casualties 1 Other Rank killed, 1 Officer wounded.

7 Enemy Equipment Captured

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------------------|
| 1 x 75mm gun | } | All probably in working order |
| 2 x twin 75mm guns | | |
| 1 x Searchlight | | |
| 2 dumps each 9 feet square of 20mm shells | | |
| 24 boxes 20mm shells | | |
| 1 x 20mm twin barrel AA gun | | |

11 JUL

1 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Heavy artillery and 3-inch mortar HF on enemy positions throughout night.
- (b) Some enemy firing caused casualty 1 wounded.

- (c) During morning two patrols, under covering fire from tanks, moved on right and left of road. Reached 635677 and 636675 respectively by 1000 hours. Contacted enemy astride road from 634677 to 636677. Patrols returned, enemy engaged by artillery and mortar fire. Enemy well dug in and well armed with MMGs, LMGs and mortars. During afternoon pounded enemy with artillery, 3-inch mortars and 4.2 mortars firing WP bombs.

(d) Location

No change.

2 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) D Coy patrol of 1 Officer and 10 Other Ranks moved 0830 hours. Patrolled SOUTH to JAK killing 2 Japanese at 592665. Reported back 1400 hours.
- (b) 0730 hours B Coy moved to ERODE, arrived at 0810 hours.
- (c) 0800 hours A Coy moved to MILFORD-PHILLIPSONS ROAD - arrived 0923 hours with one platoon at 614664.
- (d) 1100 hours A Coy section patrol up HIGHWAY to contact E Coy.
- (e) Standing patrol at 617670.
- (f) Patrol to STORES 614667.
- (g) Patrol to JUNIOR.
- (h) Section patrol down road to contact C Coy.
- (i) 0913 hours HQ Coy standing patrols on A and B road position.

(j) Location

B Coy - ERODE
A Coy - MILFORD HIGHWAY-PHILLIPSONS ROAD
with one platoon at 614664.
C and D Coys - No change.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) No operations. Standing patrol - one section - at BAILEY BRIDGE 602658.

(b) Location

No change.

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) Patrol to WAIN Pumping Station via CARNAYON and COAL. Contacted enemy at Pumping Station and inflicted some casualties.
- (b) Patrol left 0900 hours moved via CADDY to MILFORD HIGHWAY with view to contacting 2/31 Aust Inf Bn. Contacted enemy 610697, killed 4. Reached CADDY approximately 1500 hours and reached MILFORD HIGHWAY in rear 2/31 Aust Inf Bn late afternoon.

(c) Location

Squadron - No change
Patrol - 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

5. NEI Coy

Patrols during day counted 3 enemy dead and captured 3 FORMOSANS.

6 Artillery

- (a) Concentrations on enemy positions confronting 2/31 Aust Inf Bn during day.
- (b) FOO in tank directed fire most accurately. Artillery observer in AUSTER directed fire along MILFORD HIGHWAY NORTH of 633700. He observed a manned machine gun and engaged knocking out emplacement.
- (c) FOO with Cavalry on POPES TRACK provided effective support.
- (d) Starshells fired during night 10/11 Jul.

7. Enemy Equipment Captured

| <u>Original Items</u> | <u>Duplicate Items</u> |
|--|--|
| 1 Improvised Mortar | 1 Improvised Mortar |
| 4 Panniers .303 semi-rimmed Ammunition | 1 Type 99 LMG |
| 1 Tripod Lewis LMG | 1 Searchlight |
| 1 Flame thrower | 3 x 75mm guns |
| 1 x 7.7 AC gun | 1 x JUZI HMG |
| <u>Dumps</u> | 2 x 75mm guns and ammunition |
| 1 Ammunition | 1 Type 93 Respirator |
| 1 Field Ammunition Shed | 1 Type 99 Grenade Discharger |
| | 4 containers 40 Rounds Smoke Generators (SS) |

12 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

NIL.

2 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

Patrols forward on right 542676 and left CHAIR. Reported enemy same positions and returned. At approximately 0800 hours Battalion forward positions were ineffectively shelled by an enemy mortar - no casualties. Further enemy shelling during day - 4 Other Ranks wounded.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

NIL.

4 2/6 Aust Gdo Sqn

(a) Patrol from SOMBER HIRI found PUMPING STATION clear. Returned 1815 hours reported signs of recent enemy occupation. New enemy patrolling tracks in vicinity.

(b) Patrol staged night with 2/31 Aust Inf Bn left 0800 hours to move via GADY to CHARM and thence to cut MILFORD HIGHWAY. Worked round right flank of enemy positions and onto North-West end of CHARM - South-East along well used track and by 1715 had reached point overlooking MILFORD HIGHWAY. Enemy movement seen on HIGHWAY consisted of approximately 30 Japanese carrying stretchers SOUTH towards enemy forward positions. Another party approximately 30 observed carrying stores and supplies in same direction. An enemy patrol of approximately 20 then approached the still unobserved cavalry position from MILFORD HIGHWAY. Patrol moved back along track and set ambush. Enemy casualties 6 killed, estimated additional killed 3 and enemy patrol scattered. A large volume of fire was then heard on either flank indicating extensive enemy positions. Patrol moved 600 yards back along CHARM Ridge observing store huts at approximately 200 yard intervals (well used). A thick cable running along track was cut and patrol moved back to 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

5 Artillery

2/4 Aust Fd Regt - concentrations along MILFORD HIGHWAY and areas forward of 2/31 Aust Inf Bn.

Support given to cavalry NORTH of SOMBER HIRI. Throughout night EE along MILFORD HIGHWAY.

Total rounds fired in support of 2/31 Aust Inf Bn to date has passed 2000 EE.

13 JUL

1 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) Patrols reported enemy still on CHAIR and North-West end of COKE.

(b) Battalion relieved by 2/25 Aust Inf Bn at 1145 hours moved to -

| | |
|-----------------|----------|
| Bn HQ and D Coy | - 618666 |
| A Coy | - 608669 |
| 3 Coy | - 601674 |
| C Coy | - 626667 |

2 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) Relieved 2/31 Aust Inf Bn at 1145 hours.

(b) At 1600 hours A Coy killed 1 Japanese captured 2 Formosans forward area.

(c) Location

In close perimeter astride MILFORD HIGHWAY 636672.

| | |
|-----------|------------|
| Comd Post | - 63066705 |
| D Coy | - 637674 |
| C Coy | - 636674 |
| B Coy | - 635673 |
| A Coy | - 634672 |

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

Local protective patrols. A Coy patrol moved via GLOVE - GENT to ENVOY and ELOPE. Contacted 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn. Moved to EDIT and reached MILFORD HIGHWAY at 634671 at 1400 hours. No contact.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

(a) G Tp left SOEMBER KIRI 0955 hours to clear POPES TRACK to enable Squadron to move to ABASH. Encountered LMG fire 609697. Two mines exploded killing 3 and wounding 3, two of whom subsequently died. Enemy casualties 6 - estimated additional 4. Troop then moved NORTH of track and occupied CLONCURRY.

(b) Patrol staging night with 2/31 Aust Inf Bn night 12/13 Jul. Left area 1300 hours to move North-West to ABASH then WEST along POPES TRACK to contact G Tp in vicinity CLONCURRY.

(c) At 1600 hours Sqn HQ and 2 Troops left to occupy CLONCURRY.

(d) Location

CLONCURRY.

5 NEI Coy

- (a) By 1600 hours patrol one platoon strength was established at Pumping Station.
- (b) Coy less one platoon SOMBER KIRI.

6 Artillery

During night 12/13 Jul HF. During afternoon heavy concentration fired MILFORD HIGHWAY on fortified positions 200 yards forward D Coy 2/25 Aust Inf Bn.

Effective support given to cavalry.

HF fired NORTH POPES, MILFORD JUNCTION observation by AUSTER. Considerable enemy movement NORTH. Artillery secured direct hit on car moving along road. Ammunition 100 rounds.

14 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Patrol to EDIFY, EDIF, ELBOW contacted 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn and 2/33 Aust Inf Bn C Coy patrol - returned 1430 hours. Killed 1 Japanese.
- (b) Patrol via EDIFY-EMERY-CASE-COVE-CUP reached DADO after hard going through dense undergrowth. No contact. Returned 1800 hours.
- (c) Patrol via COKE-COCCA-CANE to CART reported. Going hard through thick timber and undergrowth. Sighted 9 Japanese 644674 moving North-West. No contact - returned via COCK and COKE 1325 hours.
- (d) Patrol via creek junction 630676 to 622677 - then NORTH to CAGE, South-West to CALM and CHAIR. No contact.
- (e) At 1420 hours enemy mortar fired on B Coy forward position wounding 5. Artillery and 3-inch mortar fire returned.
- (f) At approximately 1530 hours B Coy was relieved by A Coy 2/33 Aust Inf Bn and moved to COCCA. A Coy moved to CHAIR. In position 1900 hours.
- (g) At 1730 hours 10 Japanese approached D Coy positions and threw some 36 grenades. Own casualties nil - enemy 2 killed.
- (h) At 1800 hours another party approached B Coy old position. Driven off by heavy machine gun fire. Enemy casualties unknown.

(1) Locations

Bn HQ, C and D Coys - No change
A Coy - CHAIR
B Coy - GCGA

2 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Patrol from C Coy contacted 2/3 Aust Gdo Sqn and 2/25 Aust Inf Bn patrol.
- (b) At 1530 hours A and C Coys moved forward to positions in rear 2/25 Aust Inf Bn. In position at 1700 hours.

(c) Locations

Bn HQ, B and D Coys - No change
A Coy - 629671
C Coy - 636674

3 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

At 1000 hours Command Post moved to 612663, G Coy 610658, D Coy 613662.

4 2/6 Aust Gdo Sqn

- (a) Patrol left CLONGURRY 0800 hours and reached ABASH. No movement seen. By 1300 hours Sqn HQ, G and H Tps had occupied ABASH and were subsequently joined by J Tp.
- (b) Approximately 1200 hours, ambush party surprised Japanese on POPES TRACK - casualties 3 enemy killed.

(c) Location

ABASH.

5 NEI Coy

Patrol killed 1 Japanese at 605697. MAIN PUMPING STATION reported out of commission and much work required to make it function again.

6 Artillery

- (a) During night 13/14 JUB RF on enemy.
- (b) During day enemy positions on HIGHWAY were engaged with heavy concentrations.
- (c) Registration for future operations carried out by Air OP scoring direct hits on barracks 633712. AUSTER fired on .5 AA gun same area. Trucks observed here moving NORTH.
- (d) Ammunition - 700 rounds.

15 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) A Coy killed one Japanese in front of their position during night.
- (b) D Coy - during morning enemy mortars fell in area causing 2 casualties WIA. With Bn HQ moved to CALM, in position 1830 hours.
- (c) B Coy - 1530 hours began move to CART. In position last light.
- (d) C Coy - 1530 hours commenced move to 40 metre contour 629691. Reached CALM 1845 hours and took up night position.
- (e) Locations
 - Bn HQ and D Coy-CHAIR
 - C Coy -CALM
 - A Coy -632678
 - B Coy -CART

2 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Bn HQ - By 1000 hours had moved to new position with C Coy 629671. At 1600 hours moved to 631671.
- (b) D and B Coys relieved D and C Coys 2/25 Aust Inf Bn astride MILFORD HIGHWAY in area fallen timber. In position 1530 hours - D Coy 637676 B Coy 637675.
- (c) Locations
 - Bn HQ - 631671
 - A Coy - CELLO
 - B Coy - 637675
 - C Coy - 637674
 - D Coy 637676
- (d) Lt-Col COTTON resumed command 1600 hours.

3 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) A Coy - Patrol left 0800 hours moved North-West along PHILLIPSONS ROAD to junction 607683, thence via FILE, FLINDERS, FABRIC, FUNERAL and back to base. Located crashed B24 vicinity 617678. No movement seen.
- (b) B Coy - Same time to move North-West contact NEI SOEMER KIRI.

(c) C Coy - Patrol to move ECHO thence via McDONALDS TRACK to contact 2/25 Aust Inf Bn at CELLO.

(d) D Coy - Standing patrol JUNIOR.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

(a) Patrol left 0800 hours, via AUNT to cut MILFORD HIGHWAY 634702. Established ambush by 1300 hours. Killed 3 estimated additional 2. Returned 1600 hours. Reported Quick Fire gun vicinity 633704 and number of natives carrying personal belongings NORTH along HIGHWAY.

(b) Patrol left 0800 hours, reached ABIDE by 1300 hours - no movement seen. While returning, 1430 hours, contacted small enemy party killing 1 at 631694.

(c) Patrol left 0800 hours and moved WEST along POPES TRACK. Killed 2 Japanese at 625695, one moving WEST carrying rations and one moving EAST. Later killed another Japanese and at 1430 hours established ambushes at 616696 and 620696.

(d) At 1530 hours, 5 enemy endeavoured cutflank our ambush Southern slopes ABASH. 4 killed 1 probable.

5 NEI Coy

Protective patrols - 2 Japanese killed.

6 Artillery

(a) HF on known enemy positions including 639675.

(b) Possible gun position and troops area 633686 engaged. Rounds well in target area. At least 1 enemy killed.

(c) Ammunition 1200 HE.

16 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) C Coy (CALF)

(1) Enemy active around positions during night. Our casualties KIA 3 WIA 3 (one spear, one sword). Enemy casualties counted dead 13, wounded at least 16.

(ii) Patrol left 1230 hours, investigate feature 40 (628690) returned by 1730 hours having reached approximately 630687 where found extensive unoccupied defence position.

(iii) Patrol to CADDY same time return 1700 hours reported reaching 626687. No contact.

(b) D Coy (CHAIR)

Slight enemy infiltration attempted during night own casualties 3 WIA - enemy unknown.

(c) A Coy (632678)

At 0800 hours strong patrol sent to C Coy, arrived 1330 hours. No contact.

(d) B Coy (GART)

Relieved by B Coy 2/33 Aust Inf Bn and returned staging night with 2/33 Aust Inf Bn.

(e) Locations

| | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Bn HQ and D Coy | - CHAIR |
| A Coy | - 632678 |
| B Coy | - 2/33 Aust Inf Bn area |
| C Coy | - CADDY |

2 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

(a) D Coy

Patrol to 641677 and observed effect of Artillery fire on ridge 637678. Continued to 638679 and saw Japanese mortar and 12 Japanese in pits. Patrol was observed, returned and Artillery could not engage target. Restrictions on unobserved fire - none below 70 Northing grid line.

(b) C Coy

Patrol 1230 hours moved via EDIFY, EDIT, ELBOW then to 646663. Contacted 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn. Returned 1700 hours.

(c) B Coy

1445 Hours, relieved B Coy 2/25 Aust Inf Bn on GART. Reported 1830 hours that enemy force of unknown strength occupied CCGOA during late afternoon. Coy cutting L of C.

(d) A Coy

Took over B Coy 2/33 Aust Inf Bn position at 637675.

(e) Locations

| | | |
|-------|---|--------|
| Bn HQ | - | 631671 |
| A Coy | - | 637675 |
| B Coy | - | CART |
| C Coy | - | 636673 |
| D Coy | - | 637676 |

3 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) B Coy

Patrol left 0900 hours - moved via PHILLIPSONS ROAD to SOEMBER KIRI then to 608697, 613697, CHAIN, FILE-PHILLIPSONS ROAD. No movement seen.

(b) A Coy

Patrol with 2 Sappers and 1 NIGA representative left 0930 hours to investigate crashed aircraft 617678. Returned approximately 1130 hours reported MALAYAN writing on the side of the plane, words to the effect "Plane had been shot down and all members of crew killed." There were no bodies, no graves in vicinity and the plane had been stripped of guns and engines - plane was not burnt.

(c) C Coy

Along McDONALDS TRACK to contact 2/25 Aust Inf Bn at CELLO and returned along HIGHWAY. One wounded by enemy sniper 634667.

(d) D Coy

Standing patrol JUNICR. Killed 1 Japanese.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

(a) Slight enemy activity during night setting off some booby traps.

(b) At 0715 hours ambush was established on POPES TRACK at 626695. Killed 8 Japanese, returned 1730 hours.

(c) Patrol base of one Tp established on ABARE.

(d) By 1200 hours ambush set on MILFORD HIGHWAY at 633702. Destroyed 1 truck killed 10 Japanese. Returned by 1730 hours.

(e) By 1800 hours standing OP was established at 632708 and remained until night 17 Jul.

(f) Location - Sqn HQ, G and H Tps ABASH, J Tp ABARE.

5 NEI Coy

(a) Patrol observed, during day, a number of enemy digging in at approximately 616753. Engaged then, killed 1. Also fired on from 619748.

(b) Early morning 15 - 16 Japanese blew up 2 huts area SOEMBER KIRI.

6 Arty

2/6 Aust Fd Regt relieved 2/4 Aust Fd Regt at 1200 hours. During day supported forward troops. Amn 320 HE 60 smoke.

17 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) D Coy

At 0900 relieved by B Coy. D Coy moved forward preceded by a patrol and by 1445 had one Sec on CHARM and a small patrol had investigated houses at junc 639689, which contained stores. A routine enemy patrol of 20 turned up track onto CHARM from MILFORD HIGHWAY. Sec set ambush killing 6 JAPS. They then rejoined their coy.

Coy continued advance and by 1600 were in posn on CHARM.

(b) B Coy

Relieved D Coy on CHAIR at 0900. 1630 moved to join D Coy on CHARM. In posn 1830 hrs.

(c) A Coy

By 1200 had established standing patrol Sec strength on MILFORD HIGHWAY at 635677. Patrolled NORTH 100 metres and contacted enemy pl posn containing 1 HMG and 2 LMGs. Fired on enemy killing 2 and withdrew to standing patrol posn.

At 1530 a patrol to 634680 found enemy still in occupation, were fired on and returned to Coy by 1830.

(d) C Coy

Patrolled during morning to CAGE reported stores area of 4 huts 40 X 30 feet on feature.

Protective patrol killed one JAP.

(e) Location

Bn Hq and A Coy CHAIR, B and D Coys CHARM,
C Coy CALM

2 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

(a) C Coy

At 0900 moved to cut track via COKE in as direct route as possible to B Coy on CART. Contacted B Coy on CART 1545. Sighted 2 JAPS - killed them. Another party of 5 sighted but dispersed on seeing Coy. Occupied SW end of CART.

(b) B Coy

During morning a patrol moved along old L of C (via COCK and COCOA) (North to South) reached COCOA without contact and returned.

(c) A Coy

Patrol moved EAST along B Coys old L of C to COCOA found 6' of line missing at 640670 and further cuts between 642670 and 645670.

Patrol set ambush at 640670 but NMS and returned to Coy by 1800.

(d) D Coy At 1450 heard loud explosion in enemy posn and saw limbs and torso flying through air.

(e) Location
Bn HQ 631671, A Coy 637675, B and C Coys CART,
D Coy 637676.

3 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) B and C Coys occupied posn vacated by C Coy 2/33 Aust Inf Bn by 0930.

(b) Protective patrols captured 2 FORMOSANS at 618678 at approx 1500.

(c) Location
Bn HQ, A and D Coys No change, B and C Coys 636673.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo S on

(a) OP on ARCH reported single MT mov NORTH and SOUTH along HIGHWAY at approx half hourly intervals. Ambush set at 625695 killed one JAP at 0845. Returned to base 1730.

(b) At 0845 patrol moving WEST along POPES TRACK encountered 2 enemy at 624696. Killed 1. At 1130 patrol contacted enemy ambush on POPES TRACK at 617697. Killed 3 JAPS, remainder dispersed.

(c) Patrol moved SE to recce for OP posn in barracks area (Square 6369) and returned 1600 reporting no suitable posn.

(d) 1445 patrol to MILFORD HIGHWAY set ambush at 633701. Patrol was observed and 2 trucks carrying approx 40 enemy off loaded 200 yards NORTH of ambush posn and attempted to outflank own troops. Patrol returned to ABATE.

(e) At 1630 ABASH ambush posn killed 3 enemy.

5 NEI

During night enemy attacked P1 at WAIN pumping station. Attack was beaten off but pl moved to more suitable position at 589722. Enemy now in posns from 565737 to 585735. Native later reported 6 dead JAPS in pumping station area.

6 Arty

(a) 0945 predicted shoot on barrack 637697 and def post 639689. AUSTER observation made difficult by low cloud.

- (b) FOO with Cdo patrol engaged 40 JAPS at 628701.
Results unobserved.
- (c) Barrack area registered by air OP.
- (d) Amn -981 HE - 24 Smoke.

18 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) B and D Coys

During night enemy reacted violently to gradual encirclement of his posns and attacked B and D Coys in the early hours of the morning. Attacks beaten off. Own casualties 3 KIA 5 WIA. Enemy counted dead 53 estimated additional 16.

(b) A Coy

- (i) Patrol located enemy pl strength 635678. Inflicted some casualties on enemy. Own 1 WIA. returned 1400.

- (ii) Patrol left 1430 moved towards 634680. Found hut and telephone at 632681. Moved WEST towards 634680 and observed enemy digging in on reverse slopes of ridge approx 634679. Observed and withdrew returning by 1700.

(c) D Coy

Patrol moved SE to 633683, possible amn dump - thence WEST to 636683 where 3 members of the patrol were fired on. Patrol withdrew to Coy positions.

2 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

(a) Bn HQ

Attacked during night. Own casualties 4 KIA 7 WIA and one 4.2" Mortar knocked out by demolition charges. Enemy casualties 5. Moved during morning to CART.

(b) A and D Coys

D Coy patrol report enemy still at 638679 - casualties own 1 KIA. At 1000 moved to join B and C Coys on CART. Arrived 1230. Continued mov NORTH and occupied night posns at 644687. A Coy forward platoon contacted approx 10 JAPS vicinity 645688. Killed 2 and withdrew.

(c) Location

Bn HQ CART, A and D Coys 644687, B Coy 644681, C Coy 642678 with one pl 643679.

3 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) By 1000 Bn had taken over road block from 2/33 Aust Inf Bn and were astride HIGHWAY with three Coys at CELLO.
- (b) 'A' Coy remained same posn but later moved astride Junc MILFORD HIGHWAY - PHILLIPSONS RD 618688. Sent patrol via PHILLIPSONS RD - FUNERAL - FABRIC - 622676 - 618673. Found 8 unidentified graves 618671.
- (c) Location
Bn HQ and C Coy 632671, A Coy 618668, B Coy 633671, D Coy 636674.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) OP on ARCH throughout day, observation hampered by arty and air strikes. At night heard 8 single trucks moving NORTH, one SOUTH.
- (b) All morning patrols held up until air strikes completed.
- (c) At 1400 patrol to MILFORD HIGHWAY 632705 contacted 6 enemy with IMG and after exchange of fire withdrew.
- (d) At 1600 enemy cut line to ABITE at 626700 and laid ambush for main party who contacted 2 JAPS and fired on them. Estimated 1 killed.
- (e) At 1700 patrol to 629695 contacted 3 enemy, killed 1 and wounded 1.
- (f) During day 3 enemy contacted on POPES TRACE near ABASH. All killed.

5 MI

- (a) Estimated strength JAPS at pumping station area 100. Being kept under observation.
- (b) Patrol moving from SOMBER KIRI, NORTH along creek from 603695 towards SOMBER in square 6173, to probe between HIGHWAY and pumping station. Reached 627727 NMS and reported dense undergrowth. No tracks.
- (c) Patrol to WALIN fired on by IMG from enemy, unknown strength in posn 586733.

6 Arty

- (a) HF during night on barracks 639689.
- (b) DF put down in support B and D Coys 2/25 Aust Inf Bn NORTH of CHARM.
- (c) During day registration and targets of opportunity engaged.
- (d) Total sum amm 1473 HZ 42 Smoke.

19 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

Quiet night. D Coy reported sounds of digging and chopping forward of their posn.

(a) B Coy

(i) Patrol left 0830 to ABIDE. Reported unoccupied, moved on to track junc 632694 and remained 30 mins NMS. Returned Coy posn.

(ii) Patrol left 0730 and moved SE from Coy posn. Reported 6 huts once used as barracks 635686. Contacted party of 9 JAPS burying dead. Killed 5.

(b) D Coy

Patrol left 1000 and set ambush 636684, at 1530 relief patrol left to occupy posn for night 19/20 Jul.

(c) A Coy

At 1300 standing patrol at 634677 fired on by 3 LMGs. 2 ORs killed.

(d) Locations

Bn HQ and A Coy CHAIR, B and D Coys CHAIR,
C Coy CHAIR.

2 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) During night small parties of enemy outside Bn perimeter were dispersed with grenades and some casualties inflicted. Local patrols during day made no contact. A Coy killed 5 JAPS attempting to infiltrate.

(b) At 1330 C Coy proceeded by tanks and supported by artillery moved forward to 637677 without opposition. Track blown off tank by contact mine. No casualties. Limited patrols forward made no contact.

(c) Location

Bn HQ and A Coy 632671, B Coy 633671, D Coy
636674 C Coy 637677.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

(a) A and D Coys were mortared by approx 24 shells during early hours of morning. Own casualties 1 WIA. Small parties active against C Coy. At least 1 enemy killed, own casualties NIL.

(b) B Coy

- (i) Patrol left 0800 via CLOWNS, COMET, CORD and returned without contact 1400.
- (ii) Patrol left 0800 via CANE to COVE. Returned 1530 NMS.

(c) D Coy

- (i) Patrol moved 0930 to WEST - (640686) where fired on. Withdrew and moved via creek to 641687 where again contact was made. Killed 1 JAP. Returned to Coy.
- (ii) At 1535 patrol reported chopping on spur 640686.

(d) A Coy

- (i) At 0830 left to cut track at 649692. In posn 1200 and were investigating lower slopes of ACID. Vacated positions found 646688.
- (ii) Further patrol to ACID contacted enemy at 647691 killing 3 and wounding 1.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) At 0900 patrol moved WEST along POPES TRACK reached 609697. No contact - returned 1400.
- (b) 1500 patrol left ABATE at 635697 contacted 12 JAPS. Killed 12 JAPS.
- (c) Ambush set 632705 returned 1600 and reported only one enemy seen on HIGHTWAY.
- (d) Approx 1000, two FORI OSANS surrendered to OP on ARCH.

5 NCI

- (a) Patrol completed laying line to WJIN by 1130.
- (b) Patrol from WJIN posn towards pumping station reported 20 enemy in vicinity. Some were observing movement of own troops through field glasses.

6 Arty

- (a) HF during night.
- (b) Fire called for 190300I on mortars firing on A and D Coys 2/33 Aust Inf Bn.
- (c) Registration and neutralisation of DFRs carried out by Air OP.
- (d) Target for air straking marked by smoke.
- (e) Amn 577 H: 38 Smoke.

20 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) A Coy patrol moved SE at 0730, reported enemy still in position 635677.

(b) D Coy

(i) Patrol maintained night 19/20 Jul at 636684 reported sighting 19 enemy moving SOUTH along HIGHWAY. 10 were riflemen and 3 carrying stores. Enemy turned EAST at 637685. Patrol returned 0800.

(ii) A patrol blew up enemy amn dump at 635684 at 1330.

(iii) During morning patrol to clear enemy pockets on CHAIR used flame throwers on 10 JAPS incinerating 4 severely burning remainder. Another party of 12 enemy were fired on in same area and dispersed. Estimated 3 killed.

(c) C Coy

(i) 0900 patrol moved via ABIDE to 634694 killing one JAP at 634692. Patrol was fired on by L/Gs and withdrew through CHAIR to CALM - reported ABIDE clear.

(d) B Coy

Platoon occupied ABIDE at 1500.

(e) C Coy occupied ABIDE 1700H. Platoon B Coy returned to CHAIR.

(f) no platoon A Coy occupied CALM.

(g) Locations

Bn HQ and A Coy less one platoon CHAIR,
One platoon A Coy CALM, B and D Coys CHAIR, C Coy
ABIDE

2 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

(a) D Coy

0930 one platoon moved through C Coy and took up position on 60 centour at 63656775 - no opposition. Reported well used track running NNE. 17 Pl patrolled JAP track and contacted enemy estimated strength one pl at 637685. Engaged by arty and 3" mortar. Platoon moved to 637683. Coy less 17 Pl occupied feature 1200.

(b) A Coy

Two platoons moved to astride road 637674.

(c) Locations

Bn HQ and one pl A Coy 633671, A Coy less
pl astride road 637674, B Coy 637677, C Coy 638677,
D Coy less 1 pl 636678, one pl D Coy 637683.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

(a) A Coy 0845 patrol to 649691 at 1305 contacted enemy at 646692 and were fired on. Killed 2 JAPS with grenades. Found 2 dead JAPS, one with hands tied behind back - area 648692. Booby traps 648689. Set ambush 648688, killed 2 and withdrew.

(b) C Coy

Patrol to spur 639679 contacted enemy and withdrew after killing 1.

(c) D Coy

Patrol fired on from position 640686. Killed 1 JAP. Moved SOUTH along creek then EAST to contact B Coy on CLRT.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

(a) 0830 patrol left for track junction 633694 to patrol EAST to Barracks. At 1530 contacted strong defensive position at 633695. Engaged with arty and small arms fire estimating 3 killed.

(b) At 0900 enemy booby trap 626694 was exploded killing 1.

(c) Ambush at 634707 patrolled HIGHWAY between 633703 and 71 northing grid. NMS between 1030 and 1630.

(d) Locations

HQ and J Troop 630698, H Troop 628699, G Troop ABASH.

5 NEI

Protective patrols only.

6 Arty

(a) HF during night.

(b) Day shooting restricted by patrolling.

(c) Several DFPS engaged by air OP.

(d) Ammunition 676 HE 8 smoke.

(e) Arty directed by AUSTER engaged 20 enemy moving NORTH along HIGHWAY 636688. 5 hits on troops in open and 2 on log behind which some enemy took cover. Casualties unknown.

21 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

(a) Patrols during day established that enemy occupying spur 639689 with IMG positions at 635691, 634687, 634688.

(b) At 1555 patrol from Commando Squadron contacted C Coy on ABIDE.

(c) Enemy on spur 635680 were engaged by mortar fire directed by AUSTER with satisfactory results.

- (d) At 201945I D Coy ambush at 636684 saw approx 20 JAPS moving SOUTH along HIGHWAY carrying supplies forward. Estimated enemy dead 17. ~~Enemy opened fire~~ from positions NORTH and SOUTH of CHARM, sent up red flare and ignited drums of oil along road. Muffled explosions were heard some time after in enemy positions.

2 2/81 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) 0800 patrols probed forward on either side of HIGHWAY and found enemy same positions.
- (b) Artillery and mortar shoot on 636681 successful and completed by 1535. Patrols then moved forward on each side of road and found enemy had pulled back slightly but were still covering old positions by fire. Counted dead 26.

(c) Locations

Bn HQ and C Coy 638676, A Coy 637374, B Coy 638678 (one platoon at 638679), D Coy 637678.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Patrols to COSY, CLOWN and CASE and via CLOWN to spur - NORTH to 648687. IWS.
- (b) 1230 patrol moved to investigate result of air strike on ACID. Patrol was fired on from SOUTH side of spur running EAST from ACID. No result assessed.
- (c) B Coy relieved C Coy at 640679 by 1500.

(d) Locations

Bn HQ and C Coy 644681, A Coy 644687, B Coy 640679 (with one platoon 642682) D Coy 644687.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) Patrol to Barracks 6371 reached ^{point} 633711 sighting only 1 JAP in area. Reported TF gun firing from 634717. Returned 1815I.
- (b) A patrol to HIGHWAY from 1000 to 1600. Returned from 634707 NIS.
- (c) Patrol via ABITE to Barrack 6369 reported concealed enemy position covering approaches to track at 634697. Engaged with arty knocking out one pillbox, killing 1 enemy.
- (d) At 1400 patrol surprised enemy ambush of 13 at 628695 killing 5 and estimated additional 1..

5 NEI

- (a) Patrol from WHIN platoon along track 587724 to 600730 thence NE along track NOT shown on map to MILFORD HIGHWAY 613728, where they were sniped at. Returned to base.
- (b) During afternoon arty ranged on pumping station dispersing enemy in area.

6 Arty

- (a) HF during night.
- (b) ACID marked with smoke for air strike and engaged with regimental concentration.
- (c) Pumping station engaged.
- (d) Coloured smoke used by regiment for first time.
- (e) Ammunition expended HE 1645 Smoke 71.

22 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Battalion moved forward at 1400 to following locations without opposition:-

BN HQ and D COY - 630700

A COY - AUNT

B COY - 629701

C COY - ABIDE

- (b) D Coy occupied POPES JUNCTION 1000 hrs. Patrol of platoon strength moved NORTH along MILFORD HIGHWAY to approx 73 northing line where fired on by sniper. Returned 1730.

2 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Moved forward astride road without opposition to following locations:-

BN HQ and A COY - 640693

B COY - 639689

C COY - 638697

D COY - 635698

- (b) Armament factory found 640688.
- (c) Counted 8 enemy dead.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) All companies reported heavy explosions and MT traffic through night.
- (b) Moved forward on WEST of road against slight opposition.
- (c) B Coy at 0925 reported enemy position 639678 vacated.
- (d) D Coy reported feature 640686 clear 1005.
- (e) Location

Bn HQ track junction 643692, A Coy ACID, B Coy 641697, C Coy 643695, D Coy ABODE.

- (f) Counted 5 enemy dead.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) Moved to ARCH.
- (b) Patrol reached approx 628732 and saw 2 JAPS who withdrew when fired on. Advanced further 300 yards saw 7 JAPS. Killed 1 estimated additional 2, remainder withdrew. Returned to base 1930.

5 NEI

Reported small enemy party in Pumping Station area. Firing heard in distance - deduced enemy firing on natives using track running NE from pumping station.

6 Arty

- (a) HF during night 21/22 Jul.
- (b) Several regimental concentrations on DFPS.
- (c) Amn - 1699 HE 34 Smoke.

23 JUL

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Local patrolling during day.
- (b) C Coy moved from ABIDE to 630699.

2 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Local patrols.
- (b) Patrol along POPES TRACK to NEI.

3 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) A Coy patrol to ACRE staging night 23/24 Jul at 655705. Returned 240945I. No movement seen.
- (b) D Coy
 - (i) patrol NORTH to ABED thence to 645713. NMS.
 - (ii) patrol via ABODE, ACRE to BABEL.
- (c) Enemy wireless station located on ACID.

4 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

- (a) Squadron less one troop 633708.
- (b) One troop moving NORTH along HIGHWAY to establish patrol base square 6174. Contacted small enemy party with 1 LMG and 3 rifles 612747 at 1530I. Own casualties 2 WIA. Enemy unknown.

23 JUL

1 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

At 1100 hours G Troop moved from ARCH to establish base in square 6174 and patrol NORTH. By 1400 hours had reached 628731 without contact.

Squadron less G Troop moved from previous position and by 1630 hours were in position 633708.

At approximately 1645 hours patrol contacted enemy party of 1 LMG and 3 riflemen at 612747. Own casualties 2 WIA, 1 WIA remaining on duty. Enemy casualties unknown.

24 JUL

1 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

At 1100 hours patrol moving NORTH along HIGHWAY contacted enemy party of 1 LMG and 5 rifles at approximately 618760. Enemy withdrew. Patrol moved forward. At 1655 hours made contact with 15 enemy at 628774. Enemy casualties 4 KIA 1 WIA. Enemy withdrew.

At 1030 hours routine protective patrols in vicinity Squadron HQ, killed 1 JAP at 632716.

25 JUL

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt less 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn now in support 25 Aust Inf Bde. During day Regt HQ and 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn moved into brigade area.

G Troop patrol rejoined troop at 1645 hours and reported no enemy movement in strength along highway up to 628774.

By 1800 hours locations were:-

| | | |
|-----|----------------------------|--------|
| (a) | Regt HQ | 633716 |
| (b) | 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn | 630729 |
| (c) | 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn less G Tp | 631709 |
| (d) | G Troop | 634717 |

26 JUL

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

At 0900 hours two sections J Troop 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn left to establish standing patrol at 618760. At approximately 1130 hours contacted enemy of estimated platoon strength armed with 2 LMGs and rifles in freshly dug positions astride MILFORD HIGHWAY at 615758. Own casualties 2 KIA 1 WIA. Enemy casualties unknown. Patrol took up defensive position at 615755 and was subsequently built up to troop strength. At 1340 hours 3 enemy attempting to cross road forward of position were fired on. 2 killed 1 wounded.

(b) 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn

At 1500 hours squadron, accompanied by OPO with one troop arty on call, moved to relieve J Troop and were in position 615755 by 1630 hours.

At 1900 hours enemy brought down mortar fire on squadron. (Believed 89 grenade discharged). Engaged with our arty.

(c) 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

At 1800 hours J Troop rejoined 2/6 Cdo Sqn.

Local protective patrols EAST and WEST of road as far NORTH as 75 grid reported NMS.

27 JUL

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

(a) 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn

Line forward to Squadron cut in several places during night 26/27 Jul. Party left Regt 0730 to repair it.

Patrols forward during morning found enemy still in occupation. Squadron withdrew to enable arty concentrations to be brought on enemy positions. Reoccupied position at 615755 on conclusion of fire.

Patrols sent forward to observe results:-

- (i) patrol at 1445 hours found enemy position at 616757 vacated. Inspected and deloused an aerial bomb buried in centre of road.
- (ii) patrol found 618758 vacated. Both patrols rejoined squadron.

At 1600 hours patrol moved forward to investigate road block reported by AUSTER at 618762. Sighted 10 JAPS in position behind it and returned.

Later patrolling revealed enemy had reoccupied positions 616757 and 618758 and were again engaged by artillery fire.

(b) 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

At 0730 hours two patrols moved to clear right and left of road for width of 150 to 200 yards up to 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn.

Patrols each of one section strength contacted 2/25 Aust Inf Bn at WJIN and 2/31 Aust Inf Bn.

28 JUL

1 2/7 Aust Cav Cdo Regt

(a) 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn

During night 27/28 Jul arty HF on enemy positions.

Patrols probed forward on both sides of road. At 1030 hours contacted enemy armed with 2 IMGs in position on 150 yard front at 618758.

- 37 -

At 1100 hours same patrol fired on 4 enemy - results unknown. Withdrew and brought down arty concentrations.

At approximately 1600 hours patrol round right flank saw and killed 1 JAP sentry 150 yards EAST of road.

At 1800 hours exchange of LMG fire on left flank wounded 1 OR.

29 JUL

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

(a) 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn

Patrols during day maintained contact.

Enemy patrols probed our positions. 2 marines killed. Own casualties 1 WIA.

Locations

F Troop 616754, Sqn HQ, D and E Troops 617753.

(i) Enemy Locations (amended)

LMGs 614756 and 616755 with riflemen in between and from 617756 to 618758. Armed with 2 LMGs, 1 HMG and 81 mm Mortar. Enemy counted dead 3 estimated additional 2.

(b) 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn

At 1730 hours patrol contacted enemy ambush at 629722 and again contacted same party 1800 hours killed 1.

Protective patrols NTS.

30 JUL

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 0900 hours own troops in jeep moving NORTE along highway to establish standing patrol at 613748 were ambushed at 613747 by enemy armed with 1 LMG, grenades and demolition charge which failed to explode. Own casualties 2 WIA. A patrol moved to ambush position and found no enemy.

Enemy patrols active during day on our flanks. 2 JAPs attempting to infiltrate 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn positions were killed.

31 JUL

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 0830 hours patrol left 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn to establish base in square 6275 for offensive patrols to enemy rear. To remain out night 31 Jul/1 Aug.

No patrols forward of 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn until completion of air strike.

4 SPITFIRES and 4 P40s accurately strafed enemy positions 616755 from 1100 hours to 1130 hours.

- 38 -

At 1100 hours 4 JAPS approached 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn at 618754. Two killed.

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn patrol killed 1 JAP armed with 4 BALITPAPAN grenades, 1 KISKA and 1 prepared charge at 616753 at 1100 hours.

Road clearing and protective patrols - No contact.

Arty supported 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn throughout day with concentrations on enemy positions. OP reported road block 618762.

2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt less C Troop now under command 25 Aust Inf Bde.

1 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 1540 hours patrol forward from 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn, found position at 615757 vacated. E Troop occupied position. Moved forward drew fire from enemy at 617758.

AUSTER recce at 1800 hours reported MFS between 76 and 78 northing grids.

Patrol forward from 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn at 1745 hours found one fresh grave at 618759 and two at 618758. Bodies of two enemy killed previous day found.

Routine road clearing and protective patrols MFS.

2 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Enemy attacked E Troop at 1000 hours with grenades. Own casualties 1 OR wounded. Enemy casualties unknown.

From 1000 to 1040 hours enemy engaged 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn with mortar believed to be vicinity road block 618762.

Second attack on E Troop with grenades caused 1 casualty - wounded.

At 1150 hours E Troop patrol found enemy still in occupation of position 618759. Returned 1200 hours reporting estimated two platoon strength from 616758 to 618759.

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn patrol, strength one troop and one section, moved at 0730 hours to establish base at 626755 with one section. Remainder to patrol to road and establish ambush at 631774. Arrived 1800 hours.

Locations

Regt H 633716, 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn 634717, 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn 617754 with Section, E Troop 615757.

3 AUG

- 39 -

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn in ambush at 631774 reported no enemy activity during night. At 0830 hours killed 3 JAPS at 632775 and captured 1 LMG and 2 rifles. At 0945 hours, same place, killed 7 JAPS by means of flame thrower, then withdrew to base 6275 to allow artillery fire on movement heard on right flank of ambush. At 1020 patrol moved back to investigate results. Again used flamethrower, killed 5 more JAPS.

A further section patrol moved SOUTH along road to locate enemy positions vicinity 618762.

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn - at 0900 hours road clearing patrol killed 1 JAP at 614748 - other patrols NIL.

2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn less C Troop concentrated 632712 by 1730 hours.

2 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

At 1930 hours party of JAPS carrying 1 LMG fired on water party at 640688 wounding one. Patrol of 3 moved to investigate. Two were wounded and one returned to battalion. Larger patrol was sent out and enemy dispersed.

4 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn patrol commenced return to unit at 0900 hours. During night small parties of unarmed JAPS and one party of 14 carrying water bottles, spades, axes and sythes moved SOUTH along road.

At 1245 hours 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn less C Troop relieved 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn at 616754.

2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn concentrated 634718 by 1645 hours.

During afternoon 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn patrolled to 617757. Enemy positions 617758 to 618759 engaged with 100 rounds 3" mortar from 1400 hours to 1500 hours.

At 1800 hours artillery engaged reported enemy barracks area 631775.

5 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 0800 hours recce patrol forward from 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn engaged 3 JAPS in possible outpost position 615759 with grenades and small arms fire. Estimate 2 enemy killed. Own casualties NIL.

At 1400 hours 8 X P40s bombed and strafed area 614758 to 618759. 14 X 500 lb bombs fell in target area. Strafing accurate.

At 1430 hours mortar detachment fired 10 bombs on each 615758 and 614758.

At 1730 hours recce patrol moved around right flank, reached 618758 without contact and returned

Local patrols 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn and 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn during day NIL.

2 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

At 0900 hours 5 Aug 45 a patrol of 2 Officers and 34 ORs from D Coy with attached troops left on a seven day patrol. Orders were:-

Day 1- Move by LCM to WAIN

Day 2- NORTH to 603794

Day 3- To 609820 and from CASE NORTH to establish a base and patrol to highway in vicinity of 35 kilometres post approx 610834.

3 2/31 Aust Inf Bn

During night 4/5 Aug enemy infiltration parties were active within the battalion area,

At 0500 hours engineer camp at 643688 was attacked, canteen blown up and one vehicle damaged.

At 0545 hours 11 Battery 2/6 Aust Fd Regt opened fire on party of 10 JAPS moving NORTH along highway at approximately 638695 killing 4 armed with LMG, SMG and demolition charges.

At 1300 hours patrol of 1 NCO and 4 ORs contacted 2 JAPS armed with 1 LMG and rifle in gully WEST of road between Arty and Battalion HQ. Casualties - Own 1 wounded, enemy 1 wounded. Member of standing patrol same vicinity killed by sniper.

At 1330 hours patrol of 1 Officer and 8 ORs moved to clear area WEST of road. Killed 3 enemy.

6 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

By 1100 hours 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn had established patrol bases of section strength EAST and WEST of Highway at 617757 and 615757. Patrol on EAST flank opened fire on 3 JAPS killing 2, contacted enemy armed with LMG and 3 rifles at 619759. Own casualties nil, enemy unknown. Patrol withdrew to base to allow mortar and arty concentrations to be brought down. Patrol to investigate results, drew no fire but time prevented further investigation. Returned to base.

2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn and 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn road clearing and security patrols NWS.

C Troop, 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn, arrived in area staging night 6/7 Aug at 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn B Echelon.

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

D Coy patrol moving to 603794. Reported going very difficult.

At 1400 hours at 595760.

1645 hours established at 595779.

7 AUG 45

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 0800 F Troop 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn with OPO and flamethrowers, moved to establish base 608764 and patrol from there to vicinity 623768, establish ambush, locate enemy positions and investigate road blocks reported by Tac R at 618762, 623767 and 624769.

At 0930 hours, C Troop joined 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn.

B Troop moved NORTH along road and at 1100 hours contacted enemy estimated strength 12 with 2 LMGs at 619759 and withdrew to allow artillery and mortar to engage.

At 1515 hours reconnaissance patrol was fired on by 89 grenade discharger, 10 rounds fell in area 619758. 4 failed to explode - no casualties.

Patrol round right flank at 1800 hours found enemy position vacated but were fired on by 3 riflemen after advancing further 30 yards along track running parallel to road. 1 enemy killed, patrol withdrew.

F Troop established base at 615764 and at 1400 hours patrol forward was ambushed at 616766. Our casualties 1 OR wounded. Withdrew to base.

During day 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn moved to following locations - Sqn HQ 616756, B Troop 617757, C Troop 616757, A Troop less one section 616754, one section A Troop 615756

2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn moved to 614744.

Security patrols 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn and 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn MFS.

2 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

Moved 0940 hours and established base night 7/8 Aug at 603794. Strength to be built up to 4 Officers and 80 ORs on 8 Aug 45.

8 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 0800 hours patrol from F Troop contacted and engaged enemy of unknown strength at 617765. Casualties -- Own nil, enemy 3 killed, estimated 2 additional. At 1225 hours reached highway at 623769 and remained in ambush until 1350 hours. MFS. Returned to base.

2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn probed forward on either side of highway. Section on right flank reached road at 618761 at 1312 hours and at 1332 hours engaged enemy in area 618762 with unknown results. A sub-section moved SOUTH along highway and by 1430 hours had reached 617759. No contact.

At 1445 hours, section patrol around left flank occupied vacant enemy position 619759 and were relieved by A Troop at 1615 hours.

From 1500 - 1505 hours 10 rounds from BALIKPAPAN type mortar fell in area 619759. At 1535 hours our 3" mortar fired 50 bombs on suspected mortar position 619766.

At 1730 hours patrol at 618761 again engaged enemy approximately 100 yards forward of them with unknown results and then rejoined squadron.

2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn locations were - Squadron less A Troop 617757, A Troop 619759.

Patrol from 2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn killed 1 straggler at 631759, Remainder NMS.

2. 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

Moved 0830 hours and 1710 hours reached 607817. NMS.

9 AUG

1. 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 0845 hours, patrols round right, encountered enemy on ridge vicinity 619765, strength unknown. 1 LMG 619765, HMG 620765, and grenade discharger near road. Withdrew to 619759 and artillery engaged targets.

At 1435 hours patrol killed 1 rifleman at 615766 and reported LMG at 616766.

At 1415 hours member of section standing patrol established at 618762 was wounded during morning by LMG fire from 618764.

Section H Troop now located 615755.

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

At 1210 hours patrol from base at 607817 reached highway at approximately 609835. Track cut. No movement on road.

At 1630 hours an OP on highway at 609835 reported:-

- (a) Two enemy stretcher bearers moving EAST carrying stretcher.
- (b) One unarmed Jap moving WEST.
- (c) Two 25 mm AA fired at aircraft from position 315 degrees magnetic estimated distance 500 to 1000 yards from OP.

10 AUG

1. 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Section patrol at 1830 hours from 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn left to investigate positions 620766 and 619766 and to harass enemy if still in occupation. Reached highway 624767 at 1515 hours, moved SOUTH along road and at 1700 hours saw 2 Japs cross road at 619766.

During day, standing patrol at 618762 killed 3 JAPS and estimated additional 1 in bunker position at approximately 618765.

11 AUG

43

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

OP at 617831 during night 10/11 Aug reported movement of trucks and troops in small numbers EAST and WEST along highway.

At 0540 two trucks moved SOUTH laden with 25 troops each.

Recce patrol left base (DODDS POST) for OP.

11-12 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

No aggressive patrolling carried out by regiment. Protective patrols reported NMS.

12 AUG

1 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

C Coy relieved D Coy at 607817 at 1730 hours.

13 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

Following reports from 2/25 Aust Inf Bn OP at 617831 of evacuation of truck loads of night 11/12 Aug, patrols from 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn moved fwd and by 1800 hours had reached 652788, no contact.

2 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

D Coy moved to WAIN during morning.

Standing patrol on highway reported small enemy parties moving EAST and WEST along highway.

14 AUG

1 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt

At 1050 hours reported leading scout 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn fired on by 8 riflemen at 662817. At 1600 hours B Troop was at 663817. At 1605 hours 1 JAP fired on at rear of troop position.

Locations - Regt HQ and C Troop 616757, A Troop 619760.

2/5 Aust Cdo Sqn and 2/6 Aust Cdo Sqn - local patrols. NMS.

At 1905 hours 661819 two enemy walked into centre of road apparently to draw fire. Killed one.

2 2/25 Aust Inf Bn

OP reports no movement during night

Ambush established on highway.

Party 9 JAPS moving EAST along road. Unable to engage owing to mov of own recce patrol.

- 44 -

Rece patrol reached point 400 yards EAST
of kilometre 34. MS.

At 1845 hours party of 12 JAPS moved WEST
along highway. Ambush was sprung. 9 enemy killed 3 escaped
into timber. Own casualties nil.

Ambush party returned to DODDS POST 1930
hours.

APPENDIX "L" to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO
Annexure I

SEQUENCE OF PLANNING FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

| Serial | Date | Event |
|--------|------|---|
| 1 | S-53 | Divisional Commander and principal staff officers attend conference at HQ 1 Aust Corps. Divisional Commander receives:- (a) Outline Plan; (b) Firm orders and such portions of the plan as directly concern the landing; (c) Maintenance restrictions. |
| 2 | S-50 | Divisional planning staff assembles. |
| 3 | S-48 | Unit tonnage tables submitted to Division. |
| 4 | S-48 | GOC's draft Outline Tactical Plan issued to assault brigade commanders and heads of Arms and Services. |
| 5 | S-46 | Conference at Divisional Headquarters on Draft Outline Tactical Plan. |
| 6 | S-45 | Arms, Services and Beach Group submit bids and their representatives assemble at Divisional Headquarters |
| 7 | S-40 | Planning staff prepares Outline Plan to include:- (a) Naval Support Programme; (b) Air Support Programme; (c) Distribution of Force to Convoys; (d) Outline Maintenance Project. Beach Group prepares First Key Plan. |
| 8 | S-32 | Divisional Outline Plan and Maintenance Project submitted to 1 Aust Corps. |
| 9 | S-30 | Divisional Outline Plan and Maintenance Project approved by 1 Aust Corps. Plan of operation issued to brigades with list of Divisional Priorities. |
| 10 | S-30 | Divisional planning staff prepare Operation Order and Maintenance Project. |
| 11 | S-28 | Divisional planning staff prepares draft Distribution of Force to Ships including allotment of reserve stores. |

| Serial | Date | Event |
|--------|------|--|
| 12 | S-26 | Warning Order and Intelligence Summary with relevant data issued to brigades. |
| 13 | S-24 | Conference at Brigade planning headquarters. Brigade Commanders issue Outline Tactical Plans to Planning Staff. Battalion commanders to attend this conference. |
| 14 | S-23 | Warning Order for units for Brigade Commanders' conference. |
| 15 | S-22 | Brigade Outline Plan submitted to Division with requests for alteration, if necessary, to:- <div style="margin-left: 40px;"> (a) Shipping; (b) Order of Battle; (c) Naval and Air Support. </div> |
| 16 | S-20 | Brigade Outline Plan approved by Division. |
| 17 | S-22 | Conference at Brigade planning headquarters. Brigade Commander issues Outline Plan to unit commanders, together with Divisional Priorities. |
| 18 | S-18 | Conference at Brigade planning headquarters. Unit commanders submit Outline Plans and requirements for First Flight. |
| 19 | S-18 | Divisional Operation Order and Maintenance Project issued. |
| 20 | S-17 | Brigade planning staff prepares Draft Landing Table (Note 1). |
| 21 | S-15 | Draft Brigade Landing Table and Distribution of Force to Ships submitted to Division and issued to unit commanders. |
| 22 | S-16 | Unit commanders and beach group study Draft Landing Table and check priorities of reconnaissance parties, vehicles, etc. |
| 23 | S-14 | Conference at Brigade planning headquarters. Unit commanders submit requests for alterations to Brigade Landing Tables. |
| 24 | S-12 | Tonnage Tables prepared covering units and detachments of units by ships and major landing craft. |
| 25 | S-12 | Ships Landing Craft Table commenced in outline (Beach Group representatives to assist (Note 2)). |
| 26 | S-12 | Firm Brigade Landing Table, Distribution of Force to Ships and Landing Diagram issued. |
| 27 | S-11 | Appointment of ships' staffs by brigades for D Day convoys. |

| Serial | Date | Event |
|--|------|--|
| 28 | S-10 | Appointment of ships' staffs by brigades for D plus 1 Day convoys. |
| 29 | S-8 | Brigade planning headquarters draft orders (Operation, Administration, Signals). |
| 30 | S-7 | Draft Ship Landing Craft Tables submitted to brigades for checking and approval, also to Beach Group headquarters for final check. |
| 31 | S-6 | Administrative details completed by brigade planning headquarters. |
| 32 | S-6 | Ship Landing Craft Tables issued. |
| 33 | S-5 | Preparation of Stowage and Loading Plans commenced. |
| 34 | S-5 | Brigade commanders' final conference. |
| 35 | S-5 | Draft Stowage Plans and Loading Plans completed for submission to Commander. |
| 55 | S-3 | Concentration of forces at embarkation area. Loading of stores and vehicles. Embarkation for first rehearsal of exercise. |
| <p><u>Note 1 :</u> At this stage Beach Group will provide detailed information of Beach Group personnel, equipment and stores, etc for inclusion in the Brigade Landing Table in order to ensure that when information is reproduced in Battalion Landing Craft Tables these are in sufficient detail for Beach Group to work from.</p> <p><u>Note 2 :</u> Beach Group representatives should be attached to Battalion Landing Team Headquarters to assist Battalion Commanders' planning staff.</p> | | |

APPENDIX "L" to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO
Annexure 2

SEQUENCE OF PLANNING - OPERATION OBOE TWO

| Serial | Date | Event |
|--------|------------------------|---|
| 1 | 25 Apr 45 (S-62) | The Commander received outline of the probable task to be allotted to the Division and also the target date and intelligence data relating to the area. Preliminary planning was commenced. |
| 2 | 6 May (S-51) | Tonnage Tables were received from all units of 7 Aust Div. |
| 3 | 11 May (S-46) | Brigade commanders were advised of the tentative plan and commenced studying their particular tasks. |
| 4 | 23 May (S-34) | Divisional planning team commenced detailed planning at MOROTAI. |
| 5 | 26 May (S-31) | Restrictions on bombing and preliminary bombardment targets submitted to 1 Aust Corps. SPD requirements submitted to 1 Aust Corps. |
| 6 | 27 May (S-30) | 7 Aust Div Outline Plan submitted to 1 Aust Corps. 7 Aust Div, USN and RAAF discussed Outline Plan at Corps Commander's conference. |
| 7 | 7 Jun (S-19) | Draft Divisional Operation Order and Administrative Instruction issued (less Distribution of Force to Convoys). |
| 8 | 7 Jun (S-19) | Wave Diagram completed. Draft Distribution of Force to Convoys received from 1 Aust Mil Ldg Gp. Corps Commander's final conference. |
| 9 | 8 Jun (S-18) | GOC's conference to discuss Draft Operation Order and to receive "bids" for alteration of Distribution of Force to Convoys. |
| 10 | 10 Jun (S-16) | Complete Divisional Operation Order and Administrative Order issued. |
| 11 | 11 Jun (S-15) | Brigade Operation and Administrative Orders (less Signals Instruction, Distribution of Force to Ships and Landing Tables) issued. |

| Serial | Date | Event |
|--------|------------------|--|
| 12 | 12 Jun (S-14) | Brigade commanders' conference with units under command. |
| 13 | 14 Jun (S-12) | Brigade Landing Tables issued. |
| 14 | 15 Jun (S-11) | Brigade Distribution of Force to Ships issued. |
| | | Battalion Operation Orders issued. |
| 15 | 19 Jun (S-7) | Embarkation commenced. |
| 16 | 20 Jun (S-6) | An amended Wave Diagram issued to brigades, etc. |
| 17 | 22 Jun (S-4) | Embarkation completed. |
| 18 | 24 Jun (S-2) | Rehearsal carried out. |
| 19 | 26 Jun. | Convoy sailed. |

APPENDIX 'M' to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

FLAME WARFARE REPORT

7 AUST DIV - TRAINING AND OPERATIONS
FLAME THROWER MANPACK (M2-2)

INTRODUCTION

TRAINING

General

Policy

Flame Warfare School

Training of Service Personnel

Tactics

FUEL

Mixing

Ranges

EQUIPMENT

Spare Parts

Mechanical Functioning

Modifications

OPERATION BALIKPAPAN

General

Planning

Allotment of Flame Throwers

Fuels

Preparation
Maintenance
Tactical Loading
Filling

Air Pressure

Supply
Recharging Point
Tactical Loading

Loading

Shipping Chests

Servicing

Types of Targets

Ranges

Extracts from Unit Reports

Casualties

LESSONS LEARNED

CONCLUSIONS

Maintenance

Serviceability

Pressure

Fuel

Recommendations

TACTICAL DOCTRINE

Conception

Characteristics

Organisation

Principles

Methods of Use

FLAME WARFARE REPORT

7 AUST DIV - TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

FLAME THROWER MANPACK (M2-2)

INTRODUCTION

1

During the last few weeks of the Buna-Gona-Sanananda Campaign in 1942, when the Japanese soldier displayed fanatical qualities in his defence, our command became aware that the blast and fragmentation of the 36M hand grenade were not sufficiently destructive to kill the occupants of the mushroom-like bunker systems. TNT and ammonal charges were placed alongside these log emplacements and electrically detonated; 2lb quantities of ammonal were fused with the 36M hand grenades. These charges achieved good results.

However, the infantry learnt, to their cost, that these log emplacements were but a small part of well developed tunnel systems, where blast and fragmentation was offset by the design of the underground system. The occupants would remain with their dead for days and then emerge full of fight.

Something, some charge, was needed that would have the qualities of time and space, i.e., go around corners.

Under the Geneva Protocol of 1926 the use of a toxic gas was illegal. Yet something with the qualities of a gas was needed to search out the tunnels. The ordinary HCE and Zinc smokes were not sufficiently pungent to achieve good results.

It was at this juncture that the Command asked for flame throwers.

The Division received its pool of 36 Manpack Flame Throwers (M2-2) during November 1944. In addition, the introduction of the No.77 hand grenade WP MkI (Aust) to the AMF was announced.

These were two excellent weapons to counter the log emplacement.

TRAINING

General

2

Army Training and LF Memoranda, outlined tactical employment for the use of flame throwers, but it was left to the field formations to develop a tactical doctrine for their employment.

The considerations of maintenance, servicing and supply in the field were required to be studied and developed by the staff of the formation. The AMF Pamphlet on Flame Warfare was not available during the training period. However information was received through intelligence channels on the German and Japanese doctrines; these appeared very sound. This information was disseminated in the form of Divisional Flame Warfare Notes.

Policy

3 The problem of Flame Warfare Training was three-fold:-

- (a) Flame Throwers to units most likely to employ the weapons;
- (b) The personnel to be trained within these units;
- (c) The method by which the maximum number of operators could be trained in the time available.

It was considered that by far the best method was to distribute the equipment to infantry battalions. This method was prohibitive according to the following limitations.

- (a) The flame throwers are maintained by a servicing kit issued on the scale of one kit to six flame throwers. With the Divisional Pool of 36 Flame Throwers only 6 units could be satisfied leaving 5 units unequipped.
- (b) There was only one source of air pressure supply; the truck 3 ton recuperator; commercial cylinders were not available nor were spare air pressure tanks on issue.
- (c) The supply of spare parts was not available. It was decided that flame warfare training would be conducted on a divisional basis controlled by the general staff. Training was conducted in two phases running concurrently; the training of unit personnel as operators by courses and subunits by flame warfare exercises.

The training objective was to train one man per commando, infantry and pioneer section in all units as an operator. Further every commando section, infantry and pioneer platoon were to undergo a platoon exercise. The objects of this exercise was both to teach teamwork and to demonstrate the methods of employing flame throwers in the assault against log emplacements sited in jungle. The last day of each course was devoted entirely to conducting these platoon exercises.

Flame Warfare School

4 The LHC Flame Warfare Training Team was made available, and trained a cadre of instructors who were drawn from infantry battalions. The divisional cadre consisted of 4 officers and 16 serjeants and conducted the school in three groups with a capacity of 48 students per course. The LHC Team is staffed with excellent instructors and the standard of training reached by operators reflects the quality of the instruction received from this unit.

The Divisional Flame Warfare School conducted a series of six day courses.

By 15 Jun 45 every platoon had been exercised at least once and a total of 600 operators including 60 officers had been trained. Several demonstrations were also arranged showing the characteristics and capabilities of the flame thrower. Flame was also used in company and battalion field firing exercises.

Training of Service Personnel

- 5 Personnel from the AASC, AAOC and AEME services also attended the courses.

Brigade Workshops were given flame throwers to study and maintenance where required.

Tactics

- 6 The division developed tactics for using flame against AFVs, concrete and log emplacements, huts and houses, trench systems and satellite weapon pits in defence, in ambush, village and house to house fighting and use at night.

FUEL

Mixing of Fuels

- 7 The mixing of fuels has been the subject of much interest and many tests and trials. As a result of our experience in training the conclusion was reached that, provided care is taken to eliminate the presence of water in either the thickener or the petrol used, the fuel would remain in its thickened state indefinitely.

The American Thickener "NAPALM" has proved fairly reliable but is difficult to mix. On the TABLELANDS it was found necessary to heat the petrol in order to dissolve the granules into a homogeneous fuel. This is not a practical method for field use.

The Australian Thickener "GELPETROL" proved very satisfactory. It is noticed that batch numbers of 90 and above are giving the best results. This may be the result of a higher standard of water free product required by the AMF than previously laid down.

Ranges

- 8 The maximum ranges attained were -
- | | |
|----------------|------------|
| Thin Fuel | - 25 yards |
| Thickened Fuel | - 60 yards |
- The effective range -
- | | |
|----------------|-------------------|
| Thin Fuel | - 20 yards |
| Thickened Fuel | - 45 to 50 yards. |

By using the howitzer (high trajectory) method with thickened fuel an area 30 x 20 yards was flamed at a range of 90 yards (golden snow). It is considered that this method would break up an assault.

EQUIPMENT

Spare Parts

- 9 During the training period each flame thrower fired at least 200 shots. Consequently several of the functional parts of the flame thrower became unserviceable. These parts were supplied from the servicing kit.

Indents were placed each month with AAOC 7 Aust Div for replacements. Although ADOS 7 Aust Div made representations to Melbourne, no parts arrived. It was advised that the parts were supplied from America under Lend-Lease arrangements and were not available in Australia. This is understandable because the US Army at that time did not have a Usage Rate for Flame Thrower Parts.

Mechanical Functioning

10 The parts of the flame thrower which frequently become unserviceable are:-

(a) Tank Unit

- (i) Filling Plugs - burring
- (ii) Pressure Handle - stripping
- (iii) Safety Head - breakage

(b) Gun Unit

- (i) Diaphragm Fuel Valve Assembly - perished and cracking.
- (ii) Ignition Head Assembly Latch Spring - breakage.

(c) Regulator Air Pressure Assembly

Rubber Diaphragm (both Hoke and Grove Types) - perishing and cracking.

(d) Air Pressure Tank and Diffusion Pipes

- (i) Pressure Tank Valve Assembly Elbow - bending
- (ii) Diffusion Pipes - bending.

Modifications

Air Pressure System

11 Air pressure regulators (Hoke and Grove types) were modified in accordance with LHQ requirements. However the modification kits were not supplied for the spare regulator in the servicing kit. 5 Aust Inf Tp Wksp completed the modification to the spare regulators during the last few days in Australia.

Air Pressure Tanks

12 Detached air pressure tanks (no spares were available) were found to leak after having been charged to 2000 lbs per square inch. A modification was devised by AEME services.

The 216 spare tanks arrived during the last fortnight of our preparations at Morotai. 10 Aust Adv Wksp modified all the tanks within four days.

This is the simple operation of positioning the steel ball in the valve assembly.

Commercial Cylinders

- 13 Commercial Cylinders (220 cubic feet) were not supplied on the Tablelanis, although a release was granted.

The cylinders supplied to AAOC 7 Aust Div were 100 cubic feet capacity although the indent clearly stated 220 cubic feet. However it was too late to rectify this error at Morotai.

The cylinders form a convenient method of air pressure supply particularly to detached units. However these cylinders require modification.

The American charging line and manifold as supplied in the servicing kit will not fit the adapter on the Australian commercial cylinder. AEME services at Morotai made 24 fittings before the equipment could be used.

OPERATIONS - BALIKPAPAN

GENERAL

- 14 This is the first operation in which the 7 Aust Div has employed flame throwers. The manpacks were not used as widely as they could have been but with the weight of support available from other arms, commanders frequently decided their use was not necessary.

PLANNING

- 15 The planning involved a maintenance project for flame thrower fuels and a tactical allotment of flame throwers to the assault formations. This also included the requirements for the "FROG" Matilda Tank,

ALLOTMENT OF FLAME THROWERS

- 16 From studies of Aerial Photographs and other intelligence, it was appreciated that the forces opposing our landing would offer the strongest opposition on Red and Yellow Beaches and the terrain immediately beyond these beaches.

The allotment for the landing was -

18 Aust Inf Bde (Red and Yellow Beaches) - 24 Flame Throwers (M2-2)

21 Aust Inf Bde (Green Beach) - 12 Flame Throwers (M2-2).

These were further distributed -

18 Aust Inf Bde

| | |
|------------------|----|
| 2/10 Aust Inf Bn | 12 |
| 2/12 Aust Inf Bn | 12 |

21 Aust Inf Bde

| | |
|------------------|---|
| 2/27 Aust Inf Bn | 9 |
| 2/16 Aust Inf Bn | 3 |

After the first objectives were taken the 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and 2/16 Aust Inf Bn quotas were made up to 6 Flame Throwers each.

FUELS

Preparation:

17 It was decided to use GELETROL for the BALIK-PAPAN operation. The proportion of thickened to thin fire fillings were set down as 1 to 1. The thickened fuel for use on Fox Day was prepared under arrangements by this Headquarters. Care was taken to ensure that the petrol and thickener were exposed to the air for a minimum period.

The petrol was siphoned from a 44 gallon drum of MT80 petrol into a 5 gallon drum. The GELETROL was stirred in quickly, the proportion being 2 lbs to 4 gallons. The last five gallons in the 44 gallon drum were rejected. The mixture was poured into a clean dry 4 gallon drum, sealed and suitably labelled. The drums were stacked on their sides under cover.

The requirements of thin and thickened fuel were met by 18 Jun 45 and delivered to the infantry battalions. The labels on each drum of thickened fuel warned against breaking the seal until the fuel was required for use.

Maintenance

18 The maintenance project catered for fuel usage at Intense Rate for eight (8) days and a Normal Requirement for 22 days.

The project permitted of 20 shots per flame thrower M2-2 for the first eight (8) days. Six shots per flame thrower were included in unit loading tables for use on Fox Day.

Tactical Loading

19 The distribution of fillings per flame thrower was:-

One filling thickened fuel in the Flame Thrower for the landing.

Two Refills - One each Thickened and Thin Fuel in unit transport (Jeep).

Three Refills - One Thickened and Two Thin in brigade transport (2½-ton GMC 6x6 or D W).

The filling for the landing was Thickened Fuel. This was decided because of the number of log emplacements sited in the landing area.

Filling

20 Each operator carried aboard unfilled the flame thrower allotted to him. The 4 gallon drum of fuel and a set of tools were carried by a Number Two.

The flame throwers were filled on F - 1 Day with Thickened Fuel prepared with GEIETROL Batch No.97. The reason for filling on this day was to enable the operator to see the gel and so judge the effectiveness of the flame. This is very important because of the confidence gained by the operator.

AIR PRESSURE

Supply

21 There were two methods available for recharging air pressure tanks:-

- (a) Truck 3-ton recuperator.
- (b) Commercial Air Cylinder - 100 cubic feet capacity - charged to 2200 lbs per square inch.

One recuperator truck was allotted to each assault formation and were tabled to land at H plus 6 hours.

The distribution of commercial cylinders was:-

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| 18 Aust Inf Bde | 8 |
| 21 Aust Inf Bde | 4 |

The remaining cylinders were carried in each recuperator truck.

The recuperator trucks were scheduled to land on Fox Day. The commercial cylinders were brought ashore within the first hour in LVTs, DUKWs and matilda tanks.

Recharging Point

22 AEE 7 Aust Div established Flame Thrower recharging point in the vicinity of each Brigade "B" Echelon.

Some units recharged from commercial cylinders sent forward to obviate delay.

Tactical Loading

23 Two spare air pressure tanks were carried in unit transport.

The remaining four were carried under brigade arrangements; this was normally the recuperator truck.

The initial charging was between 2100 and 2200 lbs per square inch. This allows for leakage when closing the check valve and from other causes.

LOADING

Shipping Chests

24 Flame throwers M2-2 are packed in shipping chests. The dimensions of these chests prohibited their being landed with unit transport.

The empty chests were landed with brigade transport. One brigade carried all flame thrower stores including fuel and pressure tanks in a DUKW. This proved a very satisfactory arrangement.

Servicing

25 During the first two days after the landing all flame thrower maintenance was tended to by small sections set up in each forward battalion. This method was satisfactory on the battalion level but was most unsatisfactory when equipments were transferred from one battalion to another. This resulted in tools and other stores becoming lost in the field.

Subsequently each brigade established a Flame Warfare Section which was sited near the LAD within the perimeter of Bde HQ. This LAD maintained a recuperator truck. The section consisted of an NCO and three personnel who had qualified at the Div Flame Warfare School. The NCO was normally an instructor at the school and one operator was drawn from each battalion. The responsibilities of this section were:-

- (a) The supply of flame throwers, prepared for firing, to the units demanding them;
- (b) the recharging and refilling of flame throwers;
- (c) the maintenance of the equipment and associated stores;
- (d) liaison with the AAOC and AFME services to effect prompt servicing and supply of spare parts.

The method of deployment of flame throwers was for the battalions to request brigade to send forward the number required. Whenever the advance slowed down four flame throwers (two filled with thickened and two with thin fuels) were sent to each forward battalion and retained in the vicinity of Bn HQ. These were sent out to companies as required. When our own positions were mortared flame throwers were buried. These flame throwers were changed every forty-eight hours with freshly filled charged flame throwers.

Types of Targets

26 Flame throwers were used to good effect against the following targets:-

- (a) Concrete Pill boxes.
- (b) Earth covered log emplacements (Bunkers).
- (c) Weapon pits.
- (d) Trench systems
- (e) Tunnels (concrete and wooden)
- (f) Air Raid shelters.
- (g) Native Huts
- (h) Patches of dense growth (flushing snipers)
- (i) Attacking infantry.
- (j) Patrols (ambush).

Ranges

27 Thin fuel was used at a minimum of 5 yards maximum 15 yards range. Thick fuel was used at a minimum of 2 yards and maximum 40 yards. In all cases good results were obtained but, as a general rule, it is considered that thickened fuel is more effective than thin fuel for the following reasons:-

- (a) Maximum burning of solid ignited fuel deposit takes place in the target area;
- (b) Adhesive qualities which burn for ten minutes and ignite the boarding of tunnels, pillboxes, huts, etc;
- (c) Greater range therefore deeper penetration into tunnels which in most cases have narrow entrances;
- (d) Ability to get round corners owing to splashing of globules of the gel.

The thickened fuel prepared on 18 Jun 45 at Morotai gave excellent rods of flame and retained its consistency throughout. Some samples are still in gel form to this date.

Extracts from Unit Reports

28 On Fox Day 2/16 Aust Inf Bn fired eight shots in the MALANG - RECORD areas and 2/27 Aust Inf Bn six shots in the ROTTNES area. All were fired against bunkers.

In the capture of RECORD feature man-pack flame throwers were used by 2/16 Aust Inf Bn in conjunction with armour. Four shots against bunkers in this area were sufficient to dislodge 20/30 Japanese who, on vacating their strongposts, were killed by small arms fire.

Three enemy were found burnt by flame throwers in the MALANG area.

On Fox Day 2/18 Aust Inf Bn used a flame thrower against an enemy tunnel. An unignited jet was sprayed into the mouth of the tunnel and the fuel ignited by a No.77 WP hand grenade. Flame enveloped the tunnel whilst copious white smoke billowed from the entrance. Enemy firing suspected to have been coming from this tunnel ceased after this action. Weeks later when this tunnel was inspected the bodies of several Japanese were found burnt. On the same day a flame thrower was used against a tunnel on "POTTS". The entrance was smothered in flame for a period of 5 to 7 minutes which prevented any exit.

In the refinery area EAST of Pier No.6 three snipers were forced by overwhelming fire into a shelter consisting of thick logs and empty oil drums covered by six feet of earth. After four 36mm hand grenades had been hurled through the entrance the enemy was still alive. A flame thrower filled with thickened fuel was then used and the bunker collapsed in flame 15 minutes later.

During the jungle fighting at the CHAIR feature a flame thrower filled with thickened fuel was used by 2/25 Aust Inf Bn. A patrol approached an enemy defensive position consisting of a machine gun emplacement supported by riflemen in satellite weapon pits.

The patrol allowed the operator to crawl to within 20 yards of the position then by way of diversion opened up from a flank to induce the enemy to fire.

The Japanese commenced an attack but the operator flamed the entire position. Four Japanese were killed instantly by flame and eight others, six of whom were alight, ran screaming from the area.

A patrol of 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt carried a flame thrower 4000 yards through dense tropical growth and set an ambush across a Japanese trail. Subsequently a Japanese patrol of eight was ambushed. The flame thrower was used to excellent effect killing seven of the party.

The flame thrower was used in other areas to ensure that apparently deserted bunkers retained a live enemy.

Casualties

29 Only one operator became a casualty during the operation; a burst of machine gun fire cut through the leg of the operator's trousers igniting a spare ignition cylinder. However this did not interfere with the efficiency of the operator and he killed several Japanese by flame.

LESSONS LEARNED

30 The weight of the equipment imposes too much fatigue to be carried by the man for long distances; it is essential that man-pack flame throwers be transported on vehicles as far forward as is practicable. In this operation full use was made of tanks, amphibian tractors and jeeps which were moving to forward areas.

The difficulty of concealing the man-pack flame thrower makes protection of the operator necessary. No. 77 WP hand grenades were used to blanket enemy positions and screen the movement of the operator. In no instance was the operator without good fire support. On several occasions the use of flame was deferred owing to the nonavailability of phosphorus grenades.

Wherever possible it is preferable to use flamethrowing tanks, transporting the man-packs on gun tanks in the same column.

Movement of the tanks was restricted to the roads but the man-packs were successfully employed in positions to the flanks.

36m hand grenades were not always capable of clearing bunkers and tunnels. The flame thrower never failed to achieve this.

CONCLUSIONS

Maintenance

31 Difficulty was experienced in the efficient maintenance of the equipment. This was mainly due to shortages of spare parts; in particular rubber diaphragms for the fuel valve assembly and pressure regulators were scarce. As improvisation is not possible with this part of the equipment and as it is so readily subject to breakages, a plentiful supply is a prerequisite to the efficient functioning of manpack flame throwers.

Serviceability

- 32 If the equipment is properly maintained, it is sufficiently robust to withstand the rigors of operational use. Under the present "pool" system the most practical method of ensuring adequate maintenance is the establishment of a section of trained personnel sited at Brigade Headquarters near the recuperator truck. From this point flame throwers are issued as required. Whether they had been used or not, they were returned at the end of two days for servicing and checking.

Pressure

- 33 The air pressure tank on the flame thrower does not maintain the pressure as effectively as the spare air pressure tanks. For Amphibian Operations in addition to carrying the fuel on board ship the air pressure tank should be carried in the same way.

The flame thrower is then charged and filled on board ship on F - 1 Day.

Fuel

- 34 Provided care is taken to eliminate water, the thickened fuel will retain its consistency indefinitely.

Recommendations

- 35 It is recommended that the pool system for distribution of flame throwers be discontinued. The allotment should be on the basis of six flame throwers per cavalry commando regiment, infantry and pioneer battalion totalling 56. In addition, six spares should be carried by AAOC of the division. The total for a field division would be 72.

TACTICAL DOCTRINE

- 36 The 7 Aust Div devoted all Flame Warfare training in accordance with the following tactical doctrine:-

Conception

- 37 It is generally accepted that the flame thrower should be used as an offensive weapon against pillboxes or emplacements into which small arms fire cannot penetrate. Although primarily an offensive weapon it is also suitable for use in defence.

The tactical employment of the weapon is no different from that of any other infantry support weapon and there will seldom be an opportunity for its use other than in conjunction with infantry armed with Brens, SMGs or rifles. With infantry it can be employed in accordance with the normal principles of fire and movement.

CHARACTERISTICS

- 38 Any flame thrower has a high moral effect on the defenders, but has the disadvantage of a short range, necessitating operators approaching very close to the enemy position before engaging. Therefore methods must be adapted which will enable the operator to move within range of the target without disclosing his presence or our own intentions.

The flame thrower creates a terrific heat which radiates to the flanks of the flame. With thickened fuel the "heat zone" extends 10 yards and with diesel fuel 25 yards on both sides of the flame. It is not possible to employ flame while our troops are engaged forward of the operator and within the "heat zone".

The operator and infantry must act as a well trained team.

Organisation

39 It has been decided that flame throwers can best be used by personnel within rifle companies of infantry battalions as a supplementary weapon to be allotted as required for specific tasks. It is considered that each rifle platoon should be capable of manning up to three flame throwers.

It is desirable that 9 men be trained per platoon (owing to time available this Division trained only 3 per platoon) on the basis of 3 Nos.1 (operator), 3 Nos.2 (operator assistant) and 3 reserves.

Principle

40 As a result of previous operations, overseas reports and our own training the following principles are accepted:-

- (a) When allotted flame throwers the normal sub-unit tactical organisation will be maintained.
- (b) Flame throwers will be used within the rifle companies primarily as a supplementary weapon.
- (c) Adequate fire support and protection must be provided for the operators if the maximum effect of flame is to be realized, and the operator casualties minimised.
- (d) Flame should be used in mass Operators should never work independently.

METHODS OF USE

41 (a) Attack

- (i) It is desirable that flame throwers be used in twos and threes. The two types of fuel thickened and thin are used complementary to each other. The thickened fuel is used to engage the objective at longer range where accuracy is required, while the thin fuel is used to flush out the satellite weapon pits and mop up log emplacements.
- (ii) Each flame thrower requires two trained operators Nos 1 and 2. No.1 carries the flame thrower, one pistol and two phosphorus grenades (No.77). No.2 carries a SMG, two or three 36mm, three phosphorus grenades and possibly wire cutters if required. It is preferable to allot wire cutting to other personnel. This allows the No.2 to give full attention to his role of personal protection of No.1 and give assistance and relief if required.

(iii) The use of smoke is most important. It should be used in both following roles:-

- (A) To blanket the objectives and other posts likely to interfere with the flame effort;
- (B) To screen the movement of the operators.

This smoke is provided by 2 inch mortars No.63 grenade and the No.77 hand grenade. The No.81 grenade would be even better for screening than the No.77.

(iv) The fire of the platoon is directed onto the objective and supporting posts whilst the operators are moving into position. The moral effect caused by the flame is quickly exploited by the attack of our own troops. Provision should be made for attention to snipers.

(b) Defence

(i) Due to the limited range of the flame thrower this weapon will not generally be as effective as other infantry and artillery weapons in defence.

The most useful role of the flame thrower in defence is likely to be in support of the immediate counter-attack. To produce the best effect in this role the flame thrower should be kept under cover, and well clear of its objectives; routes and fire positions being reconnoitred before hand, and co-ordination with infantry or tank counter-attacks pre arranged. As the fire potential will be at its lowest, the surprise and morale effect of the flame thrower can be used to best advantage.

(ii) The flame thrower should be sited on the edge of the perimeter in defence. By day the filling should be thickened fuel and by night thin fuel should be used. The latter fuel is terrifying at night time.

(c) Ambush

Thickened fuel should be used. The operator should engage at 15-20 yards and traverse left and right of the target at full jet, thus flaming the foliage and presenting an impenetrable wall of flame.

To further conceal the flame thrower, a mesh net should be tied over the tank unit. Sprays of leaves, garnishings and grass should be used from the surrounding foliage to camouflage the tank unit. The gun unit thus appears like a normal S.M. This is a very effective means of camouflage.

(d) Tk A Weapon

The flame thrower can be used advantageously as a Tk A weapon. The thickened fuel is preferable and the rod should be directed into the louvres and exhausts of the tank.

(e) Village Fighting

Flame throwers have a special value in town and village fighting as they are able to launch incendiary particles into rooms and upper stories where normal infantry weapons are not as effective.

(f) Jungle and Close Quarter Fighting

The flame thrower will fulfill a definite requirement for dealing with targets such as pill boxes, bunkers, log palisades etc. These, although comparatively immune to infantry and their close support weapons, are vulnerable to flame which can be directed through weapon slits producing asphyxiating effects inside. The operator, protected by tropical foliage, may crawl unobserved to within a few yards of the target to achieve the maximum surprise and effect.

(g) Mobile Warfare

In mobile warfare the range of flame throwers limits their employment to comparatively short periods of close fighting which occur in the course of operations. It will therefore generally be uneconomical to include this weapon in the forward elements during movement.

APPENDIX 'P' to 7 Aust Div
Operational Report OBOE TWO

UNLOADING DETAILS
OPERATION OBOE TWO

| | DAILY UNLOADINGS | | | BUILD UP | | |
|--------|------------------|------|--------|----------|------|--------|
| | Pers | Vehs | Stores | Pers | Vehs | Stores |
| F | 9485 | 582 | 993 | 9485 | 582 | 993 |
| F - 1 | 7465 | 403 | 939 | 16950 | 985 | 1932 |
| F - 2 | 1510 | 648 | 1426 | 18460 | 1633 | 3358 |
| F - 3 | 2400 | 270 | 1592 | 20860 | 1903 | 4950 |
| F - 4 | 1454 | 540 | 1078 | 22314 | 2443 | 6028 |
| F - 5 | 402 | 134 | 161 | 22716 | 2577 | 6189 |
| F - 6 | 3164 | 150 | 884 | 25880 | 2727 | 7073 |
| F - 7 | 123 | 25 | 849 | 26003 | 2752 | 7922 |
| F - 8 | 600 | 299 | 1390 | 26603 | 3051 | 9312 |
| F - 9 | - | - | 695 | 26603 | 3051 | 10007 |
| F - 10 | - | - | 1587 | 26603 | 3051 | 11594 |
| F - 11 | 187 | 140 | 1421 | 26790 | 3191 | 13015 |
| F - 12 | - | 12 | 1578 | 26790 | 3203 | 14593 |
| F - 13 | 1780 | 539 | 1798 | 28570 | 3742 | 15391 |
| F - 14 | 3086 | 740 | 4210 | 31656 | 4482 | 20601 |
| F - 15 | - | - | 2040 | 31656 | 4482 | 22641 |
| F - 16 | 3400 | 740 | 1973 | 35056 | 5222 | 24614 |
| F - 17 | 631 | 235 | 1440 | 35687 | 5457 | 26054 |
| F - 18 | 12 | 11 | 2168 | 35699 | 5468 | 28222 |
| F - 19 | 402 | 90 | 2204 | 36101 | 5558 | 30426 |
| F - 20 | 190 | 4 | 1701 | 36291 | 5562 | 32127 |